

JPRS 71160

23 May 1978

U S S R

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, 1978

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet journal articles displaying a copyright notice and included in this report are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Further reproduction of these copyrighted journal articles is prohibited without permission from the copyright agency of the Soviet Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS 71160	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST, No. 1, 1978		5. Report Date 23 May 1978		6.
7. Author(s)		8. Performing Organization Rept. No.		
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.		
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above		11. Contract/Grant No.		
13. Type of Report & Period Covered		14.		
15. Supplementary Notes Translation of the quarterly PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, published by the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow				
16. Abstracts The report contains articles by Soviet specialists on the Far East and is devoted to the presentation of USSR foreign policy in that area.				
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors USSR Far East Behavioral and social sciences Political science Law Economics Sociology				
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms				
17c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22151		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 127	
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price	

23 May 1978

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, 1978

Translations of the Russian-language sociopolitical journal
PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTORA published quarterly in Moscow by
 the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS	PAGE
Constitution of Peace and Construction.....	1
Maoism's Self-Exposure (On the Political Campaign for 'Criticism of the Four' in China) (G. S. Nikolayev).....	3
Policy of Provocation and War (F. I. Divov).....	25
Vietnamese People's Progression Toward National and Social Liberation (Nguyen Khanh Toan).....	44
Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society Turns Twenty (O. B. Rakhmanin).....	46
More Evidence of the Antisocialist Essence of Maoism (Ye. A. Konovalov, V. F. Feoktistov, A. G. Yakovlev).....	48
Three Decades of Indo-Soviet Cooperation (Devendra Kaushik).....	66
Important Stage in Development of Soviet-Japanese Trade (V. B. Spandar'yan).....	68
Struggle of Japanese Working Class Against Monopoly Domination (V. N. Khlynov).....	84

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
How the Coastal Islands of Southeast Asia Were Settled (K. Ye. Cherevko).....	86
Otto Braun--Communist-Internationalist.....	87
Hero of the Chinese Revolution (Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Birth of P'eng Te-huai) (A. S. Titov).....	89
Inquiry Into Liu Hsieh's Aesthetic Views (V. A. Krivtsov).....	91
Pages Attesting to a Friendship of Long Standing (The Vietnam Theme in 19th Century Russian Literature) (N. I. Nikulin).....	92
Criticism of Theories of Japanese Bourgeois Economists (V. N. Kashin).....	93
History of China and Exposure of Its Falsifiers (M. S. Kapitsa).....	95
Problems of State-Monopoly Capitalism in Japan (X. M. Popov).....	104
Course Contrary to Public Interest (M. S. Ukraintsev).....	106
New Platform of Japanese Social-Reformism (I. A. Tsvetova).....	112
Machinery of Political Authority in Imperial China (L. S. Perelomov).....	114
Remarkable Page in the History of the Cis-Amur Zone (E. F. Drozdov).....	115
Youth in the Struggle for Social Progress, Peace and Security (Yu. M. Ryakin).....	116
Meeting Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Canton Commune (B. K. Chizhov).....	118
From Positions of Internationalism.....	119

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
In Memory of Yuriy Vladimirovich Novgorodskiy (1928-1977).....	120
In Memory of Ivan Fedorovich Kurdyukov (1911-1977).....	122
New Books*.....	123

* Not translated by JPRS

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST
No 1, 1978

Russian title : PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : M. I. Sladkovskiy

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Progress

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : 1978

Signed to press : 14 February 1978

Copies : 17,313

COPYRIGHT : "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka", 1978

CONSTITUTION OF PEACE AND CONSTRUCTION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 3-13

Summary The year of 1977 will go down in history as the year of the glorious anniversary of Great October and the year of the adoption of the new Constitution of the Soviet State. This outstanding political and theoretical document, which was written by the minds and hearts of the Soviet people, demonstrates the Soviet Union's remarkable success in the construction of a developed socialist society and defines our nation's highest goal--the construction of communism.

The new Soviet Constitution signals a new period in the history of our society and state--a period of mature socialism. By adopting a constitution of developed socialism, the Soviet people have ushered in a new and glorious era in the history of civilization. Developed socialism is the highest achievement of contemporary social progress. For the first time in the history of mankind, socialism guarantees a harmonious combination of the rights and obligations of members of society.

During the 40 years since the adoption of our previous constitution, profound and fundamental changes have taken place in our country and have affected all aspects of life in the Soviet society. The new Constitution of the USSR reflects all of these democratic and humanitarian changes and enriches them by instilling them with new meaning. The socialist nature of the rights and freedoms of the Soviet citizens consists primarily in the fact that these are the rights and freedoms of working people who control their government.

The adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR has been observed with great interest in nations which have recently liberated themselves from colonial oppression and are now making plans for their future course of development. This document will be of great assistance to the states that have chosen the course of socialist development. The constitution has also received a great deal of attention in the bourgeois world. It has forced the people of this world to acknowledge that socialist democracy has been developed even further, the rights of Soviet citizens and public organizations have been broadened and their influence on state policy has grown. The progressive world public is greatly pleased by the special section in the

new Constitution of the USSR which expands the peace-loving foreign policy of this nation. This section serves as legislative reinforcement of the general aims of socialist foreign policy--peace and friendship between peoples and cooperation and peaceful coexistence between states.

It is completely obvious to any sensible politician that attempts to return to the doctrines of the cold war are destined to fail. Detente and peaceful coexistence are now the only possible basis for relations between the different social systems. Despite the protests of the world public, the White House is preparing for the production of cruise missiles and a neutron bomb. Washington's actions, which have alarmed and enraged mankind, have nothing in common with the humanitarian goals of the Soviet Union. The Peking leaders are allying themselves with Japan and the NATO countries for a battle against the socialist community. This interaction between the Peking leaders and the imperialist forces represents a great danger for our people, the continent of Asia and the entire world.

The Soviet Union bases its relations with other countries on respect for their sovereignty, nonintervention in their domestic affairs and the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation. This policy is in the interest of all peoples and all states.

8588
CSO: 1805

MAOISM'S SELF-EXPOSURE (ON THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FOR 'CRITICISM OF THE FOUR' IN CHINA)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 14-31

[Article by G. S. Nikolayev]

[Text] In his speech on the 60th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, L. I. Brezhnev presented a precise Marxist-Leninist evaluation of the ruinous effects of Maoist policy in China: "We are all well aware of the severe consequences China has suffered as a result of attempts to ignore the economic laws of socialism, to withdraw from friendship and solidarity with the socialist countries and to form an alliance with reactionary forces in the world arena. The socialist conquests of the Chinese people have been subjected to great danger."¹ Even in the past, when communist and workers parties throughout the world and many Chinese communists stated their attitudes toward events in China, they repeatedly pointed out the dangers of the Maoist domestic and foreign policy course of great-power chauvinism, anti-Sovietism, voluntarism, "revolutionary" phraseology and extremists actions threatening to divert China from the socialist course of development. The events of October 1976 in the PRC and many public statements by the Chinese leaders and the press serve as graphic evidence of the accuracy of these conclusions.

The 11th CCP Congress of August 1977 pronounced the inglorious end of the 11-year "Cultural Revolution" in China and, along with it, its founders, represented by the "gang of four"--Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan. The attempts made at the congress to somehow whitewash Mao Tse-tung and his "thought," to justify the "Cultural Revolution" and to prove that it was lawful and even that it will be necessary to repeat this kind of "revolution" in the future appeared unconvincing since they were totally inconsistent with the Chinese leaders' many acknowledgments of the harm inflicted on the nation during this darkest period in the PRC's history.

The many years during which the Maoist course was implemented in the areas of domestic and foreign policy were a time of painful ordeals for the Chinese people and inflicted irretrievable losses on them. Now this is even acknowledged in China, although in a quite distinctive manner.

Even the far from complete and not always objective information that has filtered through the pages of the Chinese press since the fall of 1976 paints a fairly dark picture of the conditions in which the Chinese people have lived and worked for the last 10 years--that is, for the period of the "Cultural Revolution."

Commenting on Mao's notorious pronouncement that "total disorder on earth leads to universal order," Hua Kuo-feng explained in his speech at the All-China Conference on the Dissemination of the Tachai Experience on 25 December 1976: "The disorder to which Chairman Mao Tse-tung was referring was disorder which disorganizes the enemy." What enemy could this be, however, in view of the fact that the "Cultural Revolution"--this brain-child of Mao Tse-tung, nurtured and nursed by the "great leader" and his closest associates, including the now criticized Lin Piao, Ch'en Po-ta and the "gang of four"--brought with it, as those in China now admitted, the destruction of the nation's party and governmental system established by the people, the suffering and deprivation of the Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia, the disorganization of production, the senseless squandering of the nation's material and financial resources and cultural treasures, and the erosion and distortion of the glorious ideals of socialism and communism?

Mao Tse-tung himself later stated a quite critical opinion of the "Cultural Revolution": "The ratio of success to error in the Great Cultural Revolution is 7:3--that is, 70 percent success and 30 percent error."² But even this estimate of its "success" is obviously too high since it does not agree with actual events. The Chinese leaders have now had to calculate the more serious errors committed by Mao and his associates and to institute measures which will take at least 3 years to put an end to the "great disorder" in public life and the national economy.

In an interview with the general director of AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE in October 1977, Teng Hsiao-p'ing acknowledged that the "four" had been engaging in sabotage for 11-12 years but that the after-effects of this would be felt for the next 20-30 years. Teng said: "We are very far behind in many areas, especially in science and technology. This has become particularly apparent during the last 10 years." Teng Hsiao-p'ing laid all of the blame for this, as is now accepted in Peking, on the "gang of four"--Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan.

There is no question that the "gang of four" has much to answer for to the Chinese people for the socioeconomic harm it inflicted on the nation. It was with good reason that the "four" were accused after their overthrow of having "brazenly reshaped Marxism-Leninism to suit their own purposes," "employed methods of cruel struggle and merciless attacks against a large group of party, state and army officials on the central and local levels," "provoked conflicts with the use of force and civil war," "introduced schism into the ranks of the working class" and "inflicted immeasurably sorrow and

suffering on the general public." They were also accused of "driving a wedge between different nationalities," "caring nothing about the needs of the people and the vital interests of the masses and, moreover, being brutal and mocking the workers, the poor peasants and peasants slightly above the poverty level, the revolutionary intelligentsia and other strata of the general public." In describing the "gang of four," JEN-MIN JIH-PAO stated on 28 November 1976 that they were "the mortal enemies of the communist party, the working class, all the country's people and the Chinese nation." The Chinese people themselves can best judge the accuracy of this definition. Something else is important here: All of these accusations eloquently attest to the arbitrary rule which has reigned in China for the past 10 years and passed sentence on Macism and the entire military-bureaucratic regime that gave birth to the "gang of four" and all others like them.

"The worst thing of all the criminal counterrevolutionary activity of this anti-party group," a JEN-MIN JIH-PAO editorial stated on 22 December 1976, consisted "in attempts to usurp supreme power in the party and state and to establish the authority of this gang--a fascist dictatorship." According to the Chinese leaders themselves, the situation in China during Mao Tse-tung's last years was so grave that "the fate of our party and our state hung by a hair."

In his speech at the conference on Tachai, Hua Kuo-feng spoke of the "great chaos in the public mind and in politics" and the "enormous damage to the economy" caused by the "four," who were actually those closest to Mao, as a result of which "dark clouds gathered over China" and it was "threatened by a very real danger." "A situation this grave," Hua Kuo-feng stated, "has never arisen since the declaration of our republic and, in fact, has rarely been encountered since the founding of our party"--that is, since 1921.

By condemning the "gang of four," Chinese propaganda has unwittingly shed light on the darkest sides of the "Cultural Revolution," the organizers of which "encouraged and supported beatings, persecution and robbery," "provoked conflicts with the use of force, disrupting the national economy and inflicting serious damages on some regions," "fostered bourgeois cliquishness, bred strife, reduced the party leadership to ruins, disunited the ranks of the working class," "introduced chaos into the administration of enterprises" and "subverted the fulfillment of the national economic plan."³

In the area of ethnic policy, the "gang of four" took advantage of their almost unlimited power in the nation to "cultivate national estrangement" and "smother national culture and art," "radically changed the premises of Marxism-Leninism regarding nationalities and emasculated the ethnic question of its class essence" and "became the sworn enemies of the multinational Chinese population." First Secretary Sayfuddin of the Party Committee of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and candidate for membership in the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee noted that, in the past, this

region "had suffered serious losses in the political and economic sense."⁴ The same was true of other autonomous regions in China as well.

Much is now known in China about the political characteristics and methods of the "gang of four." According to the Chinese press, the CCP Central Committee spent more than 6 months on a "painstaking and serious check of the political past of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen and ascertained, on the basis of a vast amount of irrefutable proof, that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was a special agent of the Kuomintang, Chiang Ch'ing was a traitor, Yao Wen-yuan was a class-hostile element and Wang Hung-wen was a converted-bourgeois element." Besides this, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Chiang Ch'ing were "two-time counterrevolutionaries"--in the past and the present.

The conclusions of the CCP Central Committee, however, say nothing about the fact that it was precisely on these "main criminals" that Mao Tse-tung relied when he was unleashing the "Cultural Revolution." For their part, the "four," as has been established, "surrounded themselves with a mob of new and old counterrevolutionaries, people who specialized in riots, raids and robbery, embezzlers and plunderers, so-called old cadres who had sold themselves out to the four, vile and mercenary hacks, opportunistic informers and experts in denunciation, as well as hooligans, various dregs of society and other vermin." All of these elements were extolled by the four as "progressive people" going "against the current" and as "rebels" ready to "butt and fight."⁵ For the sake of accuracy, it must be said that the "rebels" ("chiao-fan") and "Red Guards" ("hung-wei-ping") included many deluded and politically immature young workers and students who were attracted by the pseudo-revolutionary slogans of Mao and the "four."

The so-called "progressive" and "rebels" who ascended on the wave of the "Cultural Revolution," as the CCP Central Committee testifies, "were rapidly made members of the party" and "were promoted to administrative posts." But this was not all. The "gang of four" had jurisdiction over the "means of influencing public opinion, the information system and the support bases and strongpoints of espionage. Their black hands thrust themselves into several central agencies and the institutions of a number of provinces and cities. They also created the "second armed forces" (this is in reference to the so-called "people's militia," which performed punitive and military-control functions in its dealings with the workers and peasants).

"In the history of our party," the CCP Central Committee summarized, "there are few who can compare with them in terms of the huge area over which they spread their venom, in terms of the magnitude of the harm they inflicted and in terms of the depth of their influence."⁶ By rights, this accusation should have been made primarily against Mao Tse-tung and his closest followers, who were not limited to the "four."

The Chinese press has gone into all of the details of the methods employed during the period of the "Cultural Revolution" by those who engineered and inspired it. In particular, it has noted that "they secretly organized people who were commanded to disguise themselves as Red Guards and search the homes of those who knew everything there was to know about them, and even secretly arrested these people on absolutely unfounded charges, imprisoned them for long periods of time, cruelly tortured them, or even murdered them so that all witnesses would be put out of the way forever."⁷

On 16 October 1977, CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO listed such methods previously practiced in China as "the falsification of facts, idle talk, familiarity, absolutization, indirect attacks, monotony, disregard for the people's wishes and the assumption of the right to speak for the people, vanity and greed, when errors become a tradition."⁸

Acting on behalf of Mao Tse-tung and with his blessing, the "four," as the Chinese press has testified, "used the organizations and strong points they controlled to set up courts, open prisons, torment the innocent, extort false confessions and play with human lives, committing every kind of evil fascist deed." It was this gang that "cooked up the absolutely absurd reactionary formula that old cadres are equal to democrats, democrats are equal to defeatists, and defeatists are equal to counterrevolutionaries," according to the logic of which "a large group of party, state and army officials should be overthrown." This gold-mine of Mao Tse-tung's followers included "careerists, power-seekers, speculators and expert maulers, persecutors, robbers, embezzlers and disturbers of the peace."

The pernicious effects of the Maoist "four" were particularly strong in the area of propaganda: "Taking control over the entire propaganda system, they made use of the press, news agencies, radio, television, movies, the theater and other means of influencing public opinion, arbitrarily divested Marxism-Leninism of its meaning...and revised the party line, course and political aims." Therefore, it is now being said that central and local propaganda agencies, which were supposed to be under party control, were in the hands of a small group of people having nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism for a long time.

According to the Chinese press, "they used the propaganda agencies they controlled to distort facts, represent lies as the truth, invent rumors and deceive the masses." The "steel club plant" and the "label factory" flourished under their control. "They played a role which was not within the capability of open class enemies...and conducted a policy to the detriment of the nation and the people, a policy leading to the death of the party and state."⁹

According to JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, Chinese literature and propaganda of this period were characterized by "long and stinking narratives, unparalleled verbiage," "the piling up of Marxist phrases," "hasty conclusions," "the

use of misleading circumlocution and hints," "lies and falsehoods to deceive the masses," "the invention of facts," "monotony and redundancy," etc.¹⁰

"Completely ignoring the party Central Committee," the Chinese press noted, "the sectarian 'four' willfully organized so-called authors' groups at Peking University, the Ch'ing-hua Polytechnical Institute and the Shanghai City Committee," which "published newspaper and magazine articles written on subjects chosen by the 'four' and dictated by them to influence public opinion for counterrevolutionary purposes." According to Chinese estimates, 168 "anti-party articles" were printed in the press by proteges of the "four" in the last 3 years.

The Peking press has noted that a number of such articles were printed in HUNG'CH'I after the Tenth CCP Congress "at the bidding of Yao Wen-yuan"; these articles were written by the "Liang Hsiao," "Lo Ssu-ting," "Ch'en Yue," "Ch'ih Heng," "Fang Kang" and "Ch'u Lan" authors' groups and a number of others. Incidentally, the authors of these "antiparty articles" made many spiteful attacks on the Soviet Union and slandered it. Considering the fact that Chinese propaganda was under the control of Yao Wen-yuan at that time, we must agree with the accurate description of him printed in HUNG-CH'I: "Because of his baseness, Yao Wen-yuan truly resembles a political hooligan of the Goebbel's type."

In an article by Hua Kuo-feng, published on 1 May 1976, the accusations made against the "gang of four" included their "provocation of 'general civil war' and criminal activity for the purpose of undermining the great proletarian cultural revolution and shattering the dictatorship of the proletariat."¹¹ After all, however, it was no one else but Mao Tse-tung who first advanced the slogan "Revolt is a just cause" and "Fire on headquarters" in accordance with which the hung wei-ping and chiao-fan led by the "gang of four" devastated party and state institutions. In turn, it was precisely the actions of the hung wei-ping, encouraged by Mao and the "four," that brought the nation truly to the brink of "civil war." All of the political campaigns in China, many of which led to "civil war"--that is, to provoked conflicts, sometimes armed, between the working population and repressive agencies, whether army units, public security authorities, armed militia units or hung wei-ping acting as the "tool of the proletarian dictatorship"--were organized by Mao and his associates and, consequently, it is they who are chiefly responsible for the tragic consequences of these campaigns.

The "Cultural Revolution" inflicted considerable losses on the Chinese economy. The systems of material and technical supply operations and economic ties were disrupted, much of the equipment stood idle and entire enterprises were inactive. Labor discipline declined everywhere and sabotage became more commonplace in production. There was a sharp drop in rates of industrial development, and railway transport operations were disrupted.

During the period of the "Cultural Revolution," long-range national economic planning was abandoned, the administrative system of the Chinese economy was undermined and disorganized, there were tremendous losses of working time and huge amounts of material and monetary resources were unproductively squandered in the administrative system, in transportation, in the municipal economy and in industry (entire ministries and departments ceased to perform some of their functions, plants, factories and separate shops of the largest production facilities stood idle for months, work in the municipal economy was paralyzed, etc.).

The nation's agriculture was in a difficult position. According to the Chinese press, there was a slump or even cuts in the production of some goods in agriculture and related trades, the per capita grain yield decreased and the preliminary outlines of plans for the mechanization of agriculture were not realized.

Speakers at the 11th CCP Congress essentially admitted that "a great deal of valuable time had been lost" in the economic sphere in China during the years of the "Cultural Revolution" and the situation in the production sphere was one of "standstill or even recession." The situation was also grave in the areas of science, culture and education.

At the Fourth Session of the Permanent Committee of the National People's Congress in October 1977, Yu Ch'iu-li, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and vice premier of the PRC State Council, described the state of the national economy in the past—that is, during the period of the "Cultural Revolution"—and admitted that it was in "a half-planned and half-anarchic state" and that agriculture, industry and transportation had suffered the most. In particular, Szechwan Province, which had been a large producer of grain, became a province to which grain had to be shipped.

In 1976, according to Yu Ch'iu-li, "serious damages" were inflicted on the national economy, industry and agriculture were at a standstill, the output of some types of industrial commodities decreased, and bribery, embezzlement and speculation thrived in some regions and organizations, which undermined socialist ownership. State financial plans remained unfulfilled several years in a row.

Deliveries of steel and nonferrous metals from enterprises of China's metallurgical industry, for example, were substantially undercut during the period from 1974 through 1976 and there was a constant decline in production rates, which seriously impeded national economic development.¹²

The "mass criticism group" of the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry reported in JEN-MIN JIH-PAO that "huge losses of productive activity at some enterprises" resulted from the campaign for "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" in 1974. According to the HSIN-HUA AGENCY, "production slowed down and even stopped completely at one time" in the last few years

at one of China's leading ferrous metallurgy enterprises--the Wuhan Metallurgical Combine. It was only in November 1977, according to reports in the Chinese press, that the prolonged period of nonfulfillment of the state plan at the Wuhan and T'aiyuan metallurgical combines came to an end.¹³

Speakers at the all-China conference convened by the PRC State Council in February 1977 to discuss the work of the railroads noted that "railway transport has become an extremely weak link in the Chinese national economy" in recent years.

The situation was no better in agriculture, where there was noticeable stagnation and apathy. Despite the significant increase in the Chinese population, the agricultural product has not grown and this has resulted in a decrease in per capita food supplies. The Peking press has complained that the peasants have not been working diligently enough in recent years and have used the political atmosphere as a pretext for avoiding intensive labor. All of the talk about the mechanization of agriculture has not been reinforced by actual deeds.

As a result of the "Cultural Revolution," the nation suffered irretrievable losses in the work of training specialists. The higher academic institutions were virtually inactive from 1966 through 1971, and their work during the 1971-1975 period was extremely conditional, since all entrance and academic examinations were canceled, the course of study was reduced to 3 years and cuts were made in curricula and lecture classes. No students were admitted to higher academic institutions in 1976. According to statistics, the HSIN-HUA AGENCY noted, 1,000-3,000 students were admitted each year to post-graduate studies in the nation prior to the "Cultural Revolution." "During the last few years, however...work in this field has suffered greatly."

An article published in KUANG-MING JIH-PAO in September 1977 under the by-line of a theoretical group representing the Ministry of Education stated that "the cause of socialist cultural education had been seriously harmed and the ranks of the intelligentsia do not satisfy the needs of the cause of socialism either in quantity or in quality." Now Peking has had to acknowledge the inadequacy of Maoist theory and practice in the field of education and to return to the system which existed during the first years after the declaration of the PRC.

The activity of the Maoist group also had a harmful effect on the development of science in the PRC. During the period of the "Cultural Revolution," the scientific and technical intelligentsia was subjected to less repression and persecution than other strata of the intelligentsia or party and state workers. As the Chinese press testifies, however, the inspirers and organizers of the "Cultural Revolution," represented by the "gang of four" and others like them, contemptuously looked upon the Chinese intelligentsia as a whole as the "despised ninth category" of people ("ch'ou lao-chiu") and encroached upon the rights of the scientific and technical intelligentsia as well. The atmosphere in the scientific community at that time is

graphically attested to by admissions made in the Chinese press. "These scoundrels," someone commented during a discussion conducted in March 1977 in the PRC Academy of Sciences, "confused scientific matters with politics and arbitrarily labeled those who did not agree with their views on scientific and technical matters 'opponents of the great proletarian cultural revolution,' 'opponents of socialist innovation' and so forth." Scientific and technical workers indignantly said that, in the past or, in other words, during the years of the "Cultural Revolution," "their style of learning was discredited, the scientific atmosphere was stifled and some young people and scientific and technical workers were destroyed."

A notice published on 23 August 1977 in regard to the CCP Central Committee's decision to convene an all-China conference of scientific workers in Peking in the spring of 1978 noted that science and technology in China "have suffered great losses and are far below the world level." The "gang of four," protected by Mao Tse-tung, "denied that science promotes the development of production, made equipment unsuitable for scientific experiments, closed scientific research institutions, persecuted the intelligentsia and stifled scientific thought."¹⁴

The most important recent event in China was the 11th CCP Congress in August 1977. The congress, however, did not draw the necessary conclusions from the lessons taught by the "Cultural Revolution" and Mao Tse-tung's entire depraved policy. The chief aims of domestic policy remained the same--the continued inculcation of Maoism, the consolidation of the existing military-bureaucratic regime, the militarization of the country and the preparation of a socioeconomic basis for the realization of the Peking leadership's great-power plans. As for some of the general slogans and premises that appealed to the population (concerning the development of "democracy," "concern for the life of the masses," the reorganization of the educational system, the important role of the intelligentsia, etc.), they still have not transcended the framework of the Maoist course and cannot change its essence.

The internal political struggle was again given primary emphasis. "The central objective for the entire year of 1977," the New Year's article of three editorial staffs said, "consists in the thorough exposure and condemnation of the sectarian 'four.'" HUNG-CH'I magazine, unembarrassed by its absence of logic, stated in the same article that "the 'four' and their hard-headed accomplices constitute only an extremely meager handful," and simultaneously tried to prove the necessity for "mobilizing the masses and organizing a people's war on a broad front" against this "handful." It stated that "its pernicious influence is quite extensive and deep" and that it "had spread the venom of revisionism everywhere and had introduced great confusion into the public mind in all areas--in the superstructure and the economic basis, in revolution and construction, in theory and practice, on the central and local levels."¹⁵ The political campaign for "criticism of the four," which was accompanied by arrests, executions, repressions and general purges, seized the entire nation. The following

fact alone testifies to its scale. On 15 February 1977, the HSIN-HUA AGENCY reported that more than 50,000 "criticism" meetings, participated in by 20 million people, were organized in the city of Peking in just a few months by party organizations on different levels.

Since October 1976, an extensive purge has been going on in all party and administrative organs of the PRC on the central and local levels. This has been accompanied by the "criticism" and dismissal of cadres, not only those connected with the "four" but also those who have committed other "serious errors." Two months after the 11th Congress, according to the Peking leaders, this work was still not being conducted satisfactorily enough, in connection with which Peking again issued orders that it be renewed on a firmer basis and that the "third stage of the struggle" commence. At the end of October 1977, JEN-MIN JIH-PAO printed an article entitled "The Verification Work Must Be Completed." Recalling the demands of the CCP Central Committee for "all-out verification" (this is the name given to cadre purges in China), the CCP Central Committee's newspaper called for sterner treatment of all those who are dissatisfied with Peking's present policy, proposing that they be "shattered with feelings of the same profound hatred we once felt for the Japanese aggressors, Chiang Kai-shek's followers and the landowners' punitive brigades," without a trace of "excess mercy and softness, or, in general, corrupt liberalism."¹⁶

During the years of the "Cultural Revolution," the Chinese Communist Party was severely littered and unjustifiably inflated. In reference to difficulties in the construction of the CCP, JEN-MIN JIH-PAO noted in March 1977 that China "is a huge petty bourgeois nation and our party is surrounded by the petty bourgeoisie, from which group many party members have come. These specific social conditions made it particularly difficult for our party to combat the demoralizing influence of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology and made it necessary to indoctrinate and reindoctrinate party members." It would seem that the Chinese leaders have arrived at the correct conclusions for correcting the situation. Even here, however, this criticism only represents their favorite method of demagogic, with the aid of which public dissatisfaction is suppressed. When they categorize those who have been infected by petty bourgeois ideology, they include not only the supporters of the "four," but also all of those who do not agree with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung," those who express the slightest doubts about his absolute infallibility or, in particular, those who criticize his ideas. It is precisely these people who are the first to be subjected to "purges," ostracism and severe punishments.

A scholastic argument is being conducted in Chinese propaganda with the "four" over the degree to which the Chinese Communist Party has been infected by petty bourgeois ideology and over the proper interpretation of Mao Tse-tung's 1976 statement that the bourgeoisie in China is "right inside the communist party itself." The fundamental difference in the approaches taken to this matter by the arguing sides consists in the following: The "four" have stated that "a bourgeois class exists within the party," but

Chinese propaganda is now trying to prove that "representatives or groups of the bourgeoisie can be found and are inevitably found within a proletarian party but the presence of the entire bourgeois class is in no way possible." It is indicative, however, that neither has denied the existence of the disease itself within the CCP--the party's infection with petty bourgeois ideology. They are only arguing over the degree of infection. Besides this, the two sides are accusing one another of being the major nidus and carrier of this disease. In the given case, it can only be ascertained that such shortcomings within the party as the presence of the petty bourgeois ideology, great-Han chauvinism and subjectivism, the danger of which was pointed out as early as the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956, are not only still existent but have actually evolved into new, even more serious forms.

The bad situation in the CCP in the 1970's is best attested to by frank statements made by the former chairman of the party himself. As the Chinese press reported, Mao Tse-tung inserted the following resolution into a report on 23 April 1975: "We have few people in the party with a genuine knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. Some consider themselves to be authorities on Marxism-Leninism but actually know little about it. They represent themselves as bearers of the truth and quite often heap abuse on people. This is also one of the signs that they know nothing about Marxism-Leninism."¹⁷

Chinese propaganda is also arguing over the chief danger for the CCP and China at the present time--empiricism or revisionism. As we know, a departure from the theory of scientific communism and the revision of this doctrine took place in China long ago. The struggle against empiricism and revisionism, however, is only a screen. In fact, the Chinese leaders are not at all concerned about this; they are worried about the possible rejection of Maoism in the nation and the possible revision of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung." Under the guise of a struggle against empiricists and revisionists, the Chinese leaders are--borrowing from their own terminology--"using the red banner as a cover to oppose the red banner" of Marxism-Leninism and attempting to replace it with the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.

As we know, 1976 was proclaimed the first year of the Fifth Five-Year Plan in the PRC, but no data have been published to date on the fulfillment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan or on the plans for the Fifth, which apparently had still not been drawn up even in 1977. Although the planned proportional development of the Chinese economy, which was interrupted by the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958 and then by the "Cultural Revolution," is far from restored, and although "general order" in the national economy will, as the PRC leaders acknowledge, only come in 1980, a new "leap" has already been placed on the agenda. At the same time, the 11th Congress did not work out a concrete socioeconomic program for future development in the nation, envisaging the consistent development of all branches of the national economy and a rise in the material and cultural welfare of the Chinese people. As a result, China's most important problems are still not solved; these are primarily connected with the establishment of a modern material and technical base, with general improvement in the material status of the

workers, with the provision of the constantly growing population with food and industrial goods, with the efficient distribution and utilization of manpower and so forth.

By subordinating China's internal development to their foreign policy program, the Chinese leaders are continuing to stress the militarization of the entire national economy in their economic policy. Economic life in the PRC is being placed at the service of the objective of greater military potential, and this is undermining expanded reproduction. Militarization of the economy is inextricably connected with a disregard for the vital interests of the workers and the replacement of scientifically substantiated economic forms and methods of management with military administrative methods of extra-economic coercion that are inconsistent with objective socioeconomic laws and tendencies.

Failures in the PRC national economy have faced the Chinese leadership with an urgent need for emergency measures in economic policy. The Peking leaders, however, are still displaying no desire for any actual and resolute departure from Maoist economic policy. On the contrary, they corroborate the efficacy of Mao Tse-tung's instructions. They are placing major emphasis on such postulates as "Seize upon class struggle as the decisive link," "Policy is the commanding force" and so forth. This was reaffirmed by the objectives set by Hua Kuo-feng in 1977, the central one being the struggle against the "four," while questions of national economic development, not to mention concern for the welfare of the workers, were given least emphasis.

The second All-China Conference on the Dissemination of the Tachai Experience, held in Peking in December 1976, focused attention on political matters rather than on the need for plans for the development of agriculture. This was also true of the All-China Conference on the Dissemination of the Tach'ing Experience in Industry, held from 28 April to 13 May 1977. Political issues also prevailed at many other all-China conferences on the situation in individual branches of the national economy.

By blaming the "four" for the tremendous losses caused by enterprise inactivity and local disturbances and conflicts, the Chinese leaders are simultaneously attempting to conceal the fact that the present disturbing state of the national economy is primarily a result of the implementation of Mao Tse-tung's instructions.

The Chinese leaders "regard the last decade as lost time"¹⁸ and are underscoring the need to "make up for this lost time." As a means to this end, however, they have been unable to find anything better than continued reliance on past Maoist methods, which are based on the overstraining of human resources and the misuse of the labor enthusiasm of the masses. Appeals for the "most rapid possible compensation for the time lost through the fault of the 'four'" are used for the purpose of heightening the intensification of labor. The press has done everything possible to encourage unlimited and unpaid overtime work, when "most of the workers come to their jobs early

and leave late, each one doing the work of two."¹⁹ The appeals for more widespread "socialist labor competition" and "shock-work" have been made for the same purpose. At the Tach'ing Oil Field, which serves as a model for other enterprises, "each does the work of several, sometimes even for several days without a break." Therefore, the Chinese people are being forced to pay for Mao Tse-tung's voluntarism with their labor.

On the whole, however, the situation in Chinese industry can probably be judged by the following examples. At the Loyang Tractor Plant in 1976, production was cut, according to its administrators, by 1975. Whereas in 1975 it produced 22,000 tractors, the 1976 output was less than a quarter of this quantity. In 1977, the goal of reestablishing the 1975 level was set. How can there be any talk of a "leap forward" in this case?

The present leaders adhere to the old Maoist view on the problem of modernizing agriculture and see its resolution in the mechanization of farming without extensive state assistance and in the reliance of districts, communes and production brigades "on their own strength." According to the Chinese leaders' instructions, "all regions must make full use of local resources and thoroughly develop small industrial enterprises" (Ch'en Yung-kuei's report at the conference on Tachai on 20 December 1976).

The material conditions of the Chinese workers are still extremely difficult. There is still a rigid rationing system in the nation for the major food products and industrial goods. The insignificant rise in the wages of some low-income categories of workers, announced on 1 October 1977, has not made any essential change in these conditions; the wages of workers are still too low.

Calling for the attainment of the "strategic objective" of "general order" in the nation, the Chinese leaders are forcing their people to attain this objective by means of the previous methods which were discredited long ago: in the area of ideology--the continuation of political campaigns under the guise of "class struggle," the "embarkation upon a great political revolution" on the model of the notorious "Cultural Revolution" and the continued brainwashing of the population in the Maoist spirit; on the organizational level--another cadre purge and the suppression and elimination of all those expressing dissatisfaction with the present leadership or with the defective aspects of the entire Maoist policy; in the economic sphere--a return to the old voluntarist theories and an attempt to convince the masses of an alleged "developing situation of a new 'great leap forward' in the national economy" which will "far surpass the 'Great Leap Forward' of 1958."

In his speech on 9 May 1977 at the Tach'ing conference, Hua Kuo-feng used the term "revolutionary" to describe the "truly communist" spirit of the Tach'ing workers, which essentially boiled down to the advocacy of asceticism and the rejection of all demands for improvements in working and living conditions. The Chinese workers were requested to observe the ten-point program called the "Ten No's," including "no fear of death," "no regard for working

conditions," "no regard for the length of the working day," "no expectation of rewards" and so forth. These and other similar instructions--"shouldering loads in the absence of mechanisms," "beginning the revolution with five shovels," following a course of "relying on one's own strength" and not expecting assistance from the government--only underscore the hypocrisy of the Chinese leaders' statements of their willingness to "display concern" about improvements in the living and working conditions of their people at a time when almost half of the PRC state budget is used for military purposes. It is a well-known fact that Mao Tse-tung repeatedly resorted to this kind of political speculation and methods of extra-economic coercion in the past when he embarked on adventuristic experiments like the "Great Leap Forward," "Small-Scale Metallurgy" and the "Cultural Revolution." It is also a well-known fact that these experiments ultimately led only to a senseless and unproductive waste of huge amounts of human and material resources, not to mention the vulgarization of the very idea of scientific socialism.

When Hua Kuo-feng noted at the Tach'ing conference that "successes in construction have not been so great and the rates we expected have not been achieved," he was forced to admit that the CCP had also had to "institute tuition payments" for the purpose of "learning to follow our own, Chinese course in industrial development." There is no question that the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party paid a high price for Mao Tse-tung's adventuristic policy and are now naturally justified in expecting that the declaration of the need to "display concern for the workers," adhere to the socialist principle of payment for labor and improve the working and living conditions of the workers will finally be implemented.

At the sessions of the All-China People's Congress, Third and Fourth Convocations, Chou En-lai made public statements twice about the general schedule for the development of the Chinese national economy, which envisages two stages: The first step consists in establishing an independent and relatively integral system in industry and the entire national economy by 1980; the second step consists in the all-round modernization of agriculture, industry, defense, science and technology and the elevation of China to the level of the world's leading countries in terms of national economic development by the end of this century.

In his speech at the Tach'ing conference in December 1976, Vice Premier Yu Ch'iu-li of the PRC State Council reaffirmed Chou En-lai's 1975 statement calling the present decade, from 1976 through 1985, the decisive period in the accomplishment of these two steps. The widespread introduction of the experience of the Tachai production brigade and the Tach'ing Oil Field was proposed as the means to this end.

The Tachai and Tach'ing methods, which are being widely propagandized in China, essentially consist in the implementation of Mao's fundamental ideas about the development of production through "reliance on one's own strength"--through the use of the resources of local production collectives, the physical overexertion of the workers, the introduction of militarized forms of

labor and everyday life and the reduction of expenditures on social needs to a minimum. The use of these methods will aid in relieving the government of the responsibility of organizing the economic life of society and will permit the almost unencumbered use of centralized material and financial resources for the development of the defense industry.

- The following objective was set at the Tachai conference: "To turn more than one-third of all districts into districts of the Tachai type and to essentially complete the mechanization of agriculture throughout the nation by the end of 1980."²⁰

A similar objective was set for industry at the Tach'ing conference: To turn one out of every three enterprises (plants, factories, mines and so forth) into an enterprise of the Tach'ing type by the end of 1980. Other objectives were also set: "To turn the railroads throughout the nation into enterprises of the Tach'ing type within 3-5 years by means of persistent struggle" and "to turn railroad workers into a large industrial army of the postwar type."

The completion of the basic mechanization of agriculture by the end of 1980, Hua Kuo-feng said, will require "the development of a large army of rural machine operators to perform industrial and agricultural labor and be able to work with modern equipment." This task is to be accomplished, however, at the expense of the peasants, without any expenditures on the part of the state. As the Chinese press has noted, "the graduates of state schools and institutes for the mechanization of agriculture now constitute a small group. Most of the rural machine operators are local peasants who are trained at the expense of people's communes and production brigades."²¹ The procedure for confiscating food products from the Chinese peasants is still being made more rigid. Demands that no excess grain be left in rural areas were printed by the Chinese press under the cover of appeals for the elimination of the consequences of the "gang of four's" subversive activity.²²

In discussing the violations of the grain distribution procedure in recent years, Chinese propaganda states that "communes and brigades in some regions have kept too much grain for themselves" and proposes the "reduction of these reserves."²³ Peasants in the provinces are constantly requested to gather more medicinal herbs, hunt game and make use of other gifts of nature to supplement their harvests.²⁴

After the 11th CCP Congress in 1977, the PRC leaders began all-out preparations for a session of the All-China People's Congress. This work was performed in an atmosphere of fierce struggle behind the scenes for the highest posts in the state structure and disagreements about the course of internal political and economic development in the nation. At the Fourth Session of the Permanent Committee of the Congress, Fourth Convocation, on 23-24 October 1977, a decree was promulgated concerning the convening of the First Congress Session, Fifth Convocation, in the spring of 1978 with the following agenda: an accountability report on governmental affairs,

the amendment of the PRC Constitution and a report on these amendments, and the election and appointment of administrative state personnel.

Hua Kuo-feng said in his speech at the Fourth Session of the Permanent Committee of the All-China People's Congress that "people's assemblies should be convened in the provinces, cities and autonomous regions" prior to the congress session. In addition to this, he remarked that "people's assemblies in the provinces, cities and autonomous regions had not conducted sessions for a long time and revolutionary committees were not elected at the proper time. These circumstances made it impossible for the revolutionary committees to effectively perform their assigned functions." Since the end of 1977, the "revolutionary committees," which were formed during the "Cultural Revolution" as the new organs of authority at universities, the editorial offices of newspapers, scientific research institutes and industrial enterprises, have been falling apart and have not lived up to the hopes placed in them by the Maoists.

The election of deputies to the congress session, Hua said, would be conducted "on the basis of extensive discussion and democratic consultations." The revolutionary committees would be preserved in provinces, cities and districts, but "elected revolutionary committees must be such that the masses will gladly and proudly support them when their membership lists are published."

Human rights are still being violated in China. Persecution and execution without a trial and surveillance for political motives, encroachment upon the elementary democratic rights and freedoms of the population, the thorough regimentation of the life of the common Chinese citizen, shadowing and denunciation, the forced resettlement of youth in rural areas and the denial of the right to travel around the country or to choose a profession and place of residence are commonplace events in China. Foreign observers have noted that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a criminal and a political prisoner since all Chinese who violate the law are called "counter-revolutionaries." There is no written criminal code in China and sentences are passed by "people's courts" on an extremely shaky basis.²⁵

Some superficial changes in the area of education and culture have not led to any fundamental modifications as yet. At the end of October 1977, new enrollment requirements, involving entrance examinations, for post-graduate studies were published in China. On 20 October 1977, the HSIN-HUA AGENCY triumphantly reported that "many post-graduate students would be admitted to higher academic institutions and institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences by the end of this year." These students would be chosen from applicants from plants, factories, rural areas, academic institutions, military units, party and administrative institutions, scientific research organizations and various enterprises as well as graduates of 3-year higher academic institutions.

By 3 November 1977, however, KUANG-MING JIH-PAO explained that the state could only admit a few students to higher academic institutions at this time since the rest would have to occupy a place in "the front lines of production."

When we describe the first year of the introduction of "general order" as a whole, we must say that it did not produce the desired results and that the objectives set by the Chinese leadership remained unattained.

What kind of future do the Peking leaders see for China? Here is how Yeh Chien-ying, deputy chairman of the CCP Central Committee, describes China's prospects: "What is our aim? By 1958, Chairman Mao Tse-tung was already stating that our aim was the gradual and planned organization of the workers (industry), peasants (agriculture), trade workers (exchange), intelligentsia (culture and education) and soldiers (the militia--that is, the arming of the entire population) into a vast commune and to make it the basic unit of our society. Tach'ing and Tachai are models illustrating Chairman Mao Tse-tung's plan. Tach'ing today, as all of our comrades have already seen, has agriculture, trade, culture and education and a people's militia in addition to industry. For us, it represents the prototype of the kind of basic unit of our society of which Chairman Mao Tse-tung spoke."²⁶ This idea left no room for the basic requirement of socialism--maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural demands of the workers and the thorough development of the spiritual and physical qualities of all members of society. It does clearly indicate, however, that the ideal Chinese society envisioned by the present leadership, just as by Mao, is one of barracks communism, involving the transformation of the country into an enormous military camp with all of its inhabitants conforming to a single mold, with no consideration for their individual characteristics, on the model of the "iron Wangs," "rust-proof screws" and "soldiers of steel," unquestioningly complying with any order. It is not surprising that the Chinese leaders are still quoting Mao's instruction on the establishment of "May Seventh Schools," in which he stressed that "the army should be a great school" and "the entire population should learn from the People's Liberation Army."

The Chinese leaders have no objection to speculating on communist ideals and proclaiming their ultimate goal to be the construction of communism. This objective, however, is pushed so far into the future by them that it is virtually excluded from the life of the present generation, or at least for the next century, and seems unattainable. "Our ultimate goal," said Yeh Chien-ying, "is to achieve communism. Naturally, it will only be achieved in a hundred or a few hundred years." When we consider Mao Tse-tung's frequently quoted statement about the existence of classes and class struggle throughout the entire historical period of socialism, we can only conclude that the present Chinese leaders intend to resort for many more decades to the methods of repression, arm-twisting, encroachment upon the interests of the workers and the suppression of their rights by means of "cultural revolutions" and other political campaigns for the purpose of reinforcing the military-bureaucratic regime and building up their nuclear biceps.

In the area of international policy, the 11th Congress reaffirmed Peking's previous hegemonistic line which is hostile to the interests of the socialist countries, the international workers' and national liberation movements, all progressive forces and the interests of world peace.

The Chinese leaders are openly subordinating all national economic development in the PRC to preparations for war. In his speech at the conference on the dissemination of the Tach'ing experience on 9 May 1977, Yeh Chien-ying said: "We must speed up the development of the major branches of industry with emphasis on steel production to establish a strong basis for our defense industry and achieve greater progress in this area." The Peking leaders have set the goal of creating large regions in the nation that will have maximum autonomy in the economic sense and will be able to "independently conduct battles" in the event of war.

China's military potential is being augmented at accelerated rates. The recession in the national economy has had virtually no effect on the operations of defense industry enterprises. Attention is being focused on the perfection of nuclear missiles. In January 1977, four military conferences were held in Peking to discuss the equipping of the Chinese Army with new types of weapons and the problem of modernizing the defense industry. Peking propaganda has announced that expenditures on defense should rise in the future.

In reference to China's success in the area of science and technology during the last 28 years, the HSIN-HUA AGENCY made special mention of only one military aspect on 22 September 1977--"the successful testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs and guided projectiles"--and underscored the need to "substantially increase the defensive strength" of the nation.

The warlike nature of the Chinese leaders is also attested to by Mao's "fist philosophy," which was expounded by him in 1974 and has frequently been quoted in recent years: "There are two fists and one sacrum. Agriculture is one fist and the defense industry is the other. The fists cannot deliver powerful blows without a strong sacrum. The major branches of industry represent this sacrum."²⁷

It is indicative that the anti-Sovietism and the similar extremely questionable methods resorted to by the Chinese leaders differ little in many cases from the speculative methods of the "four." For example, Li Hsien-nien, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and vice premier of the PRC State Council, fell back on an old and hackneyed ruse in his introductory speech at the All-China Conference on the Dissemination of the Tach'ing Experience on 20 April 1977--the ruse of frightening the Chinese people with the inevitability of a new world war and threats of a Soviet attack on China. In assigning participants in the conference the task of accelerating industrial production and developing the national economy, Li Hsien-nien simultaneously felt it necessary to blackmail them with the announcements that "sooner or later a world war will break out" and that "Soviet revisionism has not rejected the idea of enslaving our nation for a single minute." At the same conference, Hua Kuo-feng issued the following appeal: "We absolutely must be ready to fight. We cannot lose a minute; time will not stand still." Yeh Chien-ying amplified this philosophy: "We

must not lose sight of war, we must prepare for it and emphasize the fact that large-scale war will soon break out."²⁸ It is not difficult to see that slanderous and provocative statements of this kind are made for the purpose of justifying Peking's anti-Soviet, antisocialist course in foreign policy and its insistence on preparations for war, the militarization of the country, the rigid reinforcement of the regime and the immediate suppression of any sign of dissatisfaction on the part of the workers.

On the eve of the 60th anniversary of October, on 1 November 1977, JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, the organ of the CCP Central Committee, printed an editorial entitled "The Theory of Chairman Mao Tse-tung on the Three Worlds--A Tremendous Contribution to Marxism-Leninism." This was the most verbose publication in the Chinese press in recent years and completely filled all six columns in the newspaper. Praising the great services of Mao Tse-tung--"the greatest Marxist of our time"--"both to the Chinese Revolution and to the world revolution," the authors of the article tried to prove that the three worlds "theory" presents "a scientific Marxist definition of the current world situation."

Most of the article was taken up by statements arguing that worldwide systems of socialism and capitalist do not exist at the present time. Discarding the Marxist-Leninist theory of classes and class struggle, the Maoist ideologists countered it with an extra-class geopolitical "theory of three worlds" in which there was no room for the socialist world. Moreover, the USSR was slanderously called "the most dangerous seat of war" and the nations and peoples of the Third World were called the major force in the struggle against...the "social-imperialism" of the Soviet Union. This struggle was also proclaimed "an important part of the world proletarian socialist movement."

Ignoring the actual alignment of forces in the world and squeezing the current international situation into the Procrustean Bed of the "theory of three worlds," the authors of the article "liquidated" the socialist world with a single stroke of the pen: "The socialist camp of the past no longer exists, and historical conditions do not dictate a need to reconstruct the socialist camp." Any comment here, as they say, would be superfluous.

The article contained appeals for the establishment of "the widest possible united front for an attack on the chief enemy"--that is, on the Soviet Union. It also contained arguments about the "extensive possibilities for organizing a war against aggression" and so-called "anti-aggressive wars," which essentially justified preventive strikes.

Representing Peking as the major center of the Third World countries, the authors of the article also tried to prove that the other capitalist countries, or the Second World (and, to some extent, the United States), represent "a force with which we could unite in the struggle against hegemonism." With exceptionally provocative aims, they alleged that "Eastern Europe has

become the advance position from which the Soviet Union is preparing to plunge into a war against Western Europe and the United States" and that "today the nations of Europe are threatened by the grave danger of annexation and occupation by Soviet social-imperialism."

In their discussion of the problem of war and peace, the Chinese strategists did not conceal their hopes that the "confrontation between the two hegemonic powers (the USSR and the United States--G. N.)...will inevitably lead to war. At present, the factor of war is obviously becoming stronger." They also alleged that "present historical conditions make lasting peace impossible and a new world war inevitable."

The Peking leaders are not only attempting to substitute Maoism's geopolitical theory for the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on classes and the class struggle, but are also openly forcing Peking's hegemony on the developing countries, the movement for non-alignment and the international communist and workers' movement. It was no coincidence that the article mentioned above abounded with pretentious and arrogant homilies, literally dictating to the international proletariat, "the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations" and the people of the entire world what they must do and how they must implement Peking's strategy. In an instructive tone, Peking is demanding that other countries and peoples "thoroughly intensify the struggle against hegemonism," "achieve greater defensive strength" and "intensify the struggle against the policy of reconciliation," alleging that "the sweeter the songs about detente, the more intensive the activity toward reconciliation and the greater the danger of war."

On the whole, the Chinese leaders are taking new steps along the dangerous course of militarization, the provocation of armed conflicts and the unification of all reactionary and imperialist forces in "the broadest possible front" of struggle against the socialist community. But this course, as history has proved repeatedly, is futile.

In summation, we must conclude that some people in Peking are still clinging to the previous defective course in the area of domestic and foreign policy and to the outdated and completely discredited old Maoist dogmas and theories, trying to spruce them up and foist them on the people as quality goods. Even the previously questionable reputation of these goods, however, has now been completely discredited. It is becoming increasingly obvious that, as those in Peking display a greater desire to adhere to Maoist aims, they lead China further and further away from socialism. Events in China show that only a discerning reassessment of the antiscientific and voluntaristic views of Mao Tse-tung on domestic policy and economic development and a rejection of the present foreign policy course which is hostile to the socialist community can aid in China's return to the path of socialism, peace and social progress.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 3 November 1977.
2. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 28 April 1977.
3. Ibid., 14 November 1976.
4. Ibid., 8 October 1977.
5. Ibid., 27 April 1977.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Reprinted in KUANG-MING JIH-PAO, 17 October 1977.
9. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 28 November 1977.
10. Ibid., 26 February 1977.
11. Hua Kuo-feng, "Completing the Continuation of the Revolution under a Dictatorship by the Proletariat," An Aid to the Study of Vol V of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 1 May 1977.
12. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 2 November 1977.
13. Ibid., 7 November 1977.
14. PRAVDA, 24 September 1977.
15. HUNG-CH'I, No 2, 1977.
16. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 29 October 1977.
17. CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO, 15 November 1976; JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 19 November 1976.
18. NEW YORK TIMES, 5 November 1977.
19. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 21 February 1977.
20. Report of Member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee and Vice Premier of the PRC State Council Ch'en Yung-kuei of 20 December 1976.
21. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 16 September 1977.
22. Ibid., 11 May 1977.

23. Ibid., 20 October 1977.
24. SUNDAY TIMES, 30 October 1977.
25. NEWSWEEK, 14 November 1977.
26. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 13 May 1977.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

8588
CSO: 1805

POLICY OF PROVOCATION AND WAR

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 32-47

[Article by F. I. Divov]

[Text] Two opposite tendencies, two diametrically opposed directions, have been in conflict for more than half a century now in international politics. The first of these, personified by the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community, embodies features which are comprehensible and close to hundreds of millions of working people and which issue from the very class nature of the socialist society and its peace-loving and constructive goals. The banner of this current is inscribed: proletarian internationalism, fraternal solidarity with the world revolutionary movement and a desire for peace and for the organization of relations between states of different social systems on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence proposed by V. I. Lenin.

The Program of Peace worked out by the 24th CPSU Congress and the program adopted by the 25th Congress of our party for further struggle for peace, international cooperation and the freedom and independence of people represent a harmonious system of measures, the implementation of which, on the one hand, will reinforce the turn toward detente, mutually beneficial cooperation and a just, democratic and lasting peace for all people and, on the other, reflects all of the preceding activity of our party and state in the international arena. The basic principles of the Soviet State's peace-loving foreign policy are formulated in the new Constitution of the USSR.

The other tendency, represented by worldwide reaction, imperialism and other antihumanitarian forces, reflects foreign policy activity with the goal of stirring up hatred between nations, undermining peace, escalating the arms race and provoking conflicts and wars between states. Special mention should be made of the fact that the Peking nationalist-chauvinist leaders have acted in concert with the representatives of this foreign policy current for the last 15-17 years. Even a brief acquaintance with the foreign policy course of the Peking leaders provides ample proof of

the fact that they have firmly taken a position opposing the line of the socialist countries and all peace-loving forces in the world.

The new Chinese leaders have completely accepted the foreign policy course forced on China by Mao Tse-tung and have proclaimed the "thought of Mao" the "only political basis" for China.¹ "We must pass the great banner of Chairman Mao Tse-tung from generation to generation as a most valuable legacy," Hua Kuo-feng announced at the 11th CCP Congress.

The 11th CCP Congress oriented the people toward the militarization of the country. They were requested to "be ready to fight," "make progress in preparations for war," "intensify the construction of a people's militia" and "raise the equipping of the army to a new level." The new leaders armed themselves with Mao Tse-tung's instructions to construct "not only a strong land army but also a powerful air force and navy," "to dig deep tunnels and store grain supplies everywhere." All of this is being justified by an imaginary, obviously nonexistent "threat" to China.

The world situation has been described as "exceptionally favorable" in connection with the fact that "the factor of war is noticeably gaining strength along with the factor of revolution." The policy of detente is being fiercely attacked and the thesis of the "inevitability of war" is being defended.

After Mac Tse-tung's death and the overthrow of the "gang of four," military men gained the upper hand in the top levels of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and they continued the course toward the militarization of the country. Yeh Chien-ying, PRC minister of national defense, frankly spoke of Peking's current ambitions on 9 May 1977: "Sooner or later the day will come when war breaks out. We must make this situation comprehensible; armed with a doctrine of war, we must be prepared to fight and we must expect war, and war on a large scale, to break out soon."

Stubbornly defending the antihumanitarian theory of the inevitability of world war, the Maoists are propagandizing the doctrine of "frontal attack and total destruction" of the enemy. On 6 August 1977, JEN-MIN JIH-PAO printed an article by Su Yu, member of the Permanent Committee of the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee and deputy chief of PLA [People's Liberation Army] General Headquarters, in which he implied that China must prepare for war and, moreover, for a war of annihilation. He stated that "actions must be conducted for the purpose of annihilation, people must be killed, prisoners must be seized and the vital strength of the enemy must be destroyed. These are our strategy and tactics." The essential conditions for implementing this doctrine were declared to be, in addition to "revolutionization," the improvement of weapons and military equipment and the accelerated re-equipping of the entire army, in accordance with which the economic base of the nation would have to be reorganized and a new defense industry would have to be established.

The new wave of all-out preparations for war and intensive modernization of the Chinese Army is closely linked with anti-Sovietism. Even the term "the threat from the North," which was once cur. at in Maoist terminology, has now been replaced by a phrase that is even more frightening to the Chinese population: "The Soviet revisionists have not rejected the idea of enslaving our nation for a single minute."

According to reports in the Chinese and foreign press, the military preparations in China are not simply a propagandistic ruse. They are a reality. The work of augmenting nuclear missile potential and developing ballistic missiles of medium- and long-range action is being carried out at accelerated rates. While nuclear tests were previously conducted once a year in China, there were four of these tests in 1976, including three after Mao Tse-tung's death. In addition to this, Peking is displaying increasing energy in allying itself with the aggressive organizations of imperialism, such as NATO, and with the military-industrial complexes of the capitalist states.

In connection with the objective of the modernization of the armed forces, the pages of the Chinese press have recently contained statements about the need for changes in the Maoist doctrine of "people's war" and a move from defensive strategy to an offensive strategy--that is, the need to extend war to the territory of other states. In addition to the modernization of troops of all types, the Peking leaders are paying unflagging attention to the combat potential of the people's militia. An article entitled "On the People's Militia," published in CHIEH-FANG-CHUN PAO on 20 June 1977 and reprinted in JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, stated that China must have strong armed forces, extensively develop divisions of the people's militia, teach each of the 800 million Chinese to fight, create cadre and reserve militia detachments, appoint political commissars and political instructors for battalions and companies, provide the militia with weapons and so forth.

These demands and the specific steps that are being taken to augment the maritime fleet in general and naval forces in particular fit into the expansionist plans of the Peking leaders. The need for a revision of all policy concerning the development and utilization of the naval fleet is being declared in China. The current objective is the creation of a fleet which will be capable of protecting the coast of China and acting independently on the vast expanses of the world ocean. The Peking leaders have armed themselves with Mao Tse-tung's appeal of May 1975 for "comprehensive struggle for the creation of a strong naval fleet." This has led to all kinds of reprisals against those who have supposedly been setting up obstacles in the way of this development. These have included P'eng Te-huai, who allegedly insisted on "reliance on the Soviet Union," Liu Shao-ch'i, who, according to the press, relieved the naval fleet of the responsibility of combating aggression, and Lin Piao, who supposedly weakened the naval fleet by his "intrigues." The "gang of four" have been subjected to particularly fierce attacks. This "gang," Peking announced, regarded the development of the naval fleet as "a waste of money and effort," asserting that China was a "land power" and limiting the responsibility of the naval fleet to "guarding the coast and serving in the capacity of rear reinforcement."²

During the discussion of the plans for the modernization of the army, the foremost tendency was one toward reduction of the size of ground forces and the concentration of resources on the development of nuclear missiles and naval forces. This is also attested to by the fact that, within a short period of time (less than 5 years), China has increased the tonnage of its merchant fleet dramatically--from 1 million registered tons to more than 4 million.

Foreign Policy Doctrine--The main aspect of Maoist strategy in the international arena is still the policy of taking advantage of the basic worldwide conflicts between socialism and capitalism for the purpose of eliminating or, at least, seriously weakening China's major "rivals," and attempts to promote conflict in its most extreme forms between the two worldwide systems, primarily between the USSR and the United States. The leaders of the PRC are working toward the escalation of international tension, the relaxation of which, according to Peking, will create additional factors contributing to an even greater gap between the economic development of the world's strongest powers and the economic level of China.

The activities of the new PRC leaders in the international arena during the past year reaffirmed the fact that they have not merely inherited all of the most reactionary and most chauvinistic features of Maoism, all that can bring the attainment of their great-power goals closer. Above all, they have emphasized the thesis of the inevitability of world war, a war between the USSR and the United States. Hua Kuo-feng announced that "imperialism and social-imperialism represent war, and we will certainly have to fight;" This was seconded by Li Hsien-nien: "We say that war is inevitable,"³ as well as by other Chinese officials. They have protected themselves with Mao Tse-tung's anti-Marxist doctrine of the "three worlds," according to which the decisive force of the present day--the worldwide socialist system--has been "abolished"; the Maoists are still exaggerating the thesis of the "degeneration" of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries into "social-imperialism" and, correspondingly, the major conflict of the present day between socialism and capitalism, which will determine the course of historical development, is represented as a "skirmish" between the two "superpowers."

In addition to establishing a military-industrial complex within the nation, the Peking leaders are striving to make the most extensive use of foreign policy means for maximum advancement toward their planned frontier. Foreign policy is being assigned the role of a factor capable of compensating for China's inadequate military and economic strength.

After Mao Tse-tung's death, his previously unpublished work "On the Ten Most Important Interrelationships" was issued; this provides "grounds" for the policy of alliance with reaction and any other forces capable of serving Peking's great-power interests. Chinese officials are now saying that even then, in the 1950's, Mao planned to sever relations with the USSR but, for

tactical reasons, preferred "not to lay all of his cards on the table at once, but to hold something in reserve."⁴

The 11th CCP Congress is now making use of Mao's idea by resolutely embarking on an alliance with imperialism. According to a statement made by Hua Kuo-feng at the 11th Congress, this course is necessary to China for "winning as many allies as possible over to its side." Therefore, the new Peking leadership has left the basic guidelines of Mao Tse-tung's course unchanged but has moved even further to the right and is conducting an intensive search for ways of establishing closer collaboration with imperialism on a hegemonic, antisocialist basis. This line has been evident in all of the major trends in Peking's international activity.

Alliance with the Imperialist States--The present Peking leaders are quite openly conducting a policy toward the further convergence and expansion of the sphere of the "common" or "parallel" international interests of Peking and Washington and toward alliance with the most aggressive groups in the United States and in other capitalist states.

American-Chinese relations were revived when the new leadership took power in China. The Peking leaders are striving for the complete normalization of relations with the United States and for broader and deeper interaction with Washington on various international issues. In itself, this approach would not evoke objections if their efforts were to be directed toward the consolidation of peace and the preservation of international security. The fact is, however, that Peking's American policy is based--and Chinese officials are not concealing this--on an attempt to involve the United States in its strategy of struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Peking approves of the U.S. military presence in Asia, including South Korea, and supports Washington's intention to build military bases in the Indian Ocean. In order to avoid negative U.S. reactions, the Chinese leaders have even curbed their own penetration of the Latin American countries temporarily and have reconciled themselves to the U.S. policy of the "two Chinas."

The first foreign policy action of Hua Kuo-feng, the new leader of the PRC, in regard to the United States was his reception of former U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, who was in China in the fall of 1976. Despite the fact that this representative of the American "hawks" had been repudiated by the Americans themselves for his militant feelings, the Peking leaders were able to find a common language with him and to discuss a variety of foreign policy issues as well as purely military problems.⁵

When the Chinese leaders have received American representatives, they have tried to convince them of the common position occupied by the PRC and the United States on international issues and have pleaded with them to understand that this common position is much more important than the unsolved

problems in their bilateral relations. Li Hsien-nien, for example, told American congressmen on 9 October 1976 that the interests of China and the United States coincide in Asia and the Pacific, and in December of the same year he tried to convince American senators that China's main problem now is the "threat of Soviet expansion" and that the Taiwan issue is of secondary importance.

Even before the Carter Administration had established itself in the White House, Peking hastened to inform the United States that China was particularly concerned about U.S. policy in regard to the USSR and that the future of Sino-American relations would depend on Washington's Soviet policy. After this, U.S. representatives in Peking were openly persuaded to join in a fight against the Soviet Union. When Li Hsien-nien received Admiral Zumwalt, former chief of staff of the American Navy in July 1977, he told him that "China and the United States must work together to get the better of the 'gray bear,'" and subjected the "conciliatory" policy of the United States in regard to the USSR to pointed criticism.⁶

Representatives of the Chinese leadership occupy the same position as the opponents of detente in the United States. Relieving the United States of the responsibility for sabotaging detente and continuing the arms race, Peking represents the matter in such a way that the United States has allegedly been "forced" to accumulate more weapons because of the "Soviet threat," is widely propagandizing statements by U.S. reactionary forces demanding the development of new types of weapons and is openly encouraging the United States to occupy a more rigid position in its relations with the USSR.

This provocative position of the Chinese leaders has reinforced the intention of some groups in the United States to make use of China for imperialist, antisocialist and anti-Soviet purposes. After Mao Tse-tung's death, the Carter Administration began to emphasize the existence of "parallel strategic interests" in the United States and the PRC. This same idea was expounded by U.S. Secretary of State Vance in a speech presented to the Asian Society in New York. He said: "After 25 years of confrontation, we are now engaged in a constructive dialog with the PRC. We regard friendly relations with China as the most important element of our foreign policy. China plays a vitally important role in the preservation of peace throughout the world. Constructive relations with China are of great significance on the regional scale and are essential for global equilibrium." In addition to being told of the "parallel strategic interests" of the United States and China in the "containment" of the Soviet Union in the international arena, the Americans are now being persuaded that China is more of an ally of the United States than an opponent.

China's relations with the United States, however, also involve serious unsolved problems, in regard to which neither one side nor the other has displayed any willingness to compromise as yet. Above all, there is the issue of Taiwan. The United States is striving to guarantee the safeguarding

of Taiwan's interests, including the "protection" of the island from the PRC, before relations with China are completely normalized. On 14 May 1977, President Carter said: "We do not want the inhabitants of Taiwan to be subjected to punishment or attack." Peking is demanding in turn that the United States not interfere in the resolution of the Taiwan problem. In his report at the 11th CCP Congress, Hua Kuo-feng remarked: "The United States must sever its so-called diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique, withdraw all of its armed forces and military installations from Taiwan and the region of the Taiwan Strait and cancel the so-called 'treaty on joint defense' it concluded with the Chiang Kai-shek clique.... As for the questions of when and how Taiwan will be liberated, this is a purely internal Chinese affair and interference in this matter by any foreign state will be absolutely inadmissible."

Secretary of State Vance's visit to Peking on 22-26 August 1977 was made for the express purpose of alleviating the tension in Sino-American relations due to the difference in the approaches of the two sides to the Taiwan issue, in addition to reinforcing their common views on many international problems. The talks with Vance were attended by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and, before his departure, the secretary of state was received by Hua Kuo-feng. The foreign press reported that the talks were "frank, serious and helpful" and that they gave the two sides a better understanding of one another's position on international issues and on aspects of their bilateral relations. Despite the efforts of the Chinese leaders, no progress was made in the resolution of their chief problem--agreement on a compromise formula for Taiwan regulation. This was referred to by Li Hsien-nien in an interview he granted to foreign correspondents on 29 August 1977 when he said that Washington did not display a "reasonable" approach to the Taiwan problem. Nonetheless, Vance's visit to China began a process of direct contacts between the new administration in the United States and the new leaders of China with a mutual desire on the part of both partners to improve relations and to prevent their differences of opinion on the Taiwan issue from dominating these relations. A representative of the White House announced that President Carter was impressed by the constructive approach displayed by the Chinese leaders in the talks with Vance. The 11th CCP Congress discerned a move toward "reasonable" pragmatism within the United States, which would present obvious opportunities for increased exports of American industrial equipment and technology to China. During 10 months of 1977, 80 different delegations from the United States went to the PRC, mainly through the channel of technological and sociopolitical exchanges.

Japan is Peking's largest partner in Asia and it is from Japan that Peking hopes to gain support for its policy of expansion. The leaders of the PRC are continuing their persistent attempts to draw Japan into an anti-Soviet alliance. They are demanding that ruling circles in Tokyo include a clause "on joint struggle against hegemony" in the treaty on peace and friendship with Japan; this will have the purpose of attaching Japan to Peking's anti-Soviet chariot.

In January 1977, Hua Kuo-feng sent a verbal message to Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda through Takeiri, chairman of the Komeito Party, which made the future of Japanese-Chinese relations dependent on the Japanese Government's agreement to include the "antihegemonic clause" in the text of the treaty. In May 1977, Li Hsien-nien informed a delegation representing the Japan Socialist Party: "Delays in the conclusion of the treaty will increase feelings of mistrust between Japan and China, and this will be undesirable."

Blinded by their hatred for the Soviet Union, the Chinese leaders are coming up with justifications for the policy of reviving Japanese militarism and are even making instigative statements, as, for example: "Japan must have the necessary weapons for self-defense."⁸ "We would not be worried by the re-arming of Japan," said Li Hsien-nien in an interview granted to English journalist D. Hamilton in March 1977, "if this were being done for the purpose of self-defense. A nation as big as Japan cannot survive without the proper defensive forces."⁹ In addition to this, military circles in Japan are making plans for the further remilitarization of the country. A. Mihara, director general of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), proposed the creation of a ministry of defense, which would unite the JDA with the defense installations administration in a single war department. This plan was made public after a meeting with Prime Minister T. Fukuda, at which military problems were discussed. The corresponding military machine has already been established in Japan in spite of the ninth article of the nation's constitution. Japan's self-defense forces include 180,000 servicemen in ground forces, 42,000 in the air force and 39,000 in the navy. They are armed with the latest weapons and military equipment, including tanks, bomber-destroyers, tactical missiles and submarines. Japan's fifth 5-year program for the modernization and augmentation of the armed forces during 1977-1981 is being carried out. The sum allocated for this purpose totals 12.6 billion yen--almost 150 percent more than the sum allocated for the preceding program.¹⁰

It is evident, however, that some people in China have forgotten that it was precisely Japanese militarism that trampled upon Chinese land for many years, murdered and robbed the Chinese people, destroyed their cities and villages and sold the workers of the long-suffering nation into slavery. Today the Peking leaders expect the militarization of Japan to be directed against other nations. At any rate, this was the opinion expressed by PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan in a talk with a delegation from the YOMIURI newspaper on 15 May 1977. He assured the Japanese that Japan would not be left "alone and helpless" in the event of war with the USSR.¹¹

China's leaders have recently begun to establish better contacts with Japanese military circles. At a talk in Peking with O. Kaihara, former secretary general of the National Defense Council, the Chinese side proposed that a detachment of naval training ships be sent to PRC ports and that the exchange of other military delegations be arranged.

In April 1977, N. Iwashima, representative of the JDA and expert on American military strategy, visited China. He attended military exercises in the Canton region and was also shown underground defense installations in Peking. Last May the PRC was visited by a group of Japanese former naval officers, including N. Nagai, former admiral of the Japanese Navy. The group had two meetings with Ch'en Hsi-lien, vice premier of the PRC State Council and deputy minister of national defense. Former Chief of Staff Miyoshi of the ground forces of Japan's "self-defense forces" went to Peking in June. He was received by Wu Hsiu-chien, deputy chief of PLA Headquarters. The above-mentioned O. Kaihara, former secretary general of the national defense council of Japan, was in China in June and July and met with Deputy Chief of PLA Headquarters Chang Ts'ai-ch'ien. Although these visits had the external appearance of unofficial trips, the representatives of Japan's military circles had contact with persons who are by no means private citizens in Peking, and their talks did not concern abstract matters. For example, they spoke of the creation of a Pacific naval fleet for the PRC, the augmentation of Japan's armed forces and the preservation and reinforcement of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty.¹²

Therefore, the policy of the new leaders in Peking in regard to Japan is essentially one of, on the one hand, supporting the forces advocating militarization and revanchism in the expectation of their future involvement in a confrontation with the USSR and, on the other, making use of Japan's economic potential and turning it into a "milk cow" to support China's as yet underdeveloped industry.

In addition to the United States and Japan, Western Europe plays a special role in the instigative foreign policy plans of the Peking leaders. In this region, Peking diplomacy has the task of doing everything possible to create an explosive situation in the relations between the nations of the socialist community and the Western European states. Peking propaganda and top level PRC statesmen constantly allege that the "strategic center of gravity" of the struggle between the USSR and the United States is Western Europe and imply that "the Soviet Union is pretending to prepare for war with the East but is actually preparing for an attack on the West." By making such instigative statements, Peking is undoubtedly relying on the possibility that it is precisely in this part of the world that it will be able to mobilize all reactionary forces capable of opposing the community of socialist states. DIE WELT Editor-in-Chief Kremp made the following statement on this matter: "Deputy Minister Yu Chan answered in the affirmative to the question of whether China and Western Europe have common interests. In his words, they consist in the fact that we feel equally threatened by the Soviet Union. This is why we are concerned about the policy of Western Europe and are interested in it.... The Western Europeans must realize that the Soviet Union threatens them above all, said Yu Chan. The political unification of Western Europe and the reinforcement of its defensive might will serve primarily to save Europe. China is only of secondary importance here. And, conversely, the reinforcement of China will naturally be in Europe's interest."¹³ The fact that Peking proposed .

in June 1977 that its trade with the EEC be raised to the level of its trade with Japan underscores the important role played by Western Europe in the strategy of the new PRC leadership. On 4 June 1977, the West Berlin newspaper DER TAGESSPIEGEL interpreted this step in the following way: Since October 1976, China has "flung open a window" to the West. It has again become obvious that Peking and imperialist forces in Western Europe are striving to establish an alliance for the sake of their global chauvinistic plans, or, as they put it in Peking, to establish a "united front of struggle" against the USSR and the other socialist countries. Something else, however, is also obvious: The imperialist states and China are striving to find someone else to pull their chestnuts out of the fire.

Peking's alliance with the Western European NATO countries is taking place under the guise of reinforcing "general security" against the imaginary threat of the Warsaw Pact. Li Hsien-nien said in a conversation with French journalists in November 1976: "We want Europe to be powerful and to have a stronger defense against the Soviet Union."¹⁴ A short while later, Li Hsien-nien expressed the same thought in an interview granted to a representative of a Maoist organization in Sweden: "The people of Europe are afraid of them (the Russians--F. D.). You live in Europe. We believe that it is extremely important for Europe to unite. There are many states in Europe, but they are split, and some are fighting for power over others.... We support the unification of Europe. The more states there are, the more orators there will be. China supports the EEC's desire to overcome differences of opinion and has therefore established diplomatic relations with this community."¹⁵

The military preparations and arms race in the NATO countries are being observed with satisfaction and approval in Peking. After establishing contacts with the headquarters of this bloc as early as 1975, the Chinese leaders have painstakingly coordinated their own actions with it. As soon as NATO reacted negatively to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact nations on the non-initiation of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, echoes of approval could be heard from Peking. China had a similar reaction to the socialist states' initiative in connection with the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe.

The main motive for Peking's approach to European problems consists in the fact that political forces with the aim of changing the territorial status quo are still alive and kicking in Europe, particularly in the FRG. These forces have demanded the "unification of Germany" on an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist platform. This, the Peking leaders hope, will become a new basis for conflict. If this were to take place, it would fit in perfectly with Peking's instigative foreign policy doctrine.

The FRG also has such influential political parties as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), which have categorically dissociated themselves from the Helsinki Final Act and do not recognize this historic document. The Peking leaders have attached primary

significance to precisely these forces in determining their policy in regard to the FRG and are supporting and trying to promote precisely these tendencies.

In February 1976, CDU representatives A. Droege and W. Marx visited the PRC. They were received by Hua Kuo-feng, who, during the course of negotiations at this time, unequivocally stressed his intention to adhere to the political course of the past. Uwe Romneburger, chairman of the local organization of the Free Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein, also visited China.

Peking and Bonn have established ties on the military level, including the exchange of military attaches. China was visited by Bonn's Minister for Research and Technology H. Mattoefer, whose mission consisted in establishing cooperation in the utilization of thermonuclear energy. A group of Chinese experts on the petroleum industry traveled to the FRG.

Peking invited West German firms to organize a large-scale industrial exhibit called "Technogerm-1975" in the PRC. The organizers of the exhibit established the first contacts and concluded the first deals between the Chinese side and the West German Messerschmidt-Belkov-Bloehm defense concern. This concern has signed an agreement on the transfer of technical documents to China for the construction of the B-105 multipurpose helicopter.

Peking's attempts to expand its purchases in the capitalist countries of Europe represent a general tendency.

The PRC's trade volume in 1976 with the EEC countries increased by 11.7 percent while there was a decrease in China's total foreign trade commodity turnover. The FRG and France were the only EEC countries to increase their exports to the PRC, respectively to 642.27 million dollars (by 32 percent) and to 358.2 million dollars (by 3 percent). The other nations of the "big nine" noticeably reduced their exports to the PRC. In general, China's imports of industrial goods from the EEC countries increased by 40 percent in 1976.

The Third World and Peking--One of the chief objects of China's foreign policy activity is the Third World. Taking advantage of the natural desire of the developing states for independence and self-sufficiency, the Chinese leaders are trying to use "antihegemonism" as a way of separating them from the reliable defenders and guarantors of their independence--the socialist states--and to weaken them, so that they can establish their own control over most of these nations in the future. The strictly utilitarian approach of the Chinese leaders to the Third World, which is determining their general course, is becoming increasingly obvious. For this purpose, they are resorting to such shameless methods as solidarity with reactionary pro-imperialist regimes and open hostility toward progressive forces.

Since Mao Tse-tung's death, Peking has continued its attempts to sow hatred for the USSR in the Middle East by playing up to such countries as Egypt, the Sudan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It has opposed the convening of a Geneva conference on the Middle East and has ceased to assist the Palestine movement. The PRC leaders have approved of the plans to establish an alliance between the Arab states and the reactionary regimes in the Red Sea region.

China took an active part in training and equipping the armed bands of Holden Roberto in Zaire when he tried to seize power in Angola. The PRC, just as the United States, has still not recognized the People's Republic of Angola. At the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly, the PRC joined the United States in vetoing Angola's membership in the United Nations. The events in Zaire in the spring of 1977 provided further proof that China is acting in concert with the American imperialists, the NATO militarists, the reactionary Arab regimes, the Israeli ruling circles and the South African racists. China air-ferried various kinds of freight to Zaire for the fight against the rebels in the South Zaire Province of Shaba. These "various types of freight," according to the WASHINGTON POST, included military equipment, some of it heavy artillery and tanks.¹⁶ In 1975 and 1976, China took an active part in the Zaire-based training and equipping of armed bands of the Angolan puppet group, the FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola], which participated in the imperialist intervention against the People's Republic of Angola. China continued to support Angolan terrorist bands working against the People's Republic of Angola from the territory of Zaire in 1977.¹⁷ At the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly, Peking did not participate in the vote on the resolutions concerning the Middle East, condemning the Chilean executioners and directed against the racism and apartheid of the colonial regimes in the south of Africa.

China is trying to break up the ranks of the national liberation movement which is fighting against the racist regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Peking's actions suit the purpose of the South African racists. South African Minister of Information and of the Interior C. P. Mulder announced at the beginning of 1977 that the regime of apartheid was completely satisfied with Peking's policy. He also advocated the development of close cooperation between South Africa and China. And Vorster has justified his own policy by quotations from Mao Tse-tung.¹⁸

As a result of Peking's well-known position on the events in Angola, its refusal to recognize the People's Republic of Angola, its support of reactionary forces and so forth, China has suffered a political and moral defeat in Africa. This has made it necessary for Peking to take a number of political, ideological and economic steps to reestablish its influence on the African continent. Among the political steps taken by the Chinese leaders to reinforce their positions in Africa, the invitation of African representatives on various levels to Peking has been assigned particular significance.

During the first half of 1977 Peking was visited by the presidents of Mauritania, Gabon and the Sudan, the vice president of Somalia, the prime minister of the Congo and top-level and representative delegations from Tunis, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verde Islands and other states. In all, 118 delegations from the developing countries visited Peking during that time. In their talks with these delegations, the Chinese leaders tried to arouse distrust in the USSR's policies. Moreover, Peking propaganda has attempted to falsify the actual state of affairs and implied that some progressive statesmen share Peking's anti-Soviet position in Africa. This was the case with Robert Mugabe, one of the leaders of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, who was in China at the end of June and the beginning of July 1977. The HSIN-HUA AGENCY ascribed the hackneyed cliches of its own propaganda about Moscow's "hegemonic ambitions" and the Soviet Union's "intervention" in the domestic affairs of the African countries to him. These lies, however, were decisively refuted by R. Mugabe himself, who stated that they had the purpose of undermining the Patriotic Front and discrediting the selfless assistance of the USSR and its enormous contribution to the cause of southern African liberation.¹⁹

In an attempt to reinforce its own shaky position in Africa, China is making use of economic and financial aid to the nations of this continent in addition to means of political and ideological pressure. By the beginning of 1977, Chinese aid in the form of credit extended to approximately 40 African states totaled around 2.3 billion American dollars, which constituted around two-thirds of total Chinese commitments in the Third World. In some cases, economic aid to the African countries is supplemented by military cooperation (Zaire, Sierra Leone, the Congo, Tanzania, Somalia and others). China has recently taken on commitments involving aid to Tunis, the Sudan, Mauritania, Liberia, Egypt and Zaire.

The steps taken by the new Chinese leaders have aided in elevating the PRC's prestige in the pro-Western African nations. In progressive circles of different countries, however, China's policy in Africa is meeting with criticism and is unpopular. The attitude of the African countries toward China's position in the United Nations is characteristic in this sense. Since almost all of the African countries have voted in favor of the major proposals initiated by the USSR and the other socialist countries, none of them, with the exception of South Africa, support China's negative and obstructionist position.

Peking is expanding its ties with Pinochet's fascist junta in Chile. The Chinese authorities have offered the junta the use of an interest-free loan of 62 million dollars, which was extended to the Popular Unity Government in 1972. A new Chinese loan of 55 million dollars has been negotiated. Around 120 Chinese specialists are working in Chile. The PRC invited Chile to take part in the spring fair of 1977 in Canton.

It is no secret that the Chinese expansionists regard many of their neighboring Asian countries as "their own lost territories," which, according to Peking's plans, should be "annexed" to China. It is precisely for this

reason that the PRC leaders are desperately opposing the ideas of collective security and mutually beneficial cooperation on the Asian continent.

China's practical steps in relation to South Asia are still directed toward the confrontation of the states of this region with one another, intervention in their domestic affairs and the encouragement of nationalist feeling. Peking is energetically striving to influence Indian-Bangladesh relations and to preserve the tension in Indian-Pakistani relations by stirring up the disputes over the Jammu and Kashmir issues and is exaggerating the "economic inequality" of Nepalese-Indian relations. The main thing, however, is that Peking, in developing ties with any particular nation in South Asia, sets itself the primary goal of undermining this nation's relations with the USSR. Peking has unequivocally made it known that it will continue to adhere to a dual policy in regard to the South Asian countries, emphasizing first the development of intergovernmental contacts and then the intensification, depending on conditions, of subversive and instigative activity.

The Socialist Community--The Major Obstacle in Peking's Great-Power Path--
Peking sees the socialist community as the force capable of subverting China's plans for the escalation of international tension and the provocation of military conflicts.

In the beginning of 1977, the Chinese leaders embarked upon a propagandistic attack, essentially coordinated with imperialism, on several socialist states for the purpose of encouraging counterrevolutionary and antisocialist elements. Along with the anticomunists in the West, Peking openly took the side of various types of renegades and deserters.

Peking has intensified its attacks on the socialist states' collective co-operation organs—the Warsaw Pact Organization and CEMA. The Chinese leaders are trying to misrepresent the well-known events in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are earnestly striving to encourage the socialist countries to embark upon a course of national isolation and are taking advantage of the slogans of "independence and self-sufficiency," which are advertised as a "standard" of behavior for the socialist countries in their relations with China. Peking is still relying on its policy of "special mutual relations" with some countries, formal relations with others and hostile relations with still others. This can be seen from the example of individual nations. The Chinese are inhibiting the development of relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and are waging an openly hostile propagandistic war against Cuba, primarily in connection with the events in Angola and Zaire.

Peking's rightist and antisocialist attitudes toward the GDR are becoming increasingly overt. During Filbinger's visit to China in April 1976, the Chinese leaders clearly came out in support of the revanchist theses of representatives of the FRG. Crudely showing their contempt for the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the GDR, the Peking leaders supported the thesis of the "open German question." In spite of the GDR's repeated protests, the term "West Germany" has become a permanent fixture in the

terminology of China's official news and propaganda media. Peking supports the revanchist theses of the "single German nation" and the need to "overcome the separation of Germany." PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan said in an interview with Editor-in-Chief H. Kremp of the FRG newspaper DIE WELT that China supports the "reunification of Germany" and opposes "separation," asserting that "a nation cannot be separated."²⁰

China's relations with Albania belong in a special category. Externally, they are still of a "normal" nature and have retained their anti-Soviet tendencies, but the noticeable friction in these relations has become particularly obvious since Mao's death and the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Labor Party in the beginning of November 1976.

Continuing to regard Albania as a base for ideological and political diversionary actions against the nations of the socialist community and the international communist movement and for the reinforcement of its positions in the Balkan and Mediterranean zones, China is striving to keep Albania in the orbit of its policy and reinforce the anti-Soviet tendencies in Albania's foreign policy.

One of the important ways of keeping Albania in China's orbit consists in the preservation of Albania's economic dependence on China: The PRC accounts for around 40 percent of Albania's total foreign trade turnover. Albania has a chronic negative balance in its trade with China, in connection with which it owed China more than 540 million rubles by the end of 1975, and this figure rises to 1.6 billion rubles if credit, the payment of specialists and other items of this type are included. Albania is also greatly dependent on China in the military sphere; the Albanian Army has been almost completely re-equipped with materiel of Chinese production.

Serious differences of opinion between Peking and Tirana, however, have been noticeable in recent years. Dissatisfaction has been aroused in Albania by cuts in Chinese economic aid and the negligible impact of this aid: Chinese organizations are taking too long to draw up plans and compile technical documents and are not delivering equipment and materials on schedule. This is disrupting the plans for the start-up of industrial and other facilities being constructed with the aid of the PRC.

The Albanian leaders have been greatly alarmed and disturbed by the sharp zigzags in Peking's foreign policy and its increased rapprochement with the West, especially the United States. Albania began to depart from its unquestioning acceptance of Chinese foreign policy in 1972--that is, after Nixon's trip to the PRC. In contrast to Peking, which has attached primary significance to the struggle against worldwide socialism and is allying itself on these grounds with imperialism and extreme reaction, Albania still has a foreign policy which is pointedly anti-imperialist in its nature. Tirana is still not relaxing its antagonism toward the United States, the FRG, England and Japan and has refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with them, although the governments of these states have repeatedly

made overtures in this direction. In the same way, it opposes U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia and has declined to follow China's example of support for NATO and the Common Market. Albania has a negative view of Western military and economic organizations, regarding them as one of the sources of international tension.

The Albanians' strongest attack on their Chinese ally was the article in ZERI I POPULLIT of 7 July 1977, in which Mao Tse-tung's theory of the "three worlds" was debunked. Although China was not referred to by name in this article and although the article was quite full of anti-Sovietism, there can be no doubt about the target of the attack. The Albanian foreign minister's statement at the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly and M. Shehu's speech at a reception on the national holiday of 28 November 1977 demonstrated once again that the Albanian leaders are continuing to defend their own positions and are diverging from Peking's line more and more.

Anti-Sovietism as the Basis of Peking's Policy--A distinctive feature of Peking's present foreign policy is its increasingly one-sided anti-Soviet orientation combined with flirtation with the imperialist states on this basis. Virtually all of China's international actions are based on a desire to inflict maximum harm on the Soviet Union, achieve its "isolation" and organize a crusade by imperialism and worldwide reaction against the world's first socialist state. It is precisely from this vantage point that China's partners and "allies" are chosen in the international arena. This is the course proclaimed by Peking to be the "revolutionary foreign policy line of Mao Tse-tung."

The shift toward anti-Sovietism in Peking's foreign policy was a consistent one and was reflected in the decisions of CCP congresses. While the Ninth CCP Congress (April 1969) set the objective of simultaneous struggle against the United States and the USSR--in particular, it stated that "China has pointedly dissociated itself from American imperialism and Soviet revisionism" and that "a new historical period has begun--a period of struggle against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism"²¹--another step in the direction of increased hostility toward the Soviet Union was taken at the 11th CCP Congress on 12-18 August 1977. In his political report, Hua Kuo-feng called the Soviet Union and the United States the sources of war and ascribed the greatest danger to the USSR's policies. He called for the establishment of a "united front" of struggle, which was to be directed primarily against the Soviet Union. This premise is also stated in the new CCP Charter as a policy-making guide. Hua Kuo-feng harshly attacked the Soviet Union in this report, repeated the allegation that the Soviet Union "has not rejected the idea of enslaving China" and asserted that "disputes over fundamental issues" with the USSR would continue for a long time and that China would continue to "wage a resolute point-by-point struggle" in the future.

Although speakers at the 11th Congress declared that "China and the Soviet Union should maintain normal intergovernmental relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence," the Chinese leaders not only failed

to make any constructive proposals concerning the normalization of relations between the PRC and the USSR, but also made it appear that no initiating steps had been taken by our side by stating that the Soviet Union's desire to improve intergovernmental relations with the PRC would have to be "proved by the actual deeds of the USSR."

Although the Chinese leaders have tried to put all of the blame for the present state of Soviet-Chinese relations on the Soviet Union and to represent the PRC as the side which has initiated steps to which the Soviet Union has allegedly not wished to respond, it is precisely these leaders who are setting absolutely unacceptable preliminary conditions for the normalization of relations, which will essentially bring Soviet-Chinese relations to a further impasse. Peking is demanding nothing more or less from the Soviet Union than a denial of its political course and basic policy-making premises, which have been reinforced in the decisions of the 20th through 25th CPSU congresses and in the CPSU Program, as well as the recognition of some kind of Soviet "errors" and "faults" dating back to 1960.

The highest-ranking leaders of the PRC--Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien and others--systematically issue anti-Soviet statements. During the course of their contacts with foreigners, they try to convince the latter of the "impossibility of reconciling" China with the Soviet Union due to the presence of "radical, irreconcilable and fundamental differences between the USSR and the PRC."

The objectives of internal development, economic progress and military construction were openly linked with the PRC's anti-Soviet course at the 11th CCP Congress. The need to establish "strong economic and defense forces" and accelerate the modernization of the army is substantiated by some kind of "threat" on the part of the USSR.

In Peking's policy on the USSR, it is indicative that the PRC leaders are intensifying political and ideological confrontation, particularly in the international arena, but are conducting themselves with restraint in practical intergovernmental relations.

The foreign policy of the new Chinese leaders, which is formulated in the decisions of the 11th CCP Congress, is based on the idea that the establishment of Peking's world supremacy is blocked by the two greatest powers--the United States and the USSR--which can only be eliminated by the instigation of military conflict between them. The optimal variant of this plan calls for Europe to represent the strategic center of this conflict. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of this kind of conflict in another region of the world, far away from China--for example, in Africa. In accordance with these plans, all of the imperialist and socialist states are to become involved in the military conflict. The states of the Third World will no longer be allies of the socialist countries and will enter the PRC's sphere of influence. As for China itself, it is prepared to ally itself with any forces that might seem useful to it in its confrontation with its chief enemy. At present, the Soviet Union has been declared this

chief enemy. For this reason, the other "superpower"--the United States, just as its allies--is regarded as a state with which rapprochement must be sought and the potential of which must be used for the reinforcement of China's strength.

The need to provoke a worldwide conflagration in the hegemonic interests of China was the reason for the advancement of the theory concerning the "inevitability" of a third world war. The prediction of war and even its advocacy now represent an integral part of all of the political activity of the Peking leaders. They frankly hope to turn anti-Sovietism into an instrument for the provocation of large and small international conflicts, into an instrument for struggle against the relaxation of tension in the world. This is why Peking's foreign policy represents a danger for the people of all states, regardless of their social structure. Peking's foreign policy is now entering a new stage, even more hostile and even more dangerous for the forces of peace, democracy and socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 17 February 1977.
2. Ibid., 24 June 1977.
3. Ibid., 13 May 1977.
4. Mao Tse-tung, "Selected Works," vol 5, Peking, 1977, pp 267-268 (in Chinese).
5. PRAVDA, 30 November 1976.
6. YOMIURI, 24 August 1977.
7. ASAHI, 17 May 1977.
8. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 11 January 1977.
9. THE SUNDAY TIMES, 27 March 1977.
10. PRAVDA, 2 September 1977.
11. YOMIURI, 17 May 1977.
12. PRAVDA, 29 June 1977.
13. DIE WELT, 14 May 1977.
14. LE FIGARO, 3 November 1976.

15. SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 14 August 1977.
16. PRAVDA, 9 April 1977.
17. Ibid.
18. LE FIGARO, 23 May 1977.
19. PRAVDA, 6 July 1977.
20. DIE WELT, 14 May 1977.
21. "Eleventh All-China Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Documents)," Peking, 1969, pp 91, 92, 94.

8588

CSO: 1805

VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S PROGRESSION TOWARD NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 48-57

[Article by Nguyen Khanh Toan, chairman of the Committee for the Social Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam]

[Summary] The progressive world public received the news of the declaration of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with tremendous satisfaction. The establishment of a unified Vietnam, representing an outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia, was the result of many years of selfless struggle by the Vietnamese people for the independence and territorial integrity of their country.

In ancient times, the Vietnamese land was constantly the object of aggression from its neighbors to the North. China annexed the region in the second century B.C. and ruled it for more than a thousand years. Later, France, Japan and the United States pursued their own expansionist plans in this nation. The Vietnamese people, however, never yielded to their enemies and never reconciled themselves to the puppet leaders placed on their throne by foreign invaders. The population of Vietnam preserved its national uniqueness and the best of its national traditions and culture through the centuries.

The unity displayed by the masses during the period of Chinese occupation served as the basis which made it possible for the nation to regain its independence and sovereignty. During crucial moments in the early life of this nation, the basic interests of the ruling class coincided with the public interest. As soon as these times of trial would pass, however, the feudal lords would quickly reinforce the absolute supremacy of the landowning class with the aid of the throne and the bureaucracy. At certain times during Vietnam's history, when it was being threatened by foreign enemies, this centralized feudal power was a historic necessity. When outside aggression was no longer imminent, however, the centralized monarchy was always a source of disagreements, conflicts and civil wars.

All of this changed during the modern period, when the feudal aristocracy submitted to the French colonizers. This severed all ties between the aristocracy and the masses and gave rise to various patriotic movements. Finally, the Vietnamese revolution, under the guidance of a progressive proletarian party, became an invincible force, completely did away with the colonial regime, changed conditions in the country dramatically and proved that the people of the East were no longer content to play a passive role in world history.

By combining the struggle for national independence with a struggle for socialism, the Vietnamese Communist Party was able to mobilize and unite the forces for socialism and the traditional patriotism of the Vietnamese people. On the strength of this, the Vietnamese revolution was completely supported by all forces fighting for socialism, national independence, democracy and peace in the world. Now that the Vietnamese people, guided by their party, have been victorious in their war of resistance against the American aggressors, they are building socialism in their nation. They now know that national independence and socialism are one and the same.

8588
CSO: 1805

SOVIET-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY TURNS TWENTY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 58-68

[Article by O. B. Rakhmanin, deputy chairman of the board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society]

[Summary] The Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society was our nation's first society for friendship with the people of foreign countries. It was founded by the Soviet public for the purpose of promoting the reinforcement and development of ties with the Chinese public and to give the Soviet people a better understanding of China's revolutionary history and its rich culture and art. The friendship between the Russian and Chinese people is of long standing. The Great October Socialist Revolution laid the basis for this friendship and its ideals penetrated the hearts and minds of the Chinese workers. The Soviet Republic supported the Chinese people in their struggle against imperialist oppression. It was the first state to establish egalitarian relations with China when this was still a semicolonial country. During the period of the broad-scale revolutionary demonstrations of the 1920's in China, Soviet trade unions organized the mass-scale "Hands Off China" movement, the Soviet public collected donations for the Chinese and used these funds to purchase weapons, fuel and ammunition for the Chinese fighters, and Soviet military advisers and volunteers fought shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese in their struggle. This helped the Chinese people withstand their 8-year war with imperialist Japan. Soviet support was an important factor contributing to the historic victory won by the Chinese people in 1949.

After the People's Republic of China was declared on 1 October 1949, the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize the young republic and establish diplomatic relations with it. In February 1950 a treaty on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance was concluded by the USSR and the PRC and an agreement was signed on the granting of a Soviet loan to the PRC. From the first days of the PRC's existence, ties were established between trade unions, women's organizations, sports organizations, artistic unions and other organizations in the two countries.

The ties between the Soviet and Chinese people became even deeper after the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society was founded. Soon after its founding, it became a representative organization of the Soviet public, the board of which included prominent Soviet statesmen and public figures, progressive industrial and agricultural workers, famous military leaders, scientists, writers, artists and actors. More than 400 large industrial enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, VUZ's, other academic institutions and various establishments joined the society as collective members. Branches of this society were founded in many republics, kray's, oblasts and cities.

The Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society has done a great deal of work to acquaint the Soviet public with various spheres of Chinese life, China's ancient history and rich culture, and the Chinese people's struggle against internal and external enemies and their success in socialist construction. Articles by members of the society have been printed in many central and local newspapers and magazines. Some members have given radio talks on China. Various exhibits are organized and new Chinese films are screened by the society's branches.

Since the mid-1960's, the Maoist leaders in the PRC have attempted to substitute alienation and even hatred for the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese people. All Chinese propaganda is now aimed at destroying traditional Soviet-Chinese relations. In contrast to this, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, guided by the consistent policy of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government toward the preservation of friendly ties with the Chinese people, has never stopped promoting this friendship for a single day.

8588
CSO: 1805

MORE EVIDENCE OF THE ANTSOCIALIST ESSENCE OF MAOISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 69-83

[Article by Ye. A. Konovalov, doctor of economic sciences, V. F. Feoktistov, candidate of philosophical sciences, and A. G. Yakovlev, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The 11th CCP Congress, which was held in Peking in August 1977, showed that the present Chinese leadership is striving to preserve Maoism as the guiding ideology of the party and state and is calling for compliance with Mao Tse-tung's instructions on ideological, political, organizational and economic matters. The political report of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng of the CCP Central Committee and other congress documents are permeated with unrestrained glorification of the "thought" and actions of Mao Tse-tung. The "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" has been declared "the latest addition to the theoretical treasury of Marxism-Leninism," "a powerful ideological weapon for the people of the world" and "the most valuable legacy" bequeathed by Mao Tse-tung to "our era."

One of the measures taken to secure a place for Maoism as the guiding official ideology in the future as well was the publication of the fifth volume of Mao Tse-tung's "selected works" in April 1977.

A detailed analysis of official commentaries in the Peking press on the fifth volume indicates that this publication is connected with the latest crisis within the Chinese leadership after Mao Tse-tung's death. The Peking press notes that the publication of this volume "resulted from the routing of the antiparty 'four,'" who allegedly opposed the publication of Mao Tse-tung's writings in the form of a collection of his works and sabotaged this work in every way possible; to counteract their efforts, the HSIN-HUA AGENCY reported on 14 April 1977, "the Central Committee, headed by Hua Kuo-feng, intensified the editing work on the fifth volume" and arranged for its "rush" publication.

The position occupied by the "four" in the interpretation of Maoism would be difficult to judge accurately from reports in the press. The position of the present leadership, however, can be quite fully judged primarily by the

particular works that were chosen from Mao Tse-tung's ideological legacy and by the cuts that were made during the "editing" of this volume. It seems to us that this kind of analysis could shed some light on the nature and essence of the course of the present Chinese leadership.

The fifth volume includes 70 works by Mao Tse-tung, dating from September 1949 through November 1957. Of these, 46 have been published for the first time. The collection does not include 42 of Mao Tse-tung's speeches which were published earlier in the public Chinese press and in the Red Guard collection "Long Live the Thought of Mao Tse-tung!"

All of Mao Tse-tung's works are grouped according to three periods: the period of national economic reconstruction, agrarian reform and the movement for resistance against America and aid to Korea (September 1949-1952), the elaboration of the CCP general line during the transitional period (1953-August 1956), and works and speeches following the Eighth CCP Congress (September 1956-November 1957). Nonetheless, all of them are united by a single heading: works of the "period of socialist revolution and socialist construction." And there is good reason for this: The edition should, according to the plans of its organizers, convey the impression that Mao Tse-tung developed and implemented the theory of socialist construction "under new historical conditions" for the first time in the history of Marxism.

Everyone knows that the period of 1949-1957 was the time of the successful accomplishment of democratic and social reforms in the PRC, carried out by the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist theory of scientific socialism, as a result of which the initial foundation of socialism actually was laid in China. This success was achieved in spite of the "thought" and policies of Mao Tse-tung. Incidentally, Mao Tse-tung himself made unofficial statements--for example, in 1958--to the effect that a "revisionist line" was supposedly being implemented in China from 1949 (and particularly after 1952) until 1958, that concessions were made during this period to "bourgeois ideology" and "bourgeois style," that the "Chiang Kai-shek spirit had not been overcome" in the cities and that China "immersed itself in the bourgeois stench."¹ The publishers of Mao Tse-tung's works, however, faced by this obvious contradiction to Mao's own later statements, have tried to represent the matter in such a way that even this initial period in the development of the PRC supposedly represented the embodiment of the "thought" and "lines" of Mao Tse-tung. The purpose of this kind of falsification is completely self-evident: They wish to reinforce their own thesis of the "thought" of Mao as the basis of all of the Chinese people's success in the construction of socialism with concrete historical material. In view of the fact that this kind of material cannot be found in the history of the PRC after 1957, when Mao Tse-tung's "thought" lay at the basis of CCP policy, the present publishers of Mao's works are trying to give the credit to this "thought" for the actual successes which were achieved in the PRC in the areas of economics, politics and culture during the first 8 years of its existence in spite of the "thought" and course of Mao Tse-tung.

In order to prove this thesis, the "editors" of Mao Tse-tung's works have issued a selected edition of his writings. Besides this, they have taken advantage of the fact that, during this first, 8-year period in the existence of the PRC, Mao Tse-tung was forced to take the general dominant tendency in CCP policy into account--a tendency totally consistent with the theory and practice of scientific socialism and based on consideration for the experience in socialist construction in the USSR and the other socialist countries--and maneuver, double-deal and adapt to this tendency. During this time, Mao Tse-tung sometimes made correct statements to convey the impression that he supported the CCP's course toward the construction of socialism and toward friendship and solidarity with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp as a whole. At the same time, he was slowly preparing for the subsequent revision of the CCP's Marxist-Leninist general line and for its replacement with his own voluntaristic and chauvinist program, which was also reflected in his statements of that period. All of this was the reason why the present Chinese leaders accompanied the publication of the new volume of Mao Tse-tung's works with a large number of official commentaries, explaining how certain works and speeches by Mao Tse-tung should be interpreted. Consequently, these commentaries were supposed to "remove" the remaining contradictory traces of some of Mao's statements of this period and simultaneously emphasize certain parts, so that all of Mao Tse-tung's statements would fit in with the subsequent Maoist "general" and "basic" lines which were formulated by Mao Tse-tung in 1958 and 1962.

The falsification of the history of the CCP and the PRC in the 1949-1957 period and of Mao Tse-tung's positions on fundamental aspects of CCP domestic and foreign policy was also aided by the exclusion of a large number of Mao Tse-tung's speeches (a total of 42) of this period from the collection. These speeches can be divided into two large groups--statements on Soviet-Chinese relations and PRC foreign policy, and statements concerning aspects of the internal life of the nation, mainly problems connected with the essence and nature of socialist reforms in China.

In the statements of the first group which were not included in the fifth volume, Mao Tse-tung commends the policy of the Soviet Union and the CPSU in regard to the rendering of all-round assistance to China in the revolution and in socialist construction and in regard to the reinforcement of the solidarity of the socialist camp, the international communist movement and the struggle for peace and against the instigators of war. In these statements, Mao Tse-tung stressed the need for an even stronger friendship with the Soviet Union, declaring that the Soviet Union's experience in socialist construction "sets an example for the construction of a new China."² In this connection, it is indicative that the collection does not include Mao Tse-tung's speech at the Anniversary Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in November 1957, in which he commented on the historic significance of the 20th CPSU Congress. Since these statements by Mao obviously contradict his later statements (from April 1956 on), in which he attacked the 20th CPSU Congress and the Soviet Union's experience in socialist construction in general, they were not included by the "editors" in the new collection of Mao Tse-tung's works.

The second group of Mao's statements not included in the fifth volume concerned the domestic policy of the CCP, mainly evaluations of the nature of social reforms in the PRC and the essence of the transitional period. In several of these statements, Mao Tse-tung said that the class struggle had essentially ended after 1956 and that "in 3 years the socialist revolution will have been essentially completed on the scale of the entire nation."³

This obviously contradicts Mao Tse-tung's later statements about the need for "class struggle" during the entire socialist period.

The new volume also does not include Mao's statements in which he recognized the service performed by Marx and Lenin in the elaboration of theoretical aspects of the socialist transformation of rural areas and declared that agricultural cooperation was not a "new matter" or "new theory," that "Marx was already talking about this more than 100 years ago" and that "this was already done in Russia more than 30 years ago."⁴ These statements by Mao contradict the thesis of current Peking propaganda on Mao's "contribution" to the development of the theory of socialism in general and the theory of socialist agricultural reforms in particular.

Therefore, when they made their selection of Mao's works from the 1949-1957 period, the compilers of the collection attempted, as it were, to "purge" Mao of the statements he had been forced to make at that time by the actual state of affairs and the dominant tendency in CCP policy. In other words, the Mao Tse-tung of the 1950's is depicted by the editors of the fifth volume of his works from the position of the Mao Tse-tung "line" of the 1960's and 1970's, when he began to openly embark upon his chauvinistic and anti-Soviet course. In this way, the organizers of this publication are trying to unburden Mao Tse-tung himself of accusations of double-dealing, a practice against which he fervently advocated struggle during the last years of his life.

Let us examine the basic aspects of the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung which the organizers of the publication have singled out and are trying to foist upon the party and people.

The materials have been selected, and the commentaries "worked over," in such a way that the idea of the necessity for class struggle against the "enemies" of the revolution, struggle against the "bourgeoisie" and "its guardian angels within the party," stands out clearly in every section of the volume. The organizers of the publication wish to indicate that this idea was first expressed in Mao Tse-tung's "Resolution" on an intra-party document of 6 June 1952, in which he stated that "the major conflict in China" after the overthrow of the landowning class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie "became the conflict between the working class and the national bourgeoisie."⁵ This statement, which is correct in principle for the transition period, was later "developed" in other works by Mao Tse-tung prior to his idea about the need to continue class struggle throughout the socialist period right up to the construction of communism. Although this idea in its final form was expressed by Mao Tse-tung in a speech at the Tenth Plenum

of the CCP Central Committee in 1962, its sources can be found in earlier works included in the fifth volume, particularly his speech at a conference of secretaries of the party committees of provinces, cities and autonomous regions in January 1957, the text of which has never been published prior to this time. In this speech, Mao Tse-tung stated: "Everything in society represents a unity of conflicts. The socialist society itself is also a unity of conflicts; in it, we see a unity of the conflicts within the population and a unity of the conflicts between us and our enemies.... Conflicting classes, conflicting people and conflicting opinions still exist in society."

Other works by Mao, particularly his report "On the Correct Resolution of Conflicts Within the Population" (February 1957), in this volume are also subordinated to the same goal--the substantiation of the Maoist theory of "continued revolution under dictatorship by the proletariat"--that is, the need for irreconcilable "class struggle" in the socialist society. In this report, Mao Tse-tung attempted the theoretical substantiation of the open revision of the CCP general line during the transition period and the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress (1956) by advancing the anti-Marxist and subjectivist idea of the existence of "two types" of conflicts, unidentical in their nature, in the socialist society--the so-called conflicts "between us and our enemies" and "the conflicts within the population." Mao Tse-tung's line of reasoning essentially had the purpose of representing socialism as a society in which antagonistic classes--the bourgeoisie and the proletariat--still exist; the struggle between these classes was alleged to be the characteristic feature and content of the socialist stage of the human society's development. The profanation of the Marxist class approach to the question of the nature of conflicts in the socialist society and the arbitrary assignment of social groups and classes to the categories "population" and "enemies" in this report paved the way for the subsequent subjectivism and voluntarism in Maoist social policy and served as theoretical grounds for the Maoists' political repressions against the supporters of scientific socialism.

Mao Tse-tung's thesis about the existence of antagonistic classes in the socialist society and the need to conduct a "class struggle" under these new conditions against the allegedly still-existent bourgeoisie represented open revision of the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress, which declared the victory of socialism in the PRC's economic order and the essential cessation of class struggle in the nation.

The fifth volume also includes a large number of Mao's works on the intelligentsia and its re-education. These works, written in the spirit of the Maoist idea about the "bourgeois essence" of the intelligentsia, served as grounds for future political persecution of figures in science, literature and the arts.

A significant part of the volume is taken up by Mao's works on the need for "struggle against bourgeois ideology," both in Chinese society and in the party (criticism of the views of Po I-po, Hu Feng and Liang Shu-ning, the

statement on the "Hundred Flowers" course and others). The publication of all these works is obviously expected to demonstrate the "continuity" and "naturalness" of the later Maoist policy of "class struggle" against various kinds of "bourgeois elements" and the "bourgeoisie." For this reason, it is not surprising that the volume contains many works connected with the "suppression of counterrevolution." The reason for including this kind of "work" in the fifth volume is evidently connected with the current internal political situation in the nation and reveals the intention of the CCP's present leaders to make extensive use of provocation and terrorist methods for the suppression of their political opponents with the aid of the "instructions" of their late "helmsman."

The next important aspect of the "thought" of Mao presented in the new volume of his works is his assessment of the general CCP line during the transitional period. The volume includes separate statements made by Mao in the spirit of the general CCP line of 1953. For example, it includes excerpts from Mao Tse-tung's speech at the 15 June 1953 meeting of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, in which he "criticizes the rightist errors" of Liu Shao-ch'i and, in general, correctly sets forth the basic premises of the general CCP line of the transition period. "The general line and basic objectives of the CCP in the transition period," Mao said, "consist in the essential accomplishment of the industrialization of the nation and the socialist transformation of agriculture, cottage industry and capitalist industry and trade within 10-15 years or a slightly longer period of time. This general line is a beacon illuminating all of the types of work we perform. We must not depart from this general line since departures from it will give rise to errors of 'leftist' or rightist leanings" (p 51). As we have already mentioned, this position taken by Mao Tse-tung is explained by his tactic of maneuvering and adapting to the dominant tendency in CCP policy of that period--the tendency toward the development of the socialist revolution essentially on the basis of the theory of scientific communism. The present "editors" of the volume, however, present the matter in such a way that Mao Tse-tung not only agreed with the premises of the general line of 1953, but even defended it against "errors" of rightist and "leftist" leanings.

In an attempt to depict Mao Tse-tung as the engineer of the CCP line during all stages of socialist construction, the "editors" have included Mao's speech at the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee on 9 October 1957, in which he resumed his attempts to force his own voluntaristic course on the CCP--his course of constructing socialism according to the principle of "bigger, faster, better and cheaper." In this way, a connection is drawn between the general line of the CCP (1953) and Mao's "Three Red Flags" policy, which thereby appears to be a further development of the general line despite the fact that it is a total contradiction of this line.

The tendentious nature of the selection of Mao's works also made itself apparent in the question of attitudes toward the Eighth CCP Congress. The fifth volume only includes Mao's statements about the Eighth CCP Congress

prior to its convening (for example, the "Report on the Ten Main Relationships" of 25 April 1956 and "Speech by Mao Tse-tung at the First Session of the Eighth CCP Congress Preparatory Conference" of 30 August 1956). While, in this first report, Mao Tse-tung was still trying on the whole to foist his own idea about China's economic and sociopolitical development on the party, in the second speech he took the negative attitude of some CCP leaders towards this course into account, made temporary concessions and, limiting himself to general phrases about the need to "successfully conduct" the coming congress, focused his attention on the makeup of the future central committee.

The position occupied by the volume's compilers has the goal of belittling the significance of the Eighth CCP Congress and of its decisions and depicting Mao Tse-tung as the engineer of the CCP's line during the first 8 years of the PRC's existence, which led to significant successes in China's economic and sociopolitical development. In other words, Mao Tse-tung is "given" not only the period after 1958 (as was previously the case), but also the entire preceding, successful stage in the development of the PRC. The matter is represented in such a way that Mao Tse-tung was supposedly elaborating the CCP's general line for the transitional period from the very beginning and that this line later naturally "evolved" into Mao's "Three Red Flags" policy--that is, into the new general line which Mao forced on the CCP in 1958 and which contradicted the previous general line of 1953 and the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress.

A large part of the volume is occupied by works on economic issues. Some of them were published previously while others are being published for the first time; the texts of some exceedingly important works, however, differ from known publications of the 1950's and 1960's. The substantially altered works include the statement "On the Ten Main Relationships" (25 April 1956). In the commentary to this work, the "editors" of the volume underscore the fact that, in this work, Mao Tse-tung, "citing the experience of the USSR as a bad example, summarized the experience of our nation...and advanced the basic premises of the course of socialist construction according to the bigger, faster, better and cheaper principle" (p 267). Therefore, emphasis is placed on the criticism of shortcomings and errors which had allegedly recently been seen in the process of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and on the departure from the previous general line of socialist construction in China to a transition period.

This work denigrates the colossal experience accumulated by the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries in economic construction and exaggerates isolated shortcomings and difficulties of secondary importance. At the same time, it praises the modest results attained in the reconstruction of the nation's economy, primarily in agriculture. For example, the author categorically states that, "by constantly focusing on agriculture and developing it, we properly provided ourselves with grain and the raw materials needed for industrial development" (p 268). This was untrue even at the time when the speech was made and is still fundamentally inapplicable to PRC even today.

In another section of the work "On the Ten Main Relationships," the new edition draws a parallel between the defensive strength of the PRC and that of the Soviet Union. "As a result of the resistance of American aggression, the rendering of assistance to Korea and several years of regulation and training, our army has gained strength and has become more powerful than the Soviet Red Army on the eve of World War II" (p 271). In this same section, the author insists on the further development of modern weapons, primarily on the production of China's own atom bomb. "We should have more aircraft and guns and we should have an atom bomb. We cannot do without one if we are to defend ourselves in today's world" (ibid.). Mao advocates a "wholehearted desire for an atom bomb" and calls for a discussion of strategic issues in the Military Council (p 272).

Turning to the interrelations between the state and the workers, Mao makes passing mention of the "particular error" committed in 1954 in the implementation of policy toward the peasantry, when, in spite of the poor harvest caused by floods, the state nonetheless purchased 3.5 million tons "more than necessary" of grain from the peasants (p 273). This evoked the dissatisfaction of the peasants and required some revision of purchasing policy. It is a well-known fact, however, that the system of purchases and taxes in the PRC became even more rigid and more inconsistent with the true interests of the Chinese peasantry in subsequent years, particularly when the people's communes were established. Nevertheless, Mao Tse-tung still attempts to contrast the "correct" policy in his nation to that conducted in the Soviet Union, even at a time when the fundamental issues concerning the alliance of the working class and the peasantry in China were unsolved and at a time when the most flagrant violations of relations between the state and the peasants were permitted in China. His recollections of the reduction of the discrepancy between prices on industrial and agricultural products and the policy of equivalent exchange, which was allegedly implemented in China in the interests of the peasantry, appear completely far-fetched.

On the whole, the present edition of Mao Tse-tung's work "On the Ten Main Relationships" has the goal of denigrating all of the Soviet Union's experience in socialist construction, justifying the huge miscalculations in PRC economic policy (including the future "Great Leap Forward") and extolling the "unique" path of socialist construction in China under the banner of Maoism.

Many of Mao's economic studies concern aspects of agrarian policy and the establishment of agricultural cooperatives. The basic purpose of all the works published in this volume is to convince the reader that Mao Tse-tung allegedly wisely perceived that "a new upsurge in the mass socialist movement in rural areas is gathering strength throughout the nation" in the mid-1950's (p 168). In Mao's opinion, this movement not only involved the rural population of 500 million but was also of tremendous international significance. This was a time when, as soon as the cooperative movement began to develop, hundreds of thousands of production cooperatives were established. During this period, the major tasks consisted in strengthening existing

cooperatives, determining and reinforcing the advantages of the cooperative structure and gradually turning cooperatives of the semisocialist type into cooperatives of a higher type. Mao, however, was waging a battle against "skeptics" within the party, who supposedly had doubts about the possibility of a new and dramatic upsurge in the cooperative movement on the scale of the entire nation. Mao Tse-tung set all his hopes upon the activity of the peasants and their particularly deliberate way of entering cooperative ventures. This work was to serve as a point of departure in the movement for the artificial stimulation of cooperative development in the rural areas--and in the party--in the movement for the struggle against "rightist leanings," which allegedly arose "when some comrades were frightened by the appearance of several hundred thousand small cooperatives" (p 175).

When we analyze the corresponding works by Mao Tse-tung, it is striking that the author does not bring the rates of cooperative development and the rates of technical reform in the rural areas into the necessary and essential correspondence. According to Mao's instructions, "the period of technical reforms in agriculture will be somewhat longer than the period of social reforms" and "will require 4 or 5 five-year plans--that is, approximately 20-25 years." As experience showed, however, the rate of social reforms in the PRC was radically speeded up, and the date for the establishment of a material and technical basis for collective farming has now been postponed to the end of the present century in accordance with the program for the modernization of agriculture.

The next issue which is thoroughly examined in the fifth volume of Mao Tse-tung's works is the question of the prospects for China's economic development. The compilers and editors of the volume tried to represent Mao's statements on this matter in such a way as to de-emphasize his adventuristic projects for catching up with the world's leading nations within the next few years and, conversely, have emphasized quotations from the works in which he takes a more cautious approach to the dates for "catching up and passing up." According to the published text of the speech presented at the first session of the Eighth CCP Congress preparatory conference, he said: "China has no reason not to catch up with the United States; otherwise it will have no pride and will not be as great" (p 296). "We need 50-60 years and then we will certainly catch up" (ibid.). "If China cannot pass up the United States within 50-60 years, what kind of prestige will it have? Then it will have to be banished from the earth. For this reason, passing up America is not only possible, but also absolutely essential, essential at any cost. If this is not done, our Chinese nation will be unworthy of all the world's nations and our contribution to the development of civilization will be small" (ibid.). These and other statements by Mao Tse-tung⁶ are linked with his later references to the "prestige" of the nation and "China's great contribution to the history of civilization." Their ambitious and great-power nature became most apparent at the time of the "Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution."

An analysis of the documents concerning economic issues, published in the fifth volume of Mao Tse-tung's "Selected Works," demonstrates the noticeable evolution of his views on fundamental aspects of socialist construction in the direction of adventuristic anticipation, insufficient attention to objective conditions in the nation and contempt for the rich international experience of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the area of economic construction. On the other hand, even in this sphere, Mao Tse-tung proved to be a man who had to be judged primarily by his deeds rather than by his speeches, articles and commentaries. Since the end of the 1950's, Maoist practices have almost always been completely inconsistent with many of the statements included in the fifth volume of Mao Tse-tung's "Selected Works."

Questions of World Politics, the International Position of the PRC and Chinese-Soviet Relations--Of all the works included in the volume, approximately only a third are concerned in one way or another with international issues, and even these only touch upon them briefly. Mao usually limits himself to one or two phrases of the most general nature or, to the contrary, touches upon some particular aspect of international life. Virtually none of the works contain any kind of systematic analysis of the international position of the PRC or of any significant international issues. The "Soviet theme" prevails among the foreign policy issues discussed in the volume.

The selections were chosen for the volume in such a way as to emphasize Mao's particular views on these matters which led directly to the basic premises of the Maoist foreign policy doctrine formulated after 1957.

In particular, in reference to the situation in the Middle East in connection with the Suez crisis (1956), Mao Tse-tung underscored the fact that "Asia and Africa represent the chief areas to which imperialism's tentacles are drawn" and that this conflict supposedly provided some "idea of the location of the center of the struggle going on in the world" (p 341). As for the actual center of this struggle, the major conflict of the present day, Mao notes in passing: "Naturally, the conflict between imperialism and the socialist countries is still extremely intense" (p 341--"Speech at the Conference of Secretaries of the Party Committees of Provinces, Cities and Autonomous Regions," January 1957).

It is precisely from this line of reasoning that we can draw a straight line to the idea of "intermediate zones" and to the "scientific premise on the three worlds"--that is, to the premises which constituted, so to speak, the "general theoretical" basis of the PRC foreign policy of the 1960's and 1970's, characterized by hostility toward international forces for peace and socialism.

The thesis of the unavoidability of world war and of the lack of anything that bad or frightening about war--a thesis which essentially has been the central point of Maoist propaganda in the 1960's and 1970's--is also quite thoroughly examined in the works by Mao included in the volume. In such

works as "The Atom Bomb Cannot Frighten the Chinese People" (25 January 1955), "American Imperialism is a Paper Tiger" (14 July 1956) and "All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers" (November 1957) and in the above-mentioned speech at the conference of secretaries of the party committees of provinces, cities and autonomous regions (January 1957), Mao constantly reiterates that the Chinese should not be afraid of military conflict with imperialism since "imperialism is much more afraid of us." He insists that the aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed and that it is capable of unleashing a war. Here Mao only makes obscure references to the growing strength of antiwar forces and to the mortal danger of war for imperialism, a danger which the West must take into consideration. His work, "The Great Victory in the Struggle Against American Aggression, the Rendering of Assistance to Korea and Future Objectives" (12 September 1953), anticipates, as it were, Mao's later arguments that world war, at the worst, will lead to the death of half of the human race. In this work, Mao points out the fact that China's 3 years of participation in the Korean war did not cost much and that "the amount spent was not so great"--"less than the annual tax collected from industry and trade" (p 104). Inspired by these computations, he declared at this point that China was ready to fight against American imperialism if the latter wished.

Two or three of Mao's comments about the struggle for peace as a PRC objective, contained in his works of the early 1950's that are included in the fifth volume, essentially contradict his later arguments about the "dialectic interconnection and interpenetration" of war and peace, which, what is more, imply that war is not only not a misfortune, but is actually a blessing, since it supposedly leads ultimately to the downfall of imperialism.

The volume contains statements which, in combination, clearly express the idea that China is essentially becoming the avant-garde of the world revolution and the "most correct" force in this revolution. In connection with the war in Korea, Mao made direct reference to China's role as the protector of the peoples of the East. The "Order Issued to Chinese Popular Volunteers" (8 October 1950) clearly states that they are being sent into battle "for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Koreans, the Chinese and all peoples of the East" (p 32). In this context, it is quite indicative that Mao did not have a single word to say about the role of international socialist forces in the success of the struggle against American aggression in Korea in any of the works in the volume concerning this war. The role of these forces is not even mentioned in the work "The Great Victory in the Struggle Against American Aggression, the Rendering of Assistance to Korea and Future Objectives" (12 September 1953), in which Mao presents a fairly detailed analysis of the reasons for the successful repulsion of imperialist intervention against the DPRK. In listing these reasons, he only makes reference to the heroism and unity of the Korean and Chinese peoples, as well as the organic weaknesses inherent in a military adversary such as imperialism.

In June 1950, Mao began saying that many people in China did not understand all of the great victories of the Chinese revolution and that, for this reason, "extensive propaganda of the tremendous significance of the Chinese people's victory is needed in the party and among the masses" (p 21); later, he described the situation in such a way that either everything in China was done better than in the other socialist countries or the people in China knew precisely just how to do everything better. This implied that Peking was simply obligated to set others on the right path, on the Chinese path. From the very beginning, "others" signified the Soviet Union above all. While in his public work, "An Enquiry Into the Correct Resolution of Conflicts Within the Population" (27 February 1957), Mao hypocritically declared: "The situation is different in each socialist country and each communist country and, for this reason, we are not at all of the opinion that they must or should employ Chinese methods" (p 394), in January of the same year, in his speech at the private conference of secretaries of the party committees of provinces, cities and autonomous regions, he insisted on the need to force these same "Chinese methods" on the Soviet Union and precisely for the reason that there were differences between the two countries. "Their way of thinking, line of action, historical traditions and habits are not the same as ours," he said at this conference. "This is why we must work on the Soviet Union" (p 344).

The selection of works represented in the volume is such that it clearly implies how negligible, from Mao's standpoint, the significance of international socialist and other revolutionary forces was in the victory of the Chinese Revolution and in the construction of socialism in China. In the speech with which the volume begins, "The Chinese People Have Stood Up Straight," Mao evaluated the role played by these forces in the fate of people's China only in the sense that unity with the USSR and the other nations of the socialist camp was necessary "so that we would not be isolated in the struggle to preserve the fruits of the victory of the people's revolution and the fight against attempts by internal and external enemies to revive the old order" (p 6). As for all-round cooperation with the socialist countries and their fraternal assistance of China, which took on its greatest dimensions precisely in the 1949-1957 period, they are not mentioned at all in the volume, even though we know of many works in which Mao touched upon this theme.

The, so to speak, "Soviet subject"--issues connected with Sino-Soviet relations in general--is presented in the volume only as the pre-history of the open struggle against the CPSU and the USSR which was begun by Mao Tse-tung at the end of 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's. The appeals for solidarity with the USSR and for the study of the Soviet experience literally drown in an infinite quantity of statements about some kind of "negative" aspects of Soviet practice and in constant references to the need for using China's own experience in the making of decisions and choosing only the good and the best from any foreign experience. As a rule, the works selected for the volume do not specify the good that should be acquired from the Soviet experience. In these works, the author uses the most general phrases to get around this subject. He does make specific and, in

some cases, detailed statements, however, about the alleged bad things in the USSR.

A typical example of Mao Tse-tung's "defense" of the need to "earnestly study the progressive experience of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries" can be seen, in particular, in the following paragraph from the work entitled "Let Us Uphold the Advancement of the Revolution" (9 October 1957): "The experience accumulated in construction in the Soviet Union is quite full. So-called "fullness" must also include certain errors.... We are advocating learning from the Soviet Union after criticism of its dogmatism, because this is not dangerous" (p 473). Of the works included in the volume, "On the Ten Main Relationships" (25 April 1956) has the most to say about Soviet-Chinese relations and the "negative aspects" of Soviet experience. It alleges that "the interests of the state, the group and the individual are poorly coordinated" in the USSR, "the peasants are severely limited" and so forth. Finally, Mao implies that the Russians are chauvinists for two reasons: In the first place, Russia was an imperialist country and, in the second, "the October Revolution took place there later." "Many Soviet people brag too much about this and turn up their noses" (p 287), and this is why China has to defend its dignity and rights and, in general, its rightness, in its relations with the Soviet Union. In January 1957, at the conference of secretaries of the party committees of provinces, cities and autonomous regions, Mao quite definitely explained how China should deal with the USSR: "When we talk with the Soviets, we must not mince words" (p 344); "if they continue to be this stubborn in the future, we will reveal all of our feelings one fine day" (p 345). Here, Mao immediately called for caution in the criticism of the USSR, saying that "we still need to learn from the Soviet Union" ("bid.).

As a result of this kind of "balance" between criticism of the USSR and recognition of its good points, the reader, particularly the Chinese reader, should be convinced that the dramatic deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations and the change in their nature after 1957 were exclusively due to the position taken by the Soviet side. In this way, the reader of the volume is given the impression that Mao was the first to perceive the danger of the USSR's "revisionist degeneration" and that he did everything possible to avert this danger.

The compilers of the volume have tried in every way to reduce the contradictions in Mao's views to a minimum--or, more precisely, to conceal his obvious double-dealing and hypocrisy and the fundamental carelessness of his so-called "scientific analysis." All of these qualities of Mao as a politician and "theoretician" are particularly evident in his approach to international issues, especially the relations between the PRC and the USSR. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the volume does not include many well-known works by Mao, in which he noted the worldwide historic role of the USSR with complete objectivity and wrote about its fraternal treatment of China and about the absence of reasons for mutual dissatisfaction.

It would not be out of place at this point to quote some sections of at least just two of Mao's works not included in the volume, which date back to the end of 1949 and the end of 1957. Here, for example, is what he said upon his arrival in Moscow on 16 December 1949: "A deep and lasting friendship exists between the great people of China and the Soviet Union. After the October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet Government...was the first to abrogate the inegalitarian treaties in regard to China which had existed since the time of tsarist Russia. For almost 30 years, the Soviet people and Soviet Government repeatedly assisted the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people. This fraternal friendship on the part of the Soviet people and the Soviet Government, with which the Chinese people were favored in a time of serious trials, will never be forgotten."⁷ The inclusion of just this part of Mao's speech in the volume would reveal much to the reader about, for example, the far-fetched nature of the territorial claims on the USSR which were voiced by the "helmsman" himself in 1964 when he made reference to the "inegalitarian" agreements concluded by tsarist Russia with the Ch'ing Dynasty.

In his speech at the anniversary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 6 November 1957, Mao said: "It is completely obvious that, if after the October Revolution the proletarian revolutionaries of various nations will ignore the experience of the Russian Revolution or not take it seriously, if they do not give serious attention to the experience in proletarian dictatorship and socialist construction in the Soviet Union, or if they do not use this experience analytically and creatively in accordance with the specific conditions in their own countries, they will not be able to master Leninism, representing a new stage in the development of Marxism, and will not be able to find the correct solutions to problems connected with revolution and construction in their own countries. It is equally obvious that, after the October Revolution, if the government of any country refuses to live in friendship with the Soviet Union, it will only harm the genuine interests of the people of its country.... The people of all nations in the world can see their own future more clearly every day in the successes of the Soviet people.... We feel that the reinforcement of the solidarity of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, is the sacred international duty of all socialist states."⁸

If this statement by Mao, which evaluates the worldwide historic role of the USSR in the past and in the future, had been included in the volume, it would undoubtedly cause even the young Chinese reader indoctrinated in the spirit of anti-Sovietism to wonder whether Chairman Mao had not harmed the genuine interests of the people of his country when he refused to live in friendship with the Soviet Union.

An analysis of the works included in the volume, as well as of those which are absent, convinces us that its compilers, striving to represent Mao as the engineer of the "integral theory of socialism," attempted to use their purposeful selection of works to also depict him as the engineer of the "truly revolutionary, socialist foreign policy" which is characterized by

anti-Sovietism and the deliberate cultivation of friction between the socialist states. "In my opinion, friction is always necessary," Mao summarized his own views, particularly in connection with Soviet-Chinese relations (p 344—"Speech at a Conference of Secretaries of the Party Committees of Provinces, Cities and Autonomous Regions" January 1957).

The Evaluation of the Fifth Volume of Mao Tse-tung's 'Selected Works' by Official Peking Propaganda

Through all of the official commentaries to the fifth volume of Mao Tse-tung's "Selected Works," the impression is conveyed that Mao Tse-tung was allegedly the first in the history of Marxism to elaborate and implement the theory of socialist construction "under new historical conditions." Official materials constantly underscore the exceptional nature of the "thought of Mao" during this 8-year period after the establishment of the PRC, which he "later," particularly during the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," only "supplemented and developed."

In assessing the nature of these "brilliant ideas," the Chinese leaders persistently represent them as something encompassing all of Marxist theory. In this connection, they speak of a "contribution to the theoretical storehouse of Marxism" in terms of all three of its elements--philosophy, political economy and scientific communism. Here, major emphasis is placed on the fact that, in terms of its specific content, this is a "theory of socialism," a theory of "socialist revolution and socialist construction."

In official commentaries on the fifth volume of Mao's works, these "important," "brilliant" and, finally, "new ideas," in summarized form, are called the "laws of the development of socialist society" and the great theory of continued revolution under dictatorship by the proletariat, the discovery and establishment of which are supposed to be Mao's specific contribution to the "theoretical treasure house of Marxism." This assessment of the contents of the fifth volume of Mao's "Selected Works" on the part of the present Chinese leaders essentially represents a direct apology for Maoism. The main "ideas" that are represented and accepted as the ideological and theoretical basis of the PRC's course are those which were formulated by Mao Tse-tung at one time as an ideological weapon in the struggle for revision of the CCP general line on the construction of socialism in the PRC according to the principles of the theory of scientific communism and its replacement with a "unique course," the essence of which was the voluntaristic "Three Red Flags" program within the nation and great-power chauvinism and hegemonism in the international arena. These are precisely the "ideas" which, in terms of their specific content, represent a distortion of socialist doctrine and which were used by Mao Tse-tung at one time in his struggle against Marxism-Leninism in China and in the international arena.

A special place in commentaries in the Peking press is assigned to the question of the essence of socialism and the nature of "class conflicts" in the socialist society. The Peking press calls these problems a "new question," which confronted the Chinese Revolution in 1956 and for which "a correct answer was not found for a long time in the international communist movement."⁹ This is the question of "whether classes and class struggle exist in the socialist society" and "whether it is necessary to continue the socialist revolution and how it should be continued" after the accomplishment of socialist reforms with respect to the means of production.

The Peking press is trying to prove that only Mao Tse-tung should be given the credit for the theoretical elaboration of this "new question"; since Marx and Engels "did not experience the victory of a proletarian revolution, this question did not confront them specifically." As for V. I. Lenin, he "died too early; he was unable to witness the accomplishment of socialist ownership of the means of production and, for this reason, he could not provide a precise and specific answer for this question."¹⁰

It is precisely this problem, according to the present Peking leaders, that was supposedly solved by Mao Tse-tung, who was "the first in the history of the international communist movement to provide a scientific answer for the above-mentioned important question concerning the historic destiny of dictatorship by the proletariat and to establish a great theory of continued revolution under dictatorship by the proletariat."¹¹ This means that the present Chinese leaders are not content with simply assigning Mao Tse-tung the same status as Marx, Engels and Lenin in historical progression, but also wish to give him, and only him, the credit for the correct scientific-theoretical answer to the question of the nature of social relations in the socialist society.

This "new" and "great theory" of Mao Tse-tung essentially denies that socialism is the first phase of a qualitatively new, communist structure and expresses Mao's notorious formula that "the major conflict in the socialist society is the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the socialist and capitalist paths." This is supposed to explain the need for "continued revolution" in the socialist society, which is dictated by the fact that this "major conflict" in the socialist society still has the nature of a class struggle. Therefore, "continued revolution" is concretely represented as continued "class struggle."

The Peking official press assigns a unique place in this "class struggle" to the struggle against the "bourgeoisie in the party." As part of this process, it stresses Mao's thesis that "the greatest danger of the restoration of capitalism emanates from intra-party capitalist sympathizers.... Enemies inside the fortress are the most dangerous enemies."¹² All of this attests to the fact that the present Chinese leaders regard the course toward continued intra-party struggle as the most important component of the theory of "continued revolution under dictatorship by the proletariat. At present, the "four" have been named the immediate object of this struggle.

In commenting on the foreign policy "thought of Mao," the official Peking press primarily stresses the anti-Soviet aspect of Maoism. "One of the greatest services performed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung," wrote JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, "consists in the fact that he...led the struggle against contemporary revisionism, the center of which is represented by the Soviet revisionists, and utterly defeated it in the theoretical sense."¹³ On this basis, the chief objective in the area of foreign policy has been formulated as the following: "We absolutely must follow the instructions of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and bring the struggle against Soviet social-imperialism to an end."¹⁴ Maoist lies about the "tragedy of capitalist restoration" in the USSR are cited to substantiate the importance of this "objective." The Peking press is using these same lies to justify the PRC's negative course in relations with the other socialist countries, asserting that "an important change has taken place in the international communist movement: The Soviet Union has degenerated into social-imperialism and the socialist camp has ceased to exist."¹⁵

The general foreign policy goal of the present Chinese leaders has also been formulated in an overtly anti-Soviet spirit: "We must unite with all forces in the world with which we can unite and oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers--the Soviet Union and the United States."¹⁶ The ideological and theoretical basis of this course is the "scientific analysis," conducted by Mao Tse-tung in regard to the "three worlds," the essence of which, as we know, consists in the substitution of geopolitics, hegemonism and militant anti-Sovietism for a class approach to international events.

An analysis of the contents of the fifth volume of Mao Tse-tung's "Selected Works" and of the official commentaries on the works in this volume attests to the desire of the present Chinese leaders to perpetuate Maoism in the capacity of the official ideology and policy of the CCP and PRC, simultaneously representing it as the qualitatively new and highest stage in the development of Marxism.

The new volume of Mao Tse-tung's works provides more evidence of the anti-Marxist and antisocialist nature of Maoism, which represents an ideology and policy that are fundamentally hostile to the theory and practice of scientific communism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Speech by Mao Tse-tung at an Extended Meeting of the CCP Central Committee Politburo in Peitaiho (August 1958)," "Long Live the Thought of Mao Tse-tung!" Peking, 1967.
2. "Speech Prior to Departure from Moscow," IZVESTIYA, 18 February 1950.
3. "Speech by Mao Tse-tung at Summit State Conference," NARODNYY KITAY, 1956, No 4.

4. Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at Conference on the Issue of the Intelligentsia, Convened by CCP Central Committee on 20 January 1956," "Long Live the Thought of Mao Tse-tung!"
5. Mao Tse-tung, "Selected Works," Vol 5, Peking, 1977, p 65 (in Chinese). All future footnotes will be incorporated in the text.
6. For example, in the article entitled "The Situation in the Summer of 1957" (June 1957), Mao adjusted the deadline for the accomplishment of this economic task of "catching up with the United States and passing it up": "The task will consist in preparing to catch up with the United States and pass it up in the economic sense with the aid of 8-10 five-year plans."
7. IZVESTIYA, 17 December 1949.
8. Ibid., 7 November 1957.
9. JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, 1 May 1977.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.

8588
CSO: 1805

THREE DECADES OF INDO-SOVIET COOPERATION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 84-98

[Article by Devendra Kaushik (India)]

[Summary] India and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations 30 years ago and began a gradual and cautious process leading to the achievement of mutual understanding. It did not take them long to lay a solid foundation for cooperation in various fields. By 1955, the two states began their first experiment in economic cooperation.

The Soviet Union was not able to take a direct part in India's liberation from British dominion, but the fact remains that the October Revolution pulled the first brick out of the imperialist citadel and that the Soviet people's victory over fascism created the necessary conditions for India and other Afro-Asian countries to win their freedom.

At a press conference in 1946, J. Nehru announced that his government would pursue the goal of establishing friendly relations with both great powers--the Soviet Union and the United States. India's establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR met with a favorable response in both countries. Trade agreements were soon concluded by the two countries, in 1948, 1949 and 1951. By 1955 the two countries were ready to enter a new stage in their cooperation. Official reciprocal visits by statesmen confirmed the goodwill of both sides, their mutual desire for further cooperation and their mutual adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which was signed in New Delhi on 9 August 1971, put the traditional friendly relations between these countries on a firm legal basis and raised them to a new level. This treaty was the natural result of the generally identical views of the two sides on problems concerning security and peace. L. I. Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi in November 1973 represented an important milestone in the development of Indo-Soviet relations. During the course of this visit, a joint declaration was issued by the two states which graphically attested to their success in implementing the principles of the 1971 treaty.

The recent change of governments in New Dehli caused many to speculate that this would have an unfavorable effect on India's relations with the USSR. The patriotic Janata Party, however, respected the Indian public's friendly feelings for the Soviet people and took an extremely realistic approach in responding favorably to Moscow's display of interest in the maintenance of friendly relations. Prime Minister Desai's visit to the USSR in October 1977 reaffirmed the fact that the relations between India and the Soviet Union are marked by excellent prospects.

8588

CSO: 1805

IMPORTANT STAGE IN DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-JAPANESE TRADE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 99-111

[Article by V. B. Spandar'yan, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] In August 1976, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev received a delegation from the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) in the Crimea. This meeting was of tremendous significance in defining the course for the further development of Soviet-Japanese economic ties.

In June 1977, in response to the questions of ASAHI Chief Editor S. Hata, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev said: "I have happy memories of the business talk I had last August in the Crimea with the Keidanren delegation headed by its president, Toshiyo Doko. Several proposals aimed at the further development of economic ties between the Soviet Union and Japan were also made by our side."

One of these proposals concerned the wish to conclude a new long-term agreement on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan and to convene the next, seventh meeting of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation. Both of these proposals have now been implemented, and this permits us to expect a further increase in trade and broader mutually beneficial economic cooperation between the USSR and Japan.

An agreement on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan was signed on 30 May 1977 in Tokyo. This new 5-year agreement was signed by USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichhev and Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Hatoyama.

The move toward the organization of mutual deliveries of goods on the basis of 5-year agreements coinciding with the USSR's five-year plans for national economic development represents an important stage in the development of Soviet-Japanese trade. The conclusion of agreements of this kind has aided in the expansion of the commodity turnover between the two nations on a stable and long-term basis.

Since 1961, our trade with Japan has almost doubled each 5 years. For example, according to the first 5-year agreement (1966-1970), the volume of mutual deliveries amounted to 2.6 billion rubles while the figure was 1.3 billion in the 1961-1965 period. The second 5-year agreement (1971-1975) set commodity turnover at 6.1 billion rubles--that is, an increase of 130 percent.

The tendency toward the constant growth of Soviet-Japanese trade has also been reinforced in a new agreement on commodity turnover and payments during the 1976-1980 period. According to estimates in the Soviet press, the volume of deliveries according to this agreement should reach a minimum of 10 billion rubles--that is, it should be more than 60 percent higher than the volume of the preceding 5-year period.

The progress in the fulfillment of the agreement in 1976 and the first quarter of 1977 provides grounds for assuming that the actual volume of mutual deliveries will exceed this estimate. For example, in 1976--the first year the new 5-year agreement was in effect--commodity turnover exceeded 2.1 billion rubles. During 9 months of 1977, commodity turnover with Japan amounted to 1,736,000 rubles, as against 1,433,000 during the same period last year.¹

The constant growth of Soviet-Japanese trade in the periods during which 5-year agreements on commodity turnover and payments have been in effect is primarily due to, besides the regular exchange of goods, the constantly growing deliveries made in accordance with general agreements concluded by Soviet organizations and Japanese firms on economic cooperation in the development of several branches of the national economy in the eastern regions of the USSR, including the development of the Far East timber industry, the construction of Vostochnyy Port in the Bay of Wrangel, the working of coal deposits in South Yakutiya and the search for gas deposits in the Yakut ASSR.

Deliveries of goods according to these agreements, which are of a compensatory nature, are accounting for an increasing percentage of Soviet-Japanese trade and are giving the economic ties between our countries a long-term, stable nature.

A significant increase in commodity turnover has also been stimulated by Japan's constantly growing deliveries of complete sets of equipment to the USSR, particularly for enterprises of the chemical industry, financed by means of bank loans.

It is indicative that, of the total exports of Japanese equipment to the USSR in 1976, which account for around a third of the value of all our imports from Japan, 40 percent are deliveries made in accordance with general agreements on economic cooperation and 20 percent are deliveries of complete sets of equipment.

There has also been an increase in the proportional amount of Soviet goods delivered to Japan as compensation in terms of the above-mentioned general agreements, particularly lumber deliveries. According to these agreements, however, compensatory deliveries from the USSR to Japan will reach their highest point during the next 5 years.

Deliveries of goods according to general agreements on economic cooperation and purchases of complete sets of equipment financed by bank loans will largely determine the volume and assortment of Soviet-Japanese commodity turnover in the new 5-year agreement of 1976-1980 as well.

The USSR and Japan have become large-scale trade partners as a result of the high rates of increase in commodity turnover, particularly on the basis of these 5-year agreements. In recent years, Japan has occupied the eighth or ninth place among the USSR's partners in foreign trade (the second or third place among capitalist nations), while the Soviet Union has taken a firm position as one of Japan's largest trade contractors. For example, according to Japanese statistics, the USSR occupied the tenth place in Japanese foreign trade turnover in 1976 and the first place among the socialist countries trading with Japan.

Current results in the development of Soviet-Japanese trade, however, do not even come close to exhausting the tremendous potential opportunities for the expansion of commodity turnover between the USSR and Japan on the basis of long-term and large-scale economic cooperation, a direction in which only the first steps have been made to date.

In the economic sense, the Soviet Union and Japan are highly developed states, the structure of their foreign trade permits the mutually beneficial exchange of goods, and the geographic proximity of the rapidly developing regions in the USSR's Siberia and Far East and in Japan make economic co-operation between the two countries extremely productive and promising.

As we know, the Soviet side has repeatedly underscored the possibility and expediency of elaborating a long-range program for economic cooperation between the USSR and Japan for 10-20 years, mainly through the more intensive use of Siberian and Far Eastern resources. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev discussed this matter with the Japanese delegation headed by T. Doko in August 1976, and the topic was mentioned again in L. I. Brezhnev's responses to the questions of the chief editor of ASAHI, published in PRAVDA on 7 June 1977.

The Japanese business community has displayed a great deal of interest in the development of trade and economic cooperation with the USSR.

"In my opinion," said Keidanren Chairman T. Doko, "we have all the prerequisites for the fruitful expansion of bilateral economic and technological cooperation. Judge for yourselves: The Soviet Union with its tremendous industrial and economic potential and its population of 260

million on one side, and Japan--also a highly developed state with a population of 110 million--on the other."²

The Soviet view of this matter was precisely set forth in talks by USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev during his recent trip to Japan.

"Soviet foreign trade organizations and Japanese companies," said Minister N. S. Patolichev in a talk with an IZVESTIYA correspondent, "have already accumulated a certain amount of experience in business cooperation in the development of some types of natural resources in Siberia and the Far East. In our talks in Tokyo with Japanese statesmen, politicians and leaders of the business community, we members of the Soviet delegation repeatedly had occasion to hear the most positive appraisals of cooperation of this kind. It seems to me that new steps in this direction could contribute in making bilateral economic ties even more productive."³

As a result of the fulfillment of the 5-year agreements, a stable structure of commodity deliveries has taken shape in Soviet-Japanese trade which reflects the intersupplementary nature of the national economy of the USSR and Japan's economy.

The major items in Soviet exports to Japan are raw materials, fuel and industrial materials, all of which are vitally necessary to the Japanese economy. In this connection, it should be noted that the Japanese economy depends almost completely on imports of fuel, raw materials and food. Along with these, exports of Soviet machines and equipment to Japan are constantly expanding, as well as the export of licenses and technology, which reflect the scientific and technical achievements of the Soviet Union.

"The Soviet Union," S. Nagano, chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said in an interview granted to a PRAVDA correspondent, "is not only a supplier of the natural resources needed by Japan, but also an industrially developed country, which is the reason for our mutual ties in various fields of science and technology. In addition to raw materials, we also receive equipment and technical know-how from the Soviet Union."⁴

Soviet goods worth approximately 3 billion rubles were delivered to Japan during the time when the second 5-year agreement on commodity turnover and payments was in effect (1971-1975); these goods included commercial timber, cotton (in fiber), bituminous coal (mainly for coking), petroleum and petroleum products, iron ore, aluminum (secondary), potassium salts, sea products and large quantities of other commodities of importance to the Japanese economy.⁵

During this same period, Japan was supplied with machine tools, hydrofoils, helicopters, gas turbines and several other types of equipment, as well as licenses in the area of the technology of continuous steel casting, the cooling of blast furnaces, the dry extinguishing of coke and others.

According to Japanese customs statistics, in 1975--that is, during the last year the second 5-year agreement was in effect--Soviet deliveries of a number of important commodities occupied a prominent place in Japanese imports. For example, the USSR led (in terms of cost) in Japanese imports of nonferrous and other metals, it was second in imports of cotton, lumber, potassium fertilizers and zinc, it was third in imports of scrap metal, chromium ore and nickel, and it was fourth in Japanese imports of fresh fish, coal and fuel oil.

According to Japanese statistics, Soviet deliveries accounted for the following percentages of Japanese imports in 1975 (in terms of quantity): 18 percent for commercial timber, 17.5 percent for cotton, 24 percent for potassium salts, 73 percent for secondary aluminum, 35 percent for palladium, 44 percent for rhodium, 12 percent for scrap metal, 50 percent for whale meat and 60 percent for cotton seeds.

According to the new agreement on commodity turnover and payments, Soviet exports in 1976-1980 are estimated at around 5 billion rubles--that is, an increase of more than 60 percent. The most significant increase will be in deliveries of goods on the basis of general agreements on economic co-operation (lumber and coking coal). The structure of our exports to Japan will essentially remain the same, but there will be a tendency toward an increase in the percentage accounted for by processed raw materials and semimanufactured products, as well as machines and equipment.

At the same time, the fulfillment of general agreements on economic cooperation during the current 5-year period will lay a basis for the considerable expansion of exports of South Yakut coking coal to Japan.

The major items in our imports from Japan are machines and equipment, including complete plants, and the products of ferrous metallurgy (rolled ferrous metals, steel pipe and so forth). In terms of cost, these two commodity groups account for more than two-thirds of all imports from Japan. Other significant items in Soviet purchases are consumer goods, the raw materials for their production (more than 10 percent of the total cost of imports) and various chemicals.

During the 1971-1975 period--that is, during the time when the second 5-year agreement on commodity turnover and payments was in effect--goods worth a total sum of over 3 billion rubles were imported from Japan, including more than a billion rubles' worth of machines and equipment, more than a billion rubles' worth of products of ferrous metallurgy (including 2.6 million tons of rolled ferrous products and 820,000 tons of pipe) and almost 200 million rubles' worth of chemicals, as well as large quantities of synthetic and man-made fibers and yarn, fabric, knitwear and sewn items and other consumer goods.⁶

The Soviet Union has become a large market for the sale of many types of products from several important branches of the Japanese economy, including such industries as machine building, particularly chemical machine building, ferrous metallurgy and the textile industry.

According to Japanese customs statistics, the Soviet Union occupied the following positions in Japanese exports at the beginning of the current 5-year period--that is, in 1976:

First place in purchases of excavators, special-purpose vehicles, fittings, pipe made of alloy steels and seamless steel pipe, man-made silk and wool yarn, and knitted fabrics;

Second place in purchases of ready-to-wear clothing and knitwear, footwear, plastic materials and resins, shaped rolled products, tin plate, alloy steels, materials handling equipment, agricultural machinery and heavy-duty trucks;

Third place in Japanese exports of steel pipe, steel-wire rope, cable, metal-cutting tools, construction and road equipment, electrical measurement and control instruments, and railway rolling stock for the island of Sakhalin;

The Soviet Union became the fourth-largest sales market (as a whole) for Japanese exports of the products of ferrous metallurgy and all-purpose machine building and textiles.

During the new five-year plan, which will coincide with the period of the agreement on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan in 1976-1980, the Soviet market will become even more significant for the products of an increasing number of branches of Japanese industry.

According to Japanese statistics, the Soviet Union occupies the fourth place in Japanese exports as a whole (in terms of cost) during the 1976/77 fiscal year.

The value of the Soviet market to Japan, however, does not only consist in the growing volume and variety of Japanese goods exported to the USSR, but also in its reliability and stability, which have made themselves particularly apparent during years of economic crisis in the capitalist countries, including Japan.

"In 1975 Japan experienced a severe slump in business activity. During that same year, exports to the Soviet Union totaled 1.6 billion dollars. When Japanese industry is in a slump, it cannot allow itself to refuse large orders from the Soviet Union," this eloquent admission was printed in the November 1976 issue of the Japanese magazine BUSINESS JAPAN.

The new agreement on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan provides great opportunities for the expanded export of products of many leading branches in Japanese industry. The prolonged recession in the Japanese economy can only make the enormous, reliable and stable Soviet market even more important to Japan.

The new agreement has already led to the submission of large Soviet orders, including orders for complete sets of equipment for plants, complete assembled units for ammonia production, plants for the production of compound fertilizers, natural gasoline plants and a plant for the production of chloroprene rubber. Orders for several large industrial facilities are being negotiated successfully. All of this, in addition to purchases of equipment, semimanufactured goods and finished commodities made according to existing general agreements on economic cooperation, indicates that Japanese deliveries to the USSR will grow in volume and in variety during the 1976-1980 period, will introduce the element of stability into the development of several leading branches of the Japanese economy and will promote a rise in the employment rate of Japanese workers. Suffice it to say that, according to the data of Japanese economists, the order for a complete set of equipment for the ammonia production plant is being filled by around 800 large, medium-sized and small Japanese firms.

In this way, the new agreement on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan will reinforce the abundant positive experience accumulated during the development of Soviet-Japanese trade and will provide excellent opportunities for the further development of economic cooperation between the two countries on a long-term and large-scale basis.

At the same time that the agreement on commodity turnover and payments for 1976-1980 was signed in Tokyo, letters were exchanged on the development of coastal trade during the same years. This trade is of particular significance for commodity exchange and for the establishment of direct contacts between the Far Eastern regions of the USSR and Japan's northeast. The contracting partners of the all-union Dal'intorg office, which was opened for the express purpose of conducting these operations, represent more than 100 small and medium-sized firms, trade cooperatives and associations in Japan.

Since 1963, when the coastal trade began, its volume has grown by more than 30 times and exceeded 43 million rubles in 1976. According to the new agreement, the volume of mutual commodity deliveries in coastal trade should exceed 36 million rubles in 1980 with balanced exports and imports.

The major items exported to Japan through the Dal'intorg V/O [all-union association] are lumber and wood, fish and sea products, coal and mineral raw materials. The products of local industry and procurement organizations are gradually expanding the variety of commodities. Various consumer goods, fishing gear and some industrial materials and equipment are purchased in Japan to fill the needs of the Far East.

In addition to producing a definite economic savings, coastal trade is an excellent way of strengthening the friendly ties and mutual understanding between adjacent regions of the USSR and Japan.

Japanese businessmen and officials had a quite positive reaction to the conclusion of the new 5-year trade agreement by the USSR and Japan. In a talk with Minister N. S. Patolichev, Japanese Prime Minister T. Fukuda "expressed his satisfaction with the consistent development of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries."¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Hatoyama expressed the hope that "the new agreement will pave the way for the continued development of Japanese-Soviet relations."²

The conclusion of the agreement on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan in 1976-1980 represented an important stage in the realization of the tremendous potential inherent in the development of economic cooperation between the two countries in the presence of goodwill on both sides.

Another important step in this direction was the seventh conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation, which was held in Tokyo on 12-16 September 1977. The conference was extremely representative in its makeup.

The Soviet delegation was headed by I. P. Semichastnov, first deputy minister of foreign trade and chairman of the Soviet-Japanese Committee for Economic Cooperation. The delegation was made up of B. A. Borisov, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Chamber of Commerce, USSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman N. N. Inosentsev, deputy minister of the timber and wood-processing industry, the merchant fleet, transport construction, geology, the pulp and paper industry and the coal industry, and administrative personnel from USSR Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology, USSR Gosnab, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a number of other ministries and departments.

The extremely representative and large Japanese delegation was headed by S. Nagano, chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and co-chairman of the Japanese-Soviet Committee for Economic Cooperation. The Japanese delegation was made up of Keidanren President T. Doko and such prominent representatives of the Japanese business community as H. Anzai, I. Iwasa, H. Imazato, H. Makita, F. Tanaka, H. Yoshiyama, R. Kawai, K. Yasui, K. Idenitsu, T. Moriya and many others, as well as administrative personnel from the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, international trade and industry and transportation and the Export-Import Bank of Japan.

The great significance attached by both sides to the conference was also underscored by the fact that Soviet Ambassador D. S. Polyanskiy and Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Hatoyama made welcoming speeches on the first day of the conference. The head of the Soviet delegation was received by Japanese Prime Minister T. Fukuda, Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Hatoyama and Minister of International Trade and Industry T. Tanaka.

Japanese business and sociopolitical groups attached great significance to the seventh Soviet-Japanese economic conference not only because they have displayed great interest in the development of economic cooperation with the USSR, particularly at this time of prolonged recession in the Japanese economy, but also because this conference, in their opinion, was to play a positive role in the general improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

"As a whole, our nation adheres to the following basic position--," NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN reported, "Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the working of natural resources is essential and, speaking specifically, it would be wise to promote this with an eye to Japan's industrial structure."⁹

The influential Japanese newspaper MAINICHI noted that the conference "will serve the cause of developed Japanese-Soviet relations" and called for the "step-by-step accumulation of the actual results of cooperation in the development of resources."¹⁰

Two major topics were discussed at the conference--the progress in the realization of existing general agreements on economic cooperation and the future prospects for economic cooperation between the USSR and Japan on a long-term and large-scale basis.

When the first topic was discussed, speakers noted the success in the realization of existing general agreements on cooperation in the construction of Vostchnyy Port in the Bay of Wrangel, in the development of Far Eastern timber resources and the South Yakut coal field and in the organization of geological prospecting in the areas of the Yakut gas deposits; in addition, aspects of the scientific and technical cooperation between corresponding Soviet organizations and Japanese companies were discussed.

As S. Nagano, head of the Japanese delegation, noted at the conference, "cooperation in the development of Siberia's resources has been successful as a whole." This appraisal was noted in greater detail in the reports of Soviet and Japanese representatives in subcommittees, where the progress in the realization of individual projects was discussed.

All work connected with the general agreement on cooperation in the construction of a sea port in the Bay of Wrangel, which was signed on 18 December 1970, is being completed successfully.

Surveying and dredging work began in the bay in 1971. In December 1973, the first wooden mooring received and serviced its first ship. A new port, which was given the name Vostchnyy, was opened at the beginning of 1974. In subsequent years, construction work on other port facilities continued at the same time as shipping operations were carried out.

A complex for the freight handling of industrial ship with a productivity level of 800,000 tons a year was put in operation in 1975. A container terminal for 120,000 international standard containers a year was opened in

1976. The plans for 1978 call for the start-up of a complex to load 5 million tons of coal shipments per year and completion of the construction work on the first section of Vostchnyy Port.

The credit in the amount of 80 million dollars stipulated in the general agreement has been used to pay for Japanese equipment and materials which were supplied for the construction of the port.

In 1976, 1.4 million tons of export-import and transit cargo passed through Vostchnyy Port, including 124,000 containers, primarily with transit Japanese cargo taking the shortest route to Europe through Siberia.

Mister Hori, representing the Japanese side, noted the energy displayed by both sides in the realization of the general agreement on cooperation in the construction of Vostchnyy Port, stressing the fact that this port represents "a bridge for the development of commercial relations between the USSR and Japan."

The success in the fulfillment of the second general agreement on cooperation in the development of Far Eastern timber resources, signed on 30 July 1974, was noted in speeches by Soviet and Japanese representatives.

"The successful completion of this project," K. Kawai said, "will provide the Japanese side with a constant supply of timber resources and will make a significant contribution to the exploration and development of the timber resources of the Soviet Far East in accordance with the planned economy of the USSR.... This trade will greatly benefit Japanese-Soviet cooperation, which is based on mutual advantage."

Total deliveries of Soviet commercial timber and sown lumber to Japan in accordance with the second general agreement will total around 18 million cubic meters during 1975-1979, as against 8 million cubic meters in accordance with the first general agreement (1969-1974), while exports of Japanese goods to the USSR according to the new agreement should triple in terms of cost.

In 1975 and 1976, 5.2 million cubic meters of commercial timber were delivered to Japan in accordance with this agreement, and the figure rises to 3.5 million if 1977 deliveries are included. The credit extended by the Japanese side for the amount of 550 million dollars was used to purchase almost 400 million dollars' worth of machines, equipment, ships, industrial materials and consumer goods.

Specific ways of ensuring the fulfillment of the agreement were discussed at subcommittee sessions, particularly the ways of using the remainder of the credit and of solving certain problems connected with the regulation of timber deliveries made in accordance with this agreement.

The general agreement on cooperation in the development of the South Yakut coal field of 26 June 1974 is also being implemented as specified.

Construction work on the BAM-Tynda-Berkakit Railway, which will connect the South Yakut coal field with the existing Trans-Siberian Trunk Line and the projected Baykal-Amur Trunk Line is staying ahead of schedule. A great deal of preparatory, construction, installation and stripping work has been done in the South Yakut coal complex. In 1977 and 1978, capital investments and volumes of construction work will be increased for the purpose of ensuring the start-up of the Nyurengri coal mine with a capacity of 13 million tons of coal a year, including 9 million tons of coking coal.

The success of geological prospecting work at the Yakut gas deposit was noted with satisfaction at the conference. As we know, the agreement on cooperation on this project is of a trilateral nature, as the work is being done by Soviet organizations and Japanese and American companies.

The discussion of the prospects for the development of economic cooperation between the USSR and Japan evoked great interest at the conference.

S. Nagano, head of the Japanese delegation, set forth the views of the Japanese side on this matter in a special speech. He stressed the fact that the operational experience of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees gives a positive response to questions about the possibility of economic cooperation between nations with different social systems. This cooperation, according to S. Nagano, is based on the abundant resources of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, the intersupplementary economies of the two nations, their geographic proximity and the support and understanding of the Japanese and Soviet people.

Noting the depression in the Japanese economy and Japan's growing dependence on imports of raw materials, particularly sources of energy, Nagano underscored the fact that cooperation with the USSR in the development of the natural and energy resources of Siberia and the Far East acquires primary significance for Japan in this connection.

Cooperation with the USSR in the working of coking coal, petroleum and gas, Nagano said, will reinforce and expand the friendly relations between our countries and will lead to the even larger projects spoken of by L. I. Brezhnev in his talk with T. Doko.

The Japanese side expressed great interest in the report presented by USSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman N. N. Inozemtsev on the prospects for economic development in Siberia and the Far East.

In his report, he described the basic guidelines for the development of the USSR's eastern regions in accordance with the Tenth Five-Year Plan for national economic development and the prospects for the more distant future.

He emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union can and will develop the abundant resources of Siberia and the Far East on its own, but that, in addition to this, there are objective prerequisites and mutual interest on the part

of both nations--the USSR and Japan--for deeper economic cooperation between them on a long-term and large-scale basis.

The discussion at the conference resulted in the fundamental agreement of both sides to begin examining questions connected with the conclusion of a third general agreement on lumber (cooperation in the development of the timber resources of the Far East and regions adjacent to the BAM route, in the technical re-equipping of Sakhalin's pulp and paper enterprises and in the construction of container terminals in Vostochnyy Port and other Soviet ports in the Far East), as well as those connected with the further expansion of technological cooperation.

Therefore, the seventh conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation was not only an occasion for the discussion of the progress in the fulfillment of existing general agreements on economic cooperation, but also a time when the specific future ways of developing this cooperation on a long-term and large-scale basis were outlined in the light of the basic premises set forth by Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev in his talk with the Keidanren delegation.

"The appraisal made of the activities of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation at the time of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev's meeting with the Keidanren delegation, headed by T. Doko, in the Crimea in August 1976," the joint communique stated, "was noted with deep satisfaction at the conference. This meeting was an important factor stimulating the further development of Soviet-Japanese economic and trade relations."

The sides agreed to hold the next conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation in the Soviet Union at a time convenient for them.

The course and results of the seventh Soviet-Japanese economic conference received wide coverage in the Japanese press. An ASAHI editorial noted that the committees have worked out seven joint large-scale plans for Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation during their years of activity and that this has led to a significant increase in Japan's commodity turnover with the Soviet Union. In this connection, the newspaper stressed the importance of "further reinforcement of cooperation by the two countries through frank discussion."

Expressing satisfaction with the results of the conference, SANKEI SHIMBUN pointed out the fact that "the positive approach of both sides to economic cooperation will also have a favorable effect on the further development of Japanese-Soviet relations as a whole" and that "cooperation with the Soviet Union in Siberian development is extremely desirable from the standpoint of Japanese economic development. It is precisely for this reason that our nation's business community took a positive stand on this matter at the

conference.... The conference of the economic committees of the two nations will provide radiant prospects for the further development of Japanese-Soviet relations. We hope that this will provide Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation with a new stimulus for its development."¹¹

Even the conservative newspaper JAPAN TIMES noted in an editorial: "The joint communique published at the end of the conference testifies that both sides reaffirmed their long-term interest in the promotion of cooperation in the development of natural resources in the Soviet Union." The newspaper went on to state: "The actual state of affairs is such that economic ties between the two countries have been constantly expanded during the last decade. Bilateral trade has reached 3.4 billion dollars a year and has doubled in the last 10 years. Half of this commodity turnover is accounted for by joint projects."

The success of the seventh conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation was primarily a result of the fact that the development of commercial relations between the two neighboring countries--the USSR and Japan--is not based on temporary or transient considerations, but on the permanent factor of mutual benefit. Japan's true national interests dictate the need to develop economic cooperation with the Soviet Union on a long-term and large-scale basis for the purpose of reinforcing Japan's economy and its good-neighbor relations with the friendly and peaceable Soviet Union.

It would be wrong, however, to lose sight of the fact that there are forces inside and outside Japan which are striving to prevent the extensive development of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation, realizing that the development of this kind of cooperation will represent the broadest possible basis for the consolidation of peace and friendship between the USSR and Japan.

There is no point in arguing with those who oppose the development of extensive commercial ties between Japan and the USSR, since the very practice of the successful development of trade and economic cooperation represents the best possible response to the lies of anti-Soviet groups in Japan and their inspirers abroad.

In November 1976, the arguments of those opposing the development of trade and economic ties with the USSR were refuted in the magazine BUSINESS JAPAN, the organ of the Japanese business community.

"It would virtually be impossible for Japan," the magazine states, "to limit its economic relations with the Soviet Union--its neighbor--and to construct its relations with the USSR only on the basis of regular commodity exchange. As for Japan, which is now suffering a shortage of raw materials, it is completely obvious that it must export equipment and technology, the concentrated results of human labor, and diversify its own sources of raw materials for the purpose of ensuring a long-term stable supply. Everyone

knows that transport costs rise as the distance grows shorter. This makes it completely evident that the arguments against Japan's participation in Siberian development are truly groundless."

"It is completely natural," the magazine went on to stress, "for Japan to be ahead of the other Western countries in economic cooperation with the USSR due to its geographic proximity, and Japan will naturally become involved in cooperation in the development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East." The magazine calls upon Japan to make this decision independently with a view to its own situation and its own interests.

It must also be mentioned that the Soviet Union's desire to develop mutually beneficial trade and extensive commercial cooperation with Japan is sometimes represented as excessive interest in this on the part of the Soviet side, if not the "dependence" of the plans for the development of Siberia and the Far East on Japan's "participation" in their implementation.

In this connection, it is best to recall what General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev said in his response to the question of the chief editor of the ASAHI newspaper:

"I would not want to give the readers of your newspaper the impression that the Soviet Union is incapable of developing the rich resources of Siberia and the Far East on its own. It is completely obvious--and this is attested to by the entire history of our state--that we have every possibility of accomplishing this task. We only use cooperation with other states to accelerate the implementation of our plans for the development of these regions. I do not know how much the interests of Japan are served by the objections that are sometimes made to extensive commercial cooperation with the Soviet Union."¹²

It should also be noted that Japan is still far behind the other capitalist countries in terms of several important aspects in the development of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, and this reduces the competitive ability of Japanese firms in the Soviet market.

For example, Japan still does not have an agreement with the Soviet Union on the principles of economic cooperation like the USSR's agreements of this type with Finland, France, Italy, England and several other Western European countries as well as Canada--agreements which are already in effect and which have proved quite effective in practice. As we know, agreements of this kind envisage extensive economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation on a long-term basis and create the most favorable conditions for the conclusion of specific agreements between Soviet organizations and the firms in these countries by optimally combining state support with the initiative of the business community.

Japan is lagging behind many of the other developed capitalist countries in terms of the conditions for financing exports of its equipment, including complete sets, to the Soviet market.

There is every reason to believe that a reasonable approach, based on consideration for Japan's true interests, will make it possible to surmount the obstacles in the way of the broad-scale development of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

In response to the question of a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent about the position of the Japanese business community on the expansion of economic cooperation between Japan and the USSR, Keidanren Chairman Toshiyo Doko said:

"I can confidently state that most of the representatives of the Japanese business community will not change their position on this matter. We are interested in long-term cooperation through the intensive use of the resources of Siberia and the Far East.... On the whole, the Japanese business community has a positive attitude toward the idea of the further reinforcement and expansion of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. I would like to stress once again that our nations are neighbors and, for this reason, this kind of cooperation is in the interest of both."¹³

All of the necessary prerequisites exist for the development of mutually beneficial and extensive commercial cooperation between the USSR and Japan. The conclusion of the new long-term agreement on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan and the success of the seventh conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation represent clear proof of this.

FOOTNOTES

1. See appendix to VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1977, No 12.
2. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 29 June 1977.
3. IZVESTIYA, 2 June 1977.
4. PRAVDA, 8 January 1976.
5. See the statistical almanacs "Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR" [Soviet Foreign Trade] for the corresponding period.
6. According to the data in the "Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR" statistical almanacs for the corresponding years.
7. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 28 May 1977.

8. JAPAN TIMES, 31 May 1977.
9. NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 12 September 1977.
10. MAINICHI, 12 September 1977.
11. PRAVDA, 20 September 1977.
12. Ibid., 7 June 1977.
13. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 29 June 1977.

8588
CSO: 1805

STRUGGLE OF JAPANESE WORKING CLASS AGAINST MONOPOLY DOMINATION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 112-126

[Article by V. N. Khlynov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Summary] The workers in the industrially developed capitalist nations are now waging a virtually unabating struggle against domination by the monopolies. Japan is one of the leading capitalist nations in terms of the scale and pitch of this struggle. Since the mid-1950's, which marked the beginning of the technological revolution in Japan, the Japanese working class has been growing quite rapidly. Between 1955 and 1975, the Japanese proletariat almost doubled and now takes in 34 million persons. By 1975, the proletariat already accounted for almost two-thirds of the total working population in Japan.

One of the indications of the massive scale of the workers' movement is strike activity. During the 30 years after the war, there were around 94,000 organized strikes in Japan, participated in by almost 225 million workers. Another indication is the status of the proletarian parties. The Japanese socialist and communist parties now control many seats in local government. During the last election in December 1976, both of these parties were supported by more than 17.5 million voters, or 31.1 percent of the total vote. This signifies that the Japanese workers are placing their hopes in these parties.

During the last 20 years, the membership of Japanese trade unions has almost doubled; 12.5 million workers, or 33.7 percent of all hired workers in Japan, have joined trade unions.

The working class in Japan has encountered serious difficulties of an objective and subjective nature in its fierce struggle against the monopolies. The objective difficulties arise from the anti-worker policy of the monopolies and their constant attempts to divide the ranks of the working class and prevent united action by the proletariat. Other difficulties are inherent in the workers' movement itself. One of these is the presence of conciliatory tendencies in the nation's labor movement. Another is the huge number of unions representing the workers; this creates serious problems in the organization of mass-scale united action.

In spite of these difficulties, the working class has won some victories in its struggle. In particular, it was precisely as a result of this struggle that certain improvements were made in Japanese living and working conditions. Other victories have taken the form of higher wages, the prevention of mass lay-offs due to capitalist "efficiency" programs, and the institution of environmental protection measures.

8588

CSO: 1805

HOW THE COASTAL ISLANDS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WERE SETTLED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 127-137

[Article by K. Ye. Cherevko, candidate of philological sciences]

[Summary] In recent years, some foreign bourgeois writers have published books and articles in which they have misinterpreted the history of the settlement and development of islands in the Far East by asserting that the Ainu were the original inhabitants of the islands in the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk and northern Japan and that the ancestors of the groups now populating the Soviet Far East only began settling these islands much later, in the 17th century, when Russian settlers came to the Cis-Amur region.

Some new works by Soviet and foreign (primarily Japanese and American) archaeologists have shed light on this issue, but the specific ethnology of the original inhabitants of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands represents an extremely complex problem which has not been solved as yet.

Studies of the petroglyphs, ornaments, language, fishing and hunting techniques, mythology and physical characteristics of the present inhabitants have refuted the above-mentioned allegations concerning the Ainu as the original settlers of these islands. On the basis of archaeological, ethnographic, historical and linguistic data, we could conclude that Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, just as Primorskiy Kray, the Cis-Amur region and North Japan, were settled by paleolithic and mesolithic tribes related to the Tungus-Manchurian races of the Soviet Far East and to some Eskimo and Aleutian tribes. This also allows us to conclude that the allegations of foreign bourgeois historians and mass propaganda media are only based on a desire to substantiate Japan's spurious claims to these islands.

8588
CSO: 1805

OTTO BRAUN--COMMUNIST-INTERNATIONALIST

[Editorial Report] An article in Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978, pages 138-148, describes the political career of Otto Braun in a preface by A. S. Titov and presents an excerpt from Braun's memoirs, telling of his escape from Moabit Prison.

Otto Braun was one of the communists who believed it was his international duty to assist other members of his class. He fought in the revolutionary struggle of the German working class but was forced to escape from Germany at the age of 27. Almost 30 years later he returned to the GDR and served the cause of socialist construction. During the 30-year interval he lived in Russia and spent more than 7 years working for the Executive Committee of the Comintern in China as a military adviser to the CCP Central Committee.

In 1926 Otto Braun and his wife were arrested in Germany and held for questioning. When they refused to testify, they were sent to Moabit Prison. Braun was detained here for more than a year and a half without a trial before his escape.

In his memoirs he describes the prison schedule and diet. He explains the restrictions on reading material and communication between prisoners. He speaks of the boredom of prison life, punctuated only by times during which the prisoner was permitted to read the Bible or string beads.

Despite all of these restrictions, Braun was able to communicate with the other prisoners, 90 percent of whom were extremely interested in political matters. He passed the communist newspapers and political books he was able to receive on to them and spoke to them of politics.

After a year and a half, his wife, who had already been released, and some of his friends arranged for an escape. This was to be an escape in broad daylight, sensational enough to arouse even the most passive workers in Berlin to join the struggle for amnesty for political prisoners. One morning, his wife came to visit him, accompanied by two of his friends. They drew revolvers and Braun made his escape in the ensuing confusion. Prison officials soon became the object of ridicule when it was learned that over a hundred guards and other officials had been held at bay with two unloaded revolvers.

A reward of 5,000 marks was offered for the capture of Braun and his wife. Their pictures were displayed on street corners, all signposts and station walls. Hundreds of policemen joined in the search. While dozens of Otto Brauns were being arrested all over Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France, he and his wife remained in Berlin, moving from one home to another. None of the people who sheltered them were even tempted by the reward and, in fact, even refused to accept payment for their board. After a month, Braun and his wife crossed the border and went to live in Russia.

8588
CSO: 1805

HERO OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION (COMMEMORATING THE 80TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF P'ENG TE-HUAI)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 149-157

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Summary] P'eng Te-huai, one of the greatest heroes of the Chinese Revolution and most outstanding figures in the CCP and PRC, became a communist in April 1928, when the CCP was experiencing exceptional difficulties after the failure of the 1927 Revolution. Prior to this, he had been a professional soldier, but after the Kuomintang betrayed the revolutionary cause, he left the army and devoted all of his energy, enthusiasm and talent to the cause of the national and social liberation of his people.

P'eng became interested in Marxist literature at the time of the Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927. He later organized Marxist courses in political training and established a soldiers' CCP committee. At the first Congress of Soviets in 1931, P'eng Te-huai was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. At the 5th CCP Central Committee Plenum in 1934 he was appointed a member of the Central Committee and, in 1935, a member of the Central Committee Politburo. During the war with Japan, he again revealed his outstanding ability in organization when he led combat operations against the invaders and organized people's armed forces in the rear.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, he received a position in the central government and was appointed deputy chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Military-Administrative Committee of Northwest China. In the early 1950's, he led Chinese volunteers on the Korean front. In 1954 he was appointed minister of defense and vice premier of the State Council.

In the beginning of 1959, P'eng criticized some aspects of Mao Tse-tung's opportunist policy. His criticism was dictated by his concern for the party, his people and the cause of socialism and communism. Mao, however, interpreted this criticism as a malicious attack against him and had P'eng

arrested during the Cultural Revolution in 1966. He was questioned by the Red Guards for 8 days, during which, according to Red Guard protocols, he confessed to various crimes against the government. Nothing more is known about his fate. This is how the Maoists treated a man who spent his entire life working for a better future for the Chinese people.

8588
CSO: 1805

INQUIRY INTO LIU HSIEH'S AESTHETIC VIEWS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 158-164

[Article by V. A. Krivtsov, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Summary] The period taking in the second half of the 5th century and the first half of the 6th was a particularly productive time in the development of Chinese aesthetic views. The greatest Chinese literary critic of this time was Liu Hsieh, who developed a harmonious system of literary views and made a tremendous contribution to the development of aesthetic thought.

Liu Hsieh took an interest in questions of genre and style, the laws of literary development, the relationship of the writer to the era, the interconnection between literature and the writer's moral characteristics, problems connected purely with literary criticism and the connection between artistic literature and Confucian classical orthodoxy.

No other literary critic had ever set himself the huge task of tracing the most important literary issues in China from beginning to end, or as Lie Hsieh put it, "from the leaves to the roots." He had a solid background in classical Confucianism and, for this reason, was quite concerned with form and content. He objected to artistic works which abounded in stylistic ornamentation and were devoid of feeling. He felt that artistic merit and stylistic methods were closely linked with the content of the work, its emotional side, and that the narrative style should be dictated by the heart.

Just as all other Chinese thinkers of the past, Liu Hsieh regarded Confucius as an infallible authority. He differed, however, from Confucian tradition in one important respect: The Confucian aesthetic was extremely indifferent to the pure artistic merits of literary works; Liu Hsieh appreciated the significance of the ethical content of literature but his main interest clearly lay in the beauty of the work.

8588
CSO: 1805

PAGES ATTESTING TO A FRIENDSHIP OF LONG STANDING (THE VIETNAM THEME IN 19TH CENTURY RUSSIAN LITERATURE)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 165-169

[Article by N. I. Nikulin, doctor of philological sciences]

[Summary] Contacts between Soviet and Vietnamese writers have now become commonplace. The Soviet reader has become accustomed to the theme of Vietnam as a symbol of courage and inflexibility in the struggle for independence and national liberation.

The 19th century writer and reader, however, regarded Vietnam as an exotic region filled with marvelous and unimaginable flora and fauna and inhabited by strange people with peculiar customs. In most of the so-called "colonial novels" of the 19th century, the patriarchal Vietnamese society is presented in idealized terms. Idealized and exotic descriptions of this nation are also characteristic of the travel diaries of this time.

A special place in the history of the friendship between the Russian and Vietnamese people belongs to famous writer and democrat K. M. Stanyukovich, who visited Vietnam in 1863, the difficult time when the Vietnamese were fighting colonial invaders for their national independence. Stanyukovich was one of the progressive Russian writers of the 19th century whose socio-political and aesthetic views evolved under the influence of the liberation movement in Russia at the end of the feudal order. He is famous as the writer of wonderful stories about life at sea.

In his works on Vietnam, he presented a masterful description of the land, lacerated by colonial conquerors, and a people preparing for struggle. His works also convey a sense of the beauty of this land. He also had a fine satiric flair. He uses the style of Voltaire to denigrate the old Vietnamese administrative system by seemingly idealizing it. In a mock innocent tone, he describes the activities of Catholic missionaries here with profound irony. His works, with their obvious feelings of sympathy for the oppressed people of the colonies and their vivid and realistic descriptions of colonial piracy, are in sharp contrast to the exotic "colonial novel."

CRITICISM OF THEORIES OF JAPANESE BOURGEOIS ECONOMISTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 170-174

[Review by V. N. Kashin, candidate of economic sciences, of the book "Teoriya ekonomicheskogo rosta v burzhuaznoy politekonomii Yaponii" (The Theory of Economic Growth in the Bourgeois Political Economy of Japan) by Ye. A. Pigulevskaya, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, 294 pages]

[Summary] Many Soviet works have recently been published on various aspects of contemporary life in Japan. Fundamental studies have been written on Japanese philosophy, sociology, literature and economics. In her book, Ye. A. Pigulevskaya analyzes theories of economic growth, which now occupy a central position in bourgeois political economy. The author presents a critical analysis of the Japanese bourgeois economists' theories of economic growth and describes the general tendencies in the development of present-day bourgeois economic science in Japan.

The book begins with a general description of Japanese bourgeois economic theory. The next four chapters examine the neo-Keynesian and neo-classical theories of economic growth and the empirical current in bourgeois economy. In the sixth chapter, these theories are subjected to Marxist analysis. The seventh, concluding chapter describes the crisis in present-day bourgeois political economy.

Bourgeois theories of economic growth are developing in two major, and equally vulgar, directions--neo-Keynesian and neo-classical. Both of these postulate the balanced (or crisis-free) nature of economic growth and "just distribution."

The universities are still Japan's major centers of bourgeois economic thought. This is where most of the fundamental economic research is conducted. Since the mid-1960's, however, various research centers and other scientific institutions, societies and associations have played a more important role in Japan. Japanese bourgeois economists have begun to concentrate on the development of "personal" theories which will reflect the specific features of Japanese state-monopoly capitalism.

In Japan, the basic postulates of Keynes' theory--guaranteed full employment and guaranteed revenues--have taken the form of the "priority" policy. In essence, this implies one-sided economic growth with no concern for social needs and other aspects of public development. The neo-classical theories of Japanese economists are also rendered useless by reality now that Japan has become a nation dominated by monopolistic capital. The "free market economy" advocated by these theoreticians has turned out to be a myth.

The groundlessness of all these theories has led to a crisis in bourgeois economic science, and this is a reflection of the general ideological and political crisis in bourgeois society.

8588
CSO: 1805

HISTORY OF CHINA AND EXPOSURE OF ITS FALSIFIERS

Moscow Problemy DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 174-178

[Review by Professor M. S. Kapitsa of the book "Istoriya Kitaya i sovremennoe" (The History of China and the Present Day) by S. L. Tikhvinskij, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1976]

[Text] The Nauka Publishing House has published a book by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences S. L. Tikhvinskij entitled "Istoriya Kitaya i sovremennoe".¹ The topical importance of this book is indisputable: It contains an analysis of certain key events in the history of China which have become the subject of fierce ideological struggle in recent years.

The work is based on the information in several articles published by the author during the 1960's and 1970's in historical and sociopolitical journals and in various collections of works on Chinese history. All of these are united by a common purpose--to illuminate some of the more important aspects of the history of China and historical works written about China in close coordination with the present day.

A prominent place in the book being reviewed is occupied by problems in the modern history of China. This is completely comprehensible since the Maoists are still building their hegemonic plans mainly on the materials of this period (the chapters: "The Basic Features of China's Modern History," "Nationalism and the Class Struggle in Modern China," "Manchurian Dominion in China," "The 'Self-Gratification' Policy of Chinese Ruling Circles (1860-1895)" and "The Hsinhai Revolution").

A special chapter is devoted to Sun Yat-sen ("Sun Yat-sen--Chinese Revolutionary Democrat and Friend of the Soviet Union"). The author presents a comprehensive description of his revolutionary activity in the preparations for the Hsinhai Revolution, the accomplishment of this revolution, which put an end to the monarchy in China, his elaboration of the theory of "Three People's Principles" and the establishment of the Kuomintang Party, as well as his activity during a more complex period--his struggle against the militarists and the Chinese bourgeoisie who were trying to use the fruits of the revolution in their own interest.

Although only 2 of the book's 12 chapters are concerned with the problems of China's ancient and medieval history, they touch upon important aspects of this history which have had a direct effect on the PRC's interrelations with neighboring and adjacent countries. The author reveals the way in which the foreign policy of the present Maoist leaders has retained the reactionary features of the old society and describes the process by which Sinocentric feelings were inculcated in the Chinese public and how the unlimited power of the Chinese monarch was concentrated. He cites facts to prove the aggressive nature of Chinese foreign policy (particularly after the rise of the centralized Ch'ing and Han dynasties) in relations with this nation's closest neighbors--the people of the ancient Korean and Vietnamese states, Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria.

At one time, the Chinese leaders unequivocally spoke of the relatively serious danger of falling into great-power chauvinism, which is deeply rooted in Chinese history. These clear warnings, which were voiced in the statement of the PRC Government of 1 November 1956, called upon the administrators and personnel of the PRC Government and the entire population to "constantly be vigilant to prevent errors of a chauvinist nature in relations with socialist and other countries" and to constantly conduct indoctrinal work among "the workers and the entire population of the country to ensure that they fight resolutely against great-power chauvinism."² Unfortunately, these warnings were quite quickly consigned to oblivion. The history of China was revised. The aggressive actions and militant campaigns of the Chinese emperors were represented as a good thing for China's neighbors. The merciless conquerors of China and other nations, Genghis Khan and K'ang Hsi, were glorified as great heroes. Territorial claims were elevated to the status of state policy. All of this resulted from the seizure of power in the PRC by the petty bourgeois and nationalist group of Maoists.

The historical literature of the PRC sometimes contains statements in which an attempt is made to substantiate the Maoists' claims to Soviet and Mongolian territory. For this purpose, historical materials connected with Sino-Mongolian relations and the aggressive campaigns of Genghis Khan and his successors in the 13th-14th centuries are cited.

Contemporary Chinese historians praise the reactionary traditions of Chinese culture, show contempt for everything foreign and belittle the contribution made by other races to the Chinese culture. In most cases, they take the position of bourgeois, including Taiwanese, historians. Articles on Chinese history by such authors as Shih Chun and Ch'in Wu-p'ing, Wu Yin-nien and Shih Pin, Hsi Ta and Shih Yu-hsing, which appear in the central PRC press from time to time, represent propagandistic, anti-Soviet concoctions which are unworthy of the pen of a scholar. S. L. Tikhvinskiy logically reproves them, demonstrates the groundless nature of the conclusions drawn by these authors and reveals their unenviable role as the apologists of contemporary Chinese historiography who are in the service of the antihumanitarian Maoist doctrine.

In analyzing the unsightly articles printed in the PRC press on historical themes, S. L. Tikhvinskiy presents a number of examples of the methods resorted to by the Maoists when they wish to spread the noxious venom of great-power chauvinism and Sinocentrism. For example, the cheap picture books issued in huge editions by PRC propaganda agencies, which are intended for the mass reader and which extol the reactionary traditions of Chinese culture, heap filthy contempt upon the contribution made by other races to the culture of the Chinese people. The policy of the Soviet State, which has nothing in common with the aggressive policy of the Russian tsars, is equated with the latter and is even depicted as being more aggressive. And the Soviet Union itself is represented as an enemy of China and the Chinese people, threatening to attack and invade their land. The propaganda machine of the PRC is trying to force the Chinese public to believe in the aggressive nature of the USSR and is inciting war hysteria in the nation. The Chinese historians who described many aspects of China's history and Russo-Chinese interrelations from the correct Marxist-Leninist standpoint in the 1950's have now either disappeared from the scientific sphere or have undergone a complete reversal, contradicting their own previous statements, departing from objective evaluations of historical facts and presenting past and present Chinese history from a purely Maoist position.

This book aids in the critical analysis of these phenomena and the complete exposure of those who profit by science.

This kind of exposure of the falsifiers of history is essential, but it is doubly essential for a correct understanding of China's modern and contemporary development. This provides a deeper awareness of the degree to which nationalist feeling has taken hold in China and of the social-class nature of the social forces encouraging these sentiments.

While the ideology of bourgeois nationalism began to acquire anti-imperialist and anticolonial overtones in China during the period after the Great October Socialist Revolution, it has now become the great-power, nationalist and anti-Soviet ideology of Maoism in contemporary China.

The fact that nationalism has taken the form of unbridled anti-Soviet and great-power feelings in China is a result of the subjective activities of the Maoist leaders, who have based their policy on hegemonism and nationalism and have used any means at hand to establish China as a superpower in the international arena.

The idea of advancing China "to the forefront of the world's nations" was already being repeatedly expressed even by Mao Tse-tung: "We must become the foremost nation in the world" (1956), "We must subjugate the earth" (1959). These words have much in common with the statements of Ch'en T'ien-hua, bourgeois Chinese nationalist who said in the 1920's: "There is no question that our Chinese race can establish a modern state and surpass the five continents"; "We Chinese actually have the power to become the masters of the world."³

It is interesting to examine S. L. Tikhvinskiy's study of the so-called "self-aggrandizement" policy of the Ch'ing rulers (the chapter entitled "The 'Self-Aggrandizement' Policy of Chinese Kuling Circles [1860-1895]"). Noting that aspects of China's political history during the period when its ruling circles were conducting a policy of "self-aggrandizement" have not been discussed sufficiently in Soviet historical literature, the author stresses the importance of this period and lists the issues that, in his opinion, deserve thorough analysis. He advances the thesis that "self-aggrandizement" concerned domestic policy as well as foreign policy. Its supporters were striving to ensure that China would master primarily the military-technical achievements of the developed capitalist countries and grow strong for the purpose of "beating the barbarians with the aid of the barbarians themselves." One of the advocates of this policy, imperial Governor-General Tseng Kuo-fan wrote: "In relations with foreigners...we must seriously strive to ensure that our military strength is equal to theirs and that we can stand on our feet."⁴

To a significant extent, however, this policy was also aimed at the reinforcement of the Ch'ing regime for the more successful suppression of dissenters within the nation.

The events of the last few years in the PRC, including the years of the so-called "Cultural Revolution," have shown that the traditions of militarism and regionalism are still very much alive. As S. L. Tikhvinskiy accurately points out, many of the political concepts and even the terms now used in the PRC ("reliance on one's own strength," "good people are more valuable than weapons" and others), the priority given to the defense industry over civil industry, the establishment of military-police and ideological control over the population, the advocacy of extreme thrift, the arrogant chauvinistic attitudes toward everything foreign and other manifestations of this kind are rooted in the "self-aggrandizement" policy of the Manchurian-Chinese rulers of China.

Particular significance is given to China's contemporary history in S. L. Tikhvinskiy's book ("Problems in Chinese Contemporary History," pp 239-288). An appropriate position in the general composition of the work is also occupied by the chapter entitled "The Manchurian Revolutionary Base," which also concerns this period and in which the role and significance of this base in the victory of the Chinese Revolution itself is conclusively and clearly proved. The restoration of the historical truth about the events in Manchuria in the 1945-1949 period is truly of significance, not only for the history of the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people, but also for the refutation of the multitude of falsifications propounded by the Maoists in their attempt to belittle the significance of the internal factor in the victory of the Chinese Revolution in general, ignore or misrepresent the role of the USSR in the liberation of Manchuria and denigrate the significance of this battle in the attainment of the final victory in 1949. It is no secret that the role of the Manchurian revolutionary base has not been given the necessary emphasis in Chinese historical works on this period, even in the 1950's.⁵

In this chapter, the author presents a detailed description of the international nature of the Soviet Union's assistance and the significance of the USSR's historic victory in the Far East, which became a turning point in the history of East Asia and Southeast Asia and in the national liberation struggle on the Asian continent.

"The victory of the Chinese Revolution," a PRAVDA article written on the 28th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC stated, "was one of the outstanding results of the development of the world revolutionary process, which began with the Great October Socialist Revolution and the birth of the world's first socialist state. The victory of the Chinese people was partly a result of the defeat of Hitler's fascism in the West and Japanese imperialism in the East, the liberation of China's Northwest by the Soviet Army and the transformation of this most highly developed region in the industrial sense into a military-revolutionary base which played an enormous role in the victorious conclusion of the long struggle for independence."⁶

The work by O. Borisov,⁷ which is examined by S. L. Tikhvinskiy in his book, contains a logical denial of the anticommunist fabrications of bourgeois Sinologists, who misrepresent the nature and essence of the assistance given to the Chinese people by the Soviet Union, the selfless assistance received by the Chinese people on their difficult and long road to freedom. Soviet communists and the entire Soviet population believed it was their proletarian international duty to assist the Chinese people in the attainment of their great national objectives.

In recent years, historians in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have done an enormous amount of work to elaborate a fundamentally new system for classifying periods in China's contemporary history. Particularly great efforts in this field have been made by a group of Sinologists-historians, consisting of V. I. Glunin, A. M. Grigor'yev, K. V. Kukushkin and V. N. Nikiforov, who wrote "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya" [The Contemporary History of China]⁸—a book on the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people during the post-October period, the history of national economic reconstruction and the beginnings of socialist construction in the People's Republic of China. As S. L. Tikhvinskiy points out, there was an urgent need to revise the Maoist system of periodization in terms of "revolutionary wars." Analyzing the author's description of the process by which the national liberation and communist movements developed, he directs their attention to the fact that the book does not mention the objective difficulties encountered by the organizers of these movements in connection with the part played by Chinese militarists in the intervention against Soviet Russia. S. L. Tikhvinskiy reminds us of the nationalistic position occupied by Mao Tse-tung and his followers in connection with the beginning of the war in the Pacific in December 1941 and the transfer of Japan's major military efforts from the Chinese front to the Pacific Ocean. As we know, the Maoists, taking advantage of the difficult position of the party at that time, as well as of the fact that the attention of the entire international communist movement was riveted to the decisive front of the struggle against fascism—

the Soviet-German front, unleashed the nationalist "cheng-feng" campaign ("Rectification of Style") in the PRC, the major goals of which were the devastation of internationalist forces in the CCP, the modification of its ideological, theoretical and organizational principles and the complete subordination of the party to Mao Tse-tung and his group.

All of this led to the transformation of the CCP, which was already petty bourgeois in its makeup, into a party adhering to a nationalist, Maoist course.

As we know, the strategic situation in China changed dramatically after the Soviet Union entered the war.

The necessary international conditions were created for the victory of the Chinese Revolution. One of the most important factors contributing to the reinforcement of the PLA was the assistance given to Chinese democratic forces by the Soviet Union. In Manchuria, which was liberated by Soviet troops from the Japanese occupation forces and was returned to China, more stable regions took shape with a relatively developed industry, a strong rear (these regions were adjacent to the Soviet border) and with the opportunity to receive economic aid from the USSR and to train its personnel there.

The importance of the democratic reform carried out in the liberated regions of Manchuria would be difficult to overestimate. This is where the political and economic system of the future People's Republic of China was engendered.

The real patriots in China are well aware, even now, that the world's first socialist country sincerely performed its international duty, and their gratitude to the Soviet people for their selfless assistance will live forever in their hearts.

In the concluding chapter of the book, the author presents a thorough analysis of various periods in the development of historical science in the PRC. In particular, he analyzes the 1959-1965 period, which was characterized by stagnation in historical science in the PRC and by the publication of works containing obviously erroneous ideas of an idealistic and nationalist nature. The role of specific movements and individuals in Chinese history was reassessed. The special role played by China in world history was stressed and there was a marked tendency to glorify the historical figures who could reinforce the spirit of great-Han chauvinism—for example, the emperors who established centralized authority. At the same time, historical science in the PRC began to isolate itself more and more from Marxist science in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

During the years of the so-called "Cultural Revolution," Chinese historical science actually regressed, as all scientific and pedagogical activity by Chinese historians ceased; many of them fell out of favor or were simply deprived of the possibility of occupying themselves with the study of history.

After the "Cultural Revolution," when the publication of some historical journals in the PRC was resumed, articles appeared in these journals which were marked by their glorification of Chinese great-power hegemonism, their hatred for the Soviet Union and their falsification of historical facts. This was particularly clearly seen in the articles of historian Shih Chun (see pp 307-311).

S. L. Tikhvinskiy concentrates his attention on the exposure of these distortions of history and their authors.

The book contrasts the positions worked out by a collective of Soviet scholars, in which the profound adherence to party principles by Soviet historians was graphically illustrated, to the pseudo-Marxist, Maoist theory.

The book being reviewed was published in 1976. After Mao Tse-tung's death and the expulsion of Mao's widow, Chiang Ch'ing and her most influential supporters--Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen (the so-called "gang of four")--from the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee in October 1976, the new Peking leaders began to revise the domestic policy ideas and practical instructions of Mao Tse-tung. They restored the principle of financial incentives for labor in industry, which was earlier condemned as a manifestation of "bourgeois law"; they began to condemn the policy of many years' standing of persecuting the intelligentsia; they reestablished the system of university entrance examinations; they are beginning to reissue previously banned works of Chinese classical and modern literature. They have also begun to criticize some of the antiscientific historical theories of recent years, which are so brilliantly described and censured in S. L. Tikhvinskiy's work (the extra-historical interpretation of the struggle between the philosophical schools of the "legalists" and Confucians, the idealized interpretation of the personalities of ancient and medieval Chinese empresses, etc.). Therefore, we can quite confidently state that Soviet historical science has given a great deal of support to progressive forces in China by boldly defending Marxism-Leninism against the Maoist falsifiers of history. Consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism in historical science, Soviet Sinologists-historians are actively promoting the normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC and the restoration of friendship and good-neighbor relations between the Soviet and Chinese people; in doing this, they are guided by the decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, which reaffirmed the fact that the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC would correspond to the vital and long-term interests of those nations, the interests of world socialism and the interests of a stronger battle against imperialism.

There is no doubt that S. L. Tikhvinskiy's book will be quite useful in acquainting the reader with the scientific and objective approach to the complex issues in Chinese history and in giving him a better understanding of the long traditions of friendly and good-neighborly political, economic and cultural relations linking the Soviet and Chinese people. It will strike a blow at the falsifiers of history who are trying to denigrate the policy of the Soviet State.

It would not be out of place to remind the Maoist falsifiers of history that, immediately after its birth in October 1917, the young Nation of Soviets resolutely rejected the imperialist policy conducted by tsarism since the end of the 19th century and began to base its relations with China, just as with other nations, on the principles of peace, friendship and non-intervention in domestic affairs. Soviet Russia did not only cancel all of the predatory and inequitable agreements concluded with China by the tsarist government, but also began to give China active political, economic and military aid. It is particularly important that the Soviet Union assisted China precisely at those times when the Chinese people needed this assistance the most.

Invariably adhering to the Leninist policy of peace in international affairs, the Soviet Union is in favor of the genuine normalization of relations between China and the USSR and the settlement of all disputes in the spirit of cooperation and friendship.

A turn for the better in Soviet-Chinese relations would benefit both the Chinese and the Soviet people and the interests of worldwide socialism. "The fact that this kind of turn is possible is attested to by the experience in the development of relations between our countries, in the history of which one can find many glorious pages of revolutionary friendship and cooperation in the name of the cause of peace, national liberation, social programs and socialism."⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. S. L. Tikhvinskiy, "Istoriya Kitaya i sovremennoст'," Moscow, 1976.
2. IZVESTIYA, 2 November 1956; "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya. 1917-1957. [Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1917-1957], Moscow, 1959, p 322.
3. See "Opasnyy kurs" [A Dangerous Course], No 7, Moscow, 1976.
4. "The Letters of Tseng Kuo-fan," (no place, no date, ch 10, pp 5b-6a.
5. See "Modern and Contemporary Chinese History. A Brief Summary" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1950; "Review of Chinese Modern History," (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1956.
6. PRAVDA, 1 October 1977.
7. O. Borisov, "Sovetskiy Soyuz i man'chzhurskaya revolyutsionnaya baza. 1945-1949. K 30-letiyu rasgroma militaristskoy Yaponii" [The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base, 1945-1949. Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Defeat of Militaristic Japan], Moscow, 1975, p 221.

8. "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya (1917-1970)," Moscow, 1972.
9. PRAVDA, 1 October 1977.

8588
CSO: 1803

PROBLEMS OF STATE-MONOPOLY CAPITALISM IN JAPAN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 179-182

[Review by Professor K. M. Popov of the books "Gosudarstvo v ekonomike Yaponii" (The State in the Japanese Economy) by Ya. A. Pevzner, Moscow, Nauka, Main Editorial Office for Eastern Literature, 1976, 320 pages, and "Organizatsiya upravleniya ekonomikoy i gosudarstvom v Yaponii" (The Organization of Economic and Public Administration in Japan) by A. A. Prokhozhev, Moscow, Nauka, Main Editorial Office for Eastern Literature, 1977, 188 pages]

[Summary] During the process of the confrontation between the two worldwide social systems, the imperialist nations have been searching for ways of adapting to the new state of international affairs. Many Soviet works have been published on the role of the state in the capitalist countries, but most of the authors have concentrated only on Western Europe and the United States. Japan is usually given less attention. Japanese reference sources are also used in a limited way, even though progressive writers in Japan have made an important contribution to the study of this matter. The authors of both books being reviewed have spent a great deal of time analyzing Japanese literature by progressive and reactionary writers.

In his book, Professor Pevzner examines the state-monopolistic aspects of economic growth, the merging of the Japanese state structure with the monopolies, state finance and credit policy, state-monopolistic pricing procedures, the role of the state in foreign economic ties and state economic programs and forecasts.

Foreign bourgeois literature has contained a great deal about the accelerated development of the Japanese economy, but the postwar crises in this economy have been ignored. The author of this book demonstrates that the Japanese economy has not developed smoothly.

A. A. Prokhozhev's monograph concentrates on the severe crisis of 1973-1975 in the Japanese economy. The author examines such topics as state-monopolistic programming, the use of mathematical models in these programs, the foreign economic activity of the state, the activities of the research

base of the administration, the prospects for the development of a national system of technological information, the use of electronic computers in public administration, the development of automated control systems and the problem of specialist training.

The author stresses the fact that Japan is not only an importer of foreign technology but also an exporter of the achievements of Japanese science. This tendency began to develop rapidly in the early 1970's, and Japan's main customers are the developing countries.

Prokhozhev also discusses the practice of "planning" in Japan. In contrast to the socialist concept of the plan as law, the capitalist plan is regarded as only an estimate. The author shows how all "plans" are regularly revised on the basis of market conditions, the state of the finance and credit mechanism and the state of production.

Prokhozhev goes on to shatter the technocratic illusions that are being widely propagandized in Japan and abroad in regard to the transformation of Japan into a "highly developed industrial society" by the end of this century, a society characterized by "harmony between labor and capital" and ruled by a "technocratic elite." This "theory," which was adopted mainly from the United States, was completely refuted by the crisis of 1973-1975.

8588
CSO: 1805

COURSE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC INTEREST

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 182-185

[Review by M. S. Ukrantsev of the book "Vneshnyaya politika Kitaya 1969-1976. Osnovnyye faktory i vedushchiye tendentsii" (China's Foreign Policy, 1969-1976. Chief Factors and Major Tendencies) by B. Koloskov, Moscow, 1977, 328 pages]

[Text] The progressive public and peace-loving forces throughout the world are uneasily observing the course of events in China and the international actions of the Peking leaders. Contrary to the hopes and desires of the world public and to the increasing tendency toward international detente, the top leaders in Peking have been conducting an openly instigative policy for several years now with the aim of sabotaging the policy of disarmament, sowing enmity between states and provoking a new world war.

The actions of the new leaders, who came to power in China after Mao Tse-tung's death, conclusively prove that they have completely taken over the previous hegemonic course directed against the interests of socialism, the international workers' and national liberation movements, all progressive forces and the cause of world peace. Unsatisfied with their previous "achievements," the present Peking leaders are conducting an increasingly reactionary course in international affairs and are clearly revealing the anti-Marxist essence of their policy.

Under these conditions, the struggle against Maoism is not only an exceedingly important factor contributing to the unification of all revolutionary forces, but also one of the basic elements of the struggle for peace and national liberation.

"Vneshnyaya politika Kitaya 1969-1976," a book written by famous Soviet Sinologist B. Koloskov and published in a mass edition, reveals the reactionary essence of Peking's actions in the international arena and analyzes the basic tendencies in the Chinese leadership's activity in recent years.

Many Soviet works concerning Chinese issues have illuminated particular aspects of Peking's international activity. The author of the book being reviewed has set himself a more extensive and exceedingly important task:

To summarize and analyze the basic tendencies and trends in this activity in recent years on the basis of abundant factual material. One of the new book's distinctive features is its examination of foreign policy issues in their interaction with, and interdependence on, the domestic political problems of present-day China.

The author's analysis of the evolution of Peking's foreign policy after 1969--that is, after the results of the "Cultural Revolution" were formally announced at the Ninth CCP Congress (April 1969)--is of exceptional importance for the comprehension and prediction of the Chinese leaders' international activities. It was precisely during this period that the basic principles of Peking's current foreign policy doctrine were most clearly formulated, established and implemented. This process ultimately "led to radical and fundamental changes in the goals and objectives of the PRC's international activity, as a result of which this activity became associated with the position occupied by the most extreme reactionary forces throughout the world" (p 325).

The precise system proposed by the author for the categorization of Peking's foreign policy activities during the 1969-1976 period makes it possible to trace the stage-by-stage modification of the Chinese leaders' views in accordance with their gradual departure from confrontations with imperialism and concentration on struggle against the USSR and the other socialist countries. This tendency in the policy of the Peking leaders began to make itself apparent even during the first stage in this period (April-September 1969). Despite the pointed and even hysterical statements made at the Ninth CCP Congress in reference to objectives in the struggle against imperialism, "the anti-imperialist and anti-American theme at the Ninth Congress," as the author correctly points out, "was, as it were, secondary, or at least not the main topic of discussion.... If we take deeds rather than words into account, the focal point of the congress' foreign policy program, its main essence, was unbridled, frenzied anti-Sovietism" (p 11).

Therefore, by the end of the 1960's, Peking had quite openly defined its "enemy No 1"--the Soviet Union--even though it externally retained its slogan of "struggle on two fronts"--against the USSR and the United States. The Chinese leaders have used anti-Sovietism more and more for the purpose of worming their way into the confidence of the imperialist states and diverting attention away from Peking's aggressive and instigative policy which endangers the people of the world.

The unpopularity of the extremist slogans of the "Cultural Revolution" and the Chinese leaders' desire to bring the nation out of international isolation forced these leaders, just a few months after the Ninth Congress, to resort to a gradual revision of their foreign policy views. During the second stage (from September 1969 to September 1971), the Maoist leaders occupied themselves with an intensive search for methods and ways of compensating for the negative results of their "Red Guard diplomacy." During this stage--the stage defined by the author as the period during

which foreign policy was "put in order"--the Maoist leaders adopted a more flexible course, agreeing to a minimal normalization of intergovernmental relations with the USSR, narrowing the sphere of its intervention in the domestic affairs of the Third World countries, surveying the possibilities for relations with some capitalist countries and so forth. As B. Koloskov conclusively shows, however, these actions by the Chinese leaders did not in any way represent evidence of a genuine desire to accept the new alignment of forces in the world or the policy of peaceful coexistence and detente. Peking's activity during this period in almost all regions of the world was aimed only at reinforcing its own positions and inflicting as much serious harm as possible on the positions of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.

The reactionary essence of the Chinese leaders' policy was graphically illustrated by their attitude toward the treaties concluded in 1970 and 1971 between the USSR and the FRG and Poland and the FRG, as well as the quadripartite protocol on West Berlin. The conclusion of these agreements, which legally secured certain principles of relations between the European states, such as the inviolability of territorial boundaries and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, was of tremendous significance in the normalization of the situation in Europe and the relaxation of international tension. The Maoists, however, have taken a negative view of these peaceable documents and have allied themselves with the most inveterate revanchists in the FRG and with reactionaries in other capitalist countries. The author of the book is absolutely correct in noting that the final goals of the Peking leaders "are...the goals of opponents of the cause of peace, security and cooperation in Europe" (p 145).

One of the specific features of the period examined in the second chapter of the work was the Maoist's construction of a "theoretical" basis for their foreign policy. The policy of the Ninth Congress with its "ultrarevolutionary" aims and slogans corresponded less and less to Peking's international policy which was shifting more and more to the right. "The new guidelines for practical policy," the author notes, "require their own separate 'theoretical' and propagandistic grounds, and the work in this field continued for the entire period during which PRC foreign policy was 'put in order' after the Cultural Revolution" (p 166).

As a "theoretical" basis for their renovated foreign policy, the Maoists began in the early 1970's to utilize and widely publicize the idea of the "two superpowers" and the theory of "intermediate zones," which were first advanced by Mao Tse-tung as early as 1946 and were later developed by the Peking leaders. The advancement of "theories" of this kind, which totally rejected the class approach to the resolution of international problems, demonstrated the Peking leaders' further departure from Marxism-Leninism. The need to implant the theory of "intermediate zones" was dictated by the fact that "Chinese foreign policy had to take a new step in the direction of its reorientation toward the capitalist world. Projected changes essentially consisted in the actual rejection of struggle against 'two enemies'--the United States and the USSR--and the concentration of all efforts on confrontation with the Soviet Union" (p 171).

The "September Crisis" of 1971, which resulted, as the author states, in the ousting of some Chinese leaders who advocated a more cautious course in Sino-Soviet relations, marked the beginning of a new stage in Peking's foreign policy activity. This stage (from September 1971 to August 1973) is discussed in the third chapter of the monograph.

The 1971-1973 period was marked by the great successes of progressive forces in the struggle for international detente and in the implementation of the Program of Peace advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress. Soviet-American summit talks had a tremendous positive effect on the world situation. The agreements concluded as a result of these talks showed that relations could be improved and businesslike cooperation could be established between the largest world powers in spite of the differences in their social systems. One particularly important agreement resulting from these talks was the one in which both sides concurred that peaceful coexistence is the only possible basis for the maintenance of relations between the two states in the nuclear age. The GDR-FRG treaty and the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation marked important stages in the consolidation of peace in Europe. The regulation of the Vietnam issue and positive changes in the atmosphere throughout Indochina represented a significant contribution to the reinforcement of peace in Asia and the consolidation of the security of all people. Talks in Simla established a basis for the normalization of relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and this was an important stage in the reinforcement of peace and stability in South Asia. These positive changes provided a dramatic contrast to the foreign policy activity of Peking, which was still conducting a course directed against the peace and security of peoples and toward the sabotage of detente.

The United Nations became one of the central arenas chosen by the Chinese leaders for a demonstration of their foreign policy positions. The PRC's rights in this organization were reinstated in October 1971 as a result of 22 years of consistent and principled struggle on the part of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. From the very first days of its presence in this most representative international organization, the PRC delegation tried to turn it into "a pulpit for preaching Maoism and for spreading its methods of undercover intrigue, unbridled demagogic, blackmail and unprincipled maneuvers to the activities of the United Nations" (p 189). By torpedoing the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, aimed at arms limitation, nuclear test bans and so forth, Peking again demonstrated the inconsistency between the principles of its own foreign policy doctrine and the interests of the world public. The PRC's refusal to vote on the declaration granting independence to the colonial nations and peoples, its use of the veto during the discussion of the UN membership of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, its negative position during the discussion of Middle Eastern issues and other actions of this kind ultimately reveal the differences in the views of the Maoist leadership and those of the developing countries and demonstrated Peking's unprincipled approach to the resolution of international problems. The

PRC's first 2 years in the United Nations showed, as the author points out, that "the Maoist leaders were unable to create a broad and stable pro-Peking bloc in this organization, which they had hoped to use as a weapon" (p 198). Nonetheless, the UN rostrum is still being used by the Maoists to counteract detente and provoke conflicts between nations.

One of the noticeable features of Peking's foreign policy activity in the 1971-1973 period was its earnest attempt at convergence with the capitalist countries. The Peking leaders do not conceal the fact that they are striving to conduct relations with this group of nations on an anti-Soviet basis, and, while the anti-Soviet aspect remained relatively camouflaged during Peking's establishment of ties with the United States, in relations with Western Europe "the Chinese leaders have openly proposed that the central goal be... the unification of the Western European capitalist states in some kind of military and political bloc which would not merely oppose the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries but would wage an active offensive struggle against them" (p 222). While moving in this direction, Peking has unashamedly reversed its previous negative evaluations of the role of the Common Market and NATO. In working toward their goals, the Maoists have extensively propagandized the thesis that "Western Europe is being threatened by 'Soviet aggression,' against which the 'free world' must mobilize all of its strength and resources" (p 229).

At the same time, the Chinese leaders are striving to misrepresent the activities and true nature of the Warsaw Pact Organization and CEMA and are making every effort to "discredit these organizations which serve as the basis for military, political and economic cooperation by the fraternal socialist nations, impede their further reinforcement and thereby diminish the strength of the socialist community" (p 249).

The reactionary, instigative foreign policy of the Peking leaders was further developed at the Tenth CCP Congress (August 1973), which marked the beginning of the last stage of the period examined in the book.

International detente, which has become the chief tendency in today's world, is canceling Peking's opportunities for realizing its hegemonic ambitions and is making it difficult to preserve the atmosphere of a "besieged fortress" in the nation and to justify deprivations in the interest of the Maoist leadership. It was precisely for this reason that speakers at the Tenth Congress called detente a "temporary and superficial phenomenon" and declared that the future development of international affairs would bring "colossal upheavals." The position taken by the Peking leaders, which was formulated in the official congress documents, clearly showed the entire world that the course toward the unleashing of world war had become the "focal point of the Chinese leadership's international activity" and that "Maoist China had become one of the main sources of military danger in the world arena." (pp 262-263).

In 1975, the Maoist thesis of the inevitability of war became part of the basis of the foreign policy program proclaimed from the rostrum of a National People's Congress session and was legally secured in the PRC Constitution. Article 10 of the first chapter of the Basic Law of the PRC frankly declares that "the policy of the state is to...encourage preparations in the event of war." One of the characteristic features of the foreign policy program of the new constitution is its anti-Soviet orientation. The statements made by Chinese leaders about the "Soviet threat," the "threat from the North" and the "aggressive plans" of the Soviet Union have the purpose of misrepresenting the peaceable goals and objectives of the Soviet State's foreign policy.

An analysis of Chinese foreign policy from 1969 to April 1976 conclusively demonstrates that all of the Maoist's international actions have been subordinate to the realization of the great-power, chauvinist, hegemonic plans of the ruling clique. The Peking leaders have been willing to resort to any means or methods for the attainment of their own goals. Using the camouflage of revolutionary phrases, they have conducted a course which is radically contrary to the ideals of socialism and the interests of peace and public security. The more the words and deeds of the Maoist leaders have diverged, however, the more obvious the reactionary essence of their policy has become and the more closely they have allied themselves with the positions of reactionary circles in the capitalist countries. Describing the position of the Maoists, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev stressed the following in his report at the 25th CPSU Congress: "It is now no longer enough to say that Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They are overtly hostile to it."¹

B. T. Kolcskov's book, in which the reactionary nature of Peking's foreign policy is logically revealed from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, represents an important contribution to the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism and against the Chinese leaders' course toward the sabotage of international detente and the provocation of a new world war--a course which endangers all the people of the world.

8588
CSO: 1805

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 11.

NEW PLATFORM OF JAPANESE SOCIAL-REFORMISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 185-189

[Review by I. A. Tsvetova of the book "In the Interests of a New Policy: My Beliefs and Feelings" by Saburo Eda, Tokyo, Nihon Hyoronsha, 1977, 217 pages]

[Summary] An ideological and political struggle broke out in the mid-1970's between the right and left wings of the Japan Socialist Party. The leader of the reformist right wing was Saburo Eda, the author of the work being reviewed. This work, published shortly before Eda's death, represents an apology for contemporary social-reformism. The author sets forth his ideological and political views in their entirety.

In the first and main part of the book, the author explains his theories concerning the gradual social transformation of Japanese society. The second part includes several of Eda's articles, previously published in the 1960's and 1970's. The third part consists of some of his notes and memoranda, included at the publisher's request.

A large part of the book is taken up by criticism of real socialism and by the denigration of socialism as an ideal. History makes it impossible for the author to completely deny the successes of socialism throughout the world, attained through the creative use of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and for this reason, the author implies that Marxism-Leninism and the experience accumulated in socialist revolution and the construction of socialism in the USSR are supposedly of limited significance and are only applicable to backward nations.

In the author's view, the path toward socialism is one of constructive reformist policies which meet the requirements of the time. He advocates a continuous and uninterrupted process of reform. He opposes the total liquidation of capitalist ownership of the means of production, frankly asserting that large-scale nationalization is "a big minus" since it excludes the possibility of free competition.

Eda also presents his views on the creation of a coalition government in Japan. He alleges that the Japan Communist Party cannot be part of this

coalition because it is precisely this party that is the reason for the lack of unity in the progressive camp. At the same time, he cannot completely ignore the benefits of cooperation with the socialists and communists and, for this reason, he recommends that the method of "cooperation at a distance" be used in working with the Japan Communist Party.

The author makes several statements about Japanese foreign policy, particularly in regard to the desirability of relations with the United States and the PRC. He demands that the Japan Socialist Party establish a liaison channel with the United States and even advocates much closer relations with the PRC. Obviously, Eda's visit to China in June 1976 caused a dramatic change in his attitude toward Peking's attempts to include the "hegemony clause" in the Japanese-Chinese treaty on peace and friendship. Two years ago, Eda was suspicious of this move, but, in this work, he completely supports the anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leaders.

8588

CSO: 1805

MACHINERY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN IMPERIAL CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 189-192

[Review by L. S. Perelomov, doctor of historical sciences, of the book "Imperatorskiy Kitay v nachale XV v. (vnutrennyaya politika)" (Imperial China at the Beginning of the 15th Century [Domestic Policy]) by A. A. Bokshchanin, Moscow, 1976, 323 pages]

[Summary] Many works have been written on 14th century China. The events of this period--the collapse of the Mongol feudal empire and the various activities of Chu Yuan-chang, founder of the new Ming Dynasty--have attracted the attention of many researchers. The after-effects of these events and the further evolution of the changes in Chinese sociopolitical life have been largely ignored to date. A. A. Bokshchanin's book will fill this gap.

The author analyzes the political crisis in China in the beginning of the 15th century, the relationship between the central authorities and regional powers, the workings of the machinery of state, the agrarian policy of the government and its effect on the development of crafts, trade and finance, the state of the empire's military forces, the ethnic policy of the Chinese authorities and their suppression of popular movements.

The introduction contains a review of the reference sources used by the author. In the first chapter, the author describes the state of affairs ensuing in the Ming Dynasty as a result of Chu Yuan-chang's systematic autocratic policies. The next chapter contains a detailed analysis of the ideological arguments put forth by the two opposing sides in the Chingnang War, particularly during the main campaigns of 1399-1402. In the next chapter, the author describes the methods by which one government was overthrown and replaced by another. The rest of the book is concerned with the means chosen by the new Chu Ti Government to stabilize the situation in the nation.

The author demonstrates that this period was not at all a time of class peace. Popular uprisings in various parts of the empire erupted almost annually. The government took measures to prevent them, including threats and military force. The Chu Ti Government was even harsher in its treatment of the liberation movement of the non-Chinese population of some parts of the empire.

REMARKABLE PAGE IN THE HISTORY OF THE CIS-AMUR ZONE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 192-194

[Review by E. F. Drozdov of the book "Untovoye voysko" by V. A. Sergeyev, Ulan-Ude, Buryatskoye knizhnoye izdatel'stvo, 1976, 662 pages]

[Summary] Victor Aleksandrovich Sergeyev is famous in the Buryatskaya ASSR as a journalist, translator and novelist. His latest novel, "Untovoye voysko," is set in this region in the mid-19th century. The events of this time are presented from two viewpoints: One is external and official, encompassing the entire situation in Europe and the Far East. The other is internal and personal—the viewpoint of the inhabitants of this region.

In this book, Sergeyev demonstrates his talent for in-depth historical analysis and his ability to describe events and characters in such a way that they come to life. His style can best be described as documentary prose illuminated by artistic intuition.

Because of a series of historically determined injustices, Russia was virtually left without access to the Pacific at the end of the 17th century. By the mid-19th century this zone became the scene of important events and the center of activity by the Western powers; this was as dangerous for Russia as for China. The situation called for wise decisions, bold actions and patriotic enthusiasm. V. A. Sergeyev masterfully explains the complex reversals in the relations between Russia and China and in Peking's policy, never departing from historical truth and always displaying respect for the Chinese people. He describes the particulars of public life with the precision of a sociologist and the creativity of a true master. Through the example of dozens of lifelike characters and hundreds of events, V. A. Sergeyev illustrates an important truth: The development of the Amur region became possible because the Russian people embarked on this course with the participation and support of the native population of this zone.

8585
CSO: 1805

YOUTH IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS, PEACE AND SECURITY

Moscow PROBLEMY DNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 195-197

[Article by Yu. M. Ryakin]

Summary An international convention, entitled "October and Youth" and commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, was held in Leningrad on 22-25 November 1977. The convention was attended by representatives of youth and student organizations in more than 100 countries. The chief topics of discussion at the convention were the struggle of progressive youth for democracy, genuine national independence and social progress and youth's fight against colonialism and neocolonialism.

At the opening session on 22 November, G. V. Romanov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Oblkom, read a welcome message addressed to forum participants by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev.

One of the events at the convention was a conference on "October, Today's World and Youth." Speakers at this conference noted the tremendous effects of the October Revolution on the entire course of world history and analyzed the changes taking place in the world today as a result of the victory of this revolution.

The majority of the world's population is now represented by persons under 25 years of age. For this reason youth must take a more active part in the present struggle of progressive forces against reaction. Success in the achievement of international detente provides a more optimistic view of the fate of the present and future generations than ever before. And it is no coincidence that it is precisely the young people of the world who are insisting on peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial international cooperation.

Conference participants continued their work in three discussion groups entitled "Great October and the Role of Youth in the Socioeconomic and Political Life of Society," "Great October and Youth's Part in the Struggle for

Peace, International Security, the Cessation of the Arms Race and the Development of International Cooperation" and "Great October and Its Influence on the Development of the National Liberation Movement." In these discussion groups, exceedingly important issues were debated, including the current state of international relations, the process of international detente and the importance of eliminating the threat of war. Many participants in these discussions cited specific examples of Soviet assistance to the revolutionary and national liberation movement and criticized those who tried to misrepresent and distort the policy of the Soviet Union.

Those who attended the convention were particularly concerned about the present situation in Asia and the problem of consolidating peace and security on this continent. Speakers pointed out the fact that the glorious victory of the Indochinese people has improved the atmosphere considerably throughout Asia. Progressive youth wishes to turn Asia into a continent of lasting peace and security and sees the main obstacle to this in the United States' maintenance of military bases in this region. Another obstacle is seen in the imperialist plan for American-Japanese military integration with the involvement of South Korea. This sinister alliance can only militarize Japan and is not in the interest of the Japanese people.

898
CSO: 1805

MEETING COMMEMORATING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CANTON COMMUNE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 197-198

Article by B. K. Chizhov

Summary On 12 December 1977, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society and the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences held a meeting to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Canton Commune. The meeting was attended by members of the society, scholars, representatives of the capital's public, relatives of the Soviet consular personnel who died in Canton in 1927 and Chinese diplomatic representatives. This was one of a series of events organized by the society to commemorate memorable dates in the history of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle. All of these events, which have included many evening meetings devoted to the discussion of Chinese classical poetry and art, attest to the Soviet public's tremendous and unflagging interest in the life of the Chinese people and their rich heritage.

A moment of silence was observed in memory of the Soviet consular personnel brutally murdered in Canton by Chinese counterrevolutionaries.

The event known as the Canton Commune took place on 11 December 1927 in Canton, a city famous for its revolutionary tradition. The program of the Canton Commune called for the transfer of all authority to worker, peasant and soldier councils, the nationalization of capitalist property, the distribution of land to the peasants and a struggle against imperialism in concert with the USSR and the world proletariat.

V. I. Glunin, doctor in historical sciences and sector head at the Institute of the Far East presented a speech on the Canton Commune, describing the heroic events of those days, the political situation before and after the uprising, and the assistance provided by the Soviet people with their unflagging devotion to their international duty.

The rebellion in Canton ended tragically; after two days of bloody battles, it was suppressed by the Chinese militarists with imperialist support. It did, however, teach a valuable lesson and it demonstrated the best qualities of the Chinese proletariat--its unlimited courage, its willingness to sacrifice itself for the sake of freedom, and its revolutionary enthusiasm.

FROM POSITIONS OF INTERNATIONALISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 198-201

[Summary] The Soviet people's desire for friendship with the population of China has always been the focal point of the Chinese policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. On 2 December 1977, Soviet specialists who assisted in the implementation of the PRC's first five-year plans gathered to reminisce about their days in China. They spoke of the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation in which they worked with the Chinese during the period of the PRC's establishment and development.

The economic and technological assistance of the USSR was of historic significance for the Chinese people at this time. When foreign capital penetrated China in the second half of the 19th century, it had no interest in the true development of the nation. It was only attracted by the possibility of using China's natural resources and mercilessly exploiting the Chinese workers. Prior to the victory of the people's revolution, the Chinese economy was of a clearly colonial, dependent nature.

During the years of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), the colonial nature of this economy was overcome and a comprehensive industrial system was established. This work was carried out by the Chinese people with the aid of the Soviet Union and the Soviet specialists who worked selflessly in the PRC. At this time, 211 industrial facilities were built with Soviet assistance. Over a period of 10 years, the Soviet Union sent more than 10,800 of its specialists to China.

At the end of the 1950's, however, Soviet aid began to be belittled and misrepresented in China. The Chinese leaders tried to blame the Soviet specialists for the failure of the "Great Leap Forward." In 1960 the Soviet Government had to recall its specialists from China.

The Soviet specialists who worked in China during the 1950's were deeply impressed by the enthusiasm of the Chinese people and their friendly feelings for the Soviet Union. Total mutual understanding, trust and respect were the keynotes of their joint work with the Chinese. For these reasons, the Soviet People believe that the glorious traditions of friendship between the people of these two countries will be revived.

IN MEMORY OF YURIY VLADIMIROVICH NOVGORODSKIY (1928-1977)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 202-203

Summary When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the news of this event was received enthusiastically by the entire Soviet population. For Sinology students this news was a cause for celebration. They were aware of the need for specialists in the establishment of friendly relations between our nation and the new Chinese Republic and in the rendering of fraternal assistance to China in all areas of political, economic and cultural construction. One of these students was Yuriy Vladimirovich Novgorodskiy, who was given extensive opportunities to take a direct part in the monumental historical events of that time.

As a Chinese interpreter, Yu. V. Novgorodskiy was sent to work at the Central Komsomol School. At the same time, he was admitted to post-graduate studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Here he worked on a linguistic analysis of Chinese dialects. Because of his boundless energy, he was able to combine this work with service to the state as an interpreter. In addition to this, he wrote articles on various fields of Chinese science and assisted in the compilation of a Chinese-Russian dictionary.

After completing his post-graduate studies, he continued his research work and simultaneously served as the assistant executive secretary of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries. In 1958, he was appointed the executive secretary of Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. He spoke to the workers on the Wuhan Metallurgical Combine at a meeting commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, organized Chinese exhibits in Moscow, wrote newspaper articles protesting the proliferation of atomic weapons and presented theoretical reports on Socialist construction in China.

In the early 1960's, Sinology became one of the foremost areas of the ideological struggle against the Chinese leaders' anti-Marxist and anti-socialist deviations from the coordinated line of the international workers and communist movement. Yu. V. Novgorodskiy became actively involved in the translation and study of reference works in China's contemporary history.

"From 1972 on Yu. V. Novgorodskiy made several trips to China in the capacity of an expert with the Soviet Government delegation at the border negotiations in Peking. Yuriy Vladimirovich continued this work until the end of his life. Although he was a senior research associate specializing in Chinese dialects, a candidate of philological sciences and the translator of a vast number of Chinese works and materials, he never shut himself up in an office. His knowledge always served the resolution of the most important problems. This is how Yu. V. Novgorodskiy performed his duty as a communist, citizen and scholar. "In Response to the Party's Appeal and the Heart's Bidding"--this was the title of one of his works and these same words could be used to describe his entire life which came abruptly to an end so prematurely."

8588
CSO: 1805

IN MEMORY OF IVAN FEDOROVICH KURDYUKOV (1911-1977)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 204-205

Summary Ivan Fedorovich Kurdyukov, prominent diplomat, famous Sinologist, retired ambassador and member of the CPSU since 1928, died on 3 October 1977 after a prolonged illness.

I. F. Kurdyukov was born in 1911 in what is now the Mordovskaya ASSR. He began working at the age of 11 as a farm laborer. After he graduated from the Institute of Oriental Studies in 1936, he worked for the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. During his more than 40 years of diplomatic work, he served his nation in various capacities, including positions as the vice-consul and general consul in Soviet diplomatic offices in China, head of the Far East Division of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, senior advisor to the USSR Representation to the United Nations and Soviet ambassador to Australia and Uganda.

I. F. Kurdyukov worked in China for more than 10 years (1936-1948). He kept a close watch on the stormy events of the period when China was at war with Japan and when the revolutionary movement gained strength in the PRC. These observations resulted in a series of articles, brochures and other publications on China and Soviet-Chinese relations. These works reflect the author's excellent knowledge of his subject, his respect for the hard-working Chinese people and their history and culture and his sincere concern for the fate of the Chinese national liberation and revolutionary movements.

Much of I. F. Kurdyukov's strength and energy was devoted to the training of young diplomats. He generously shared his knowledge with them and taught them to work wholeheartedly to promote the cause of our party and state and to selflessly serve the Soviet people. His diplomatic and social activities were highly commended by the party and government. He was decorated with the orders of the "Labor Red Banner" and "Red Star" and many medals.

This remarkable man will always live in the memories of his friends and his comrades in the Soviet Union and abroad.

NEW BOOKS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1978 pp 206-207

[List of new books on Far East, with publication data and description of contents]

[Not translated by JPRS]

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka", 1978

8588

CSO: 1805

- END -

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

25 Mar 78